If the war had not started until December 1941: Part II – Aircraft Carriers

Same Intro as Part I - I recently started looking at the issue of what would have happened if a second 'Munich Agreement' in 1939... a 'Warsaw Agreement' perhaps (presumably because France and perhaps a couple of Dominions refused to support a declaration of war), meant that Britain and France did not actually declare war on Germany on September 3, 1939. 

Might the World War have started in December 1941 instead? Probably not, but that needs explaining. It looks like being a fun topic, but it requires a lot of background. So I thought I would start with an analysis of where naval power would be in December 1941 if the European powers had not kicked off early. Even that is too big a bite for one go, so part I looked at Battleships, and Part II will just looks at aircraft carriers. (I will also look at land and air power in another article, then consider how – or if – any war might have developed on that basis as I progress.) 

If the war had not started until December 1941: Part II – Aircraft Carriers

Britain entered the war in September 1939 with 7 aircraft carriers (Argus, Hermes, Eagle, Furious, Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal), of which the last four were fast, 30 knot plus, well equipped models, with significant antiaircraft firepower. A fifth, Eagle, was also a proper fleet carrier, but at 24 knots only as fast as the older 21, 23 or 24 knot battleships – which admittedly included every pre 1939 British or American battleship – so she could continue to work with the battle-fleet at least. Whereas Argus and Hermes were little better than escort or training carriers: and in practice spent most of the war on ferry or escort duties, with only brief roles as operational carriers. 

So let's look at 1939 for the Americans and Japanese. In 1939 America had two big Lexington carriers and the newly commissioned Yorktown and Enterprise, plus the failed experiment Ranger, while Japan had two big old Akagi/Kaga carriers, two smaller modern ones (Hiryu and Soryu), a their own little experimental one (Hoshu). So four and a bit carriers each compared to the British five and two bits in September 1939. All 3 navies were using a mixture of biplanes and some pretty unimpressive monoplanes in 1939 (see my article on naval aircraft here). 

Myths

To knock off a much misunderstood issue early, the main reason British carriers carried less planes per tonnage than the equivalent American or Japanese carriers was twofold. 

A) British carriers in general were more heavily constructed, protected, fire-safe, and armoured. No British carrier had the structural or seakeeping problems that bedevilled Shoho and Ranger (though Argus was really not a fleet carrier either); none were knocked out of service by storms like a Princeton or even an Essex (at least not after the curved bow doors of courageous were welded shut!); none were unable to fly off in anything other than calm weather like the soon to be completed Wasp. Most British carriers also tended to have considerably more fuel safety and fire suppressions systems, (to the point that when the first American built escort carriers arrived they were rushed straight into dock for extra safety fit-outs before being considered fit for operations). Though as a byproduct, no RN carrier carried anywhere like the amount of fuel for operations as many American and Japanese carriers.

B) the British also considered permanent Pacific style deck-parks completely unsuitable for Atlantic conditions, or indeed too dangerous for continental waters too close to enemy airbases like the Mediterranean. 

(Noticeably, British carriers deployed to the Indian or Pacific oceans quickly adopted deck parks for air wings on average 50% larger than their ‘designed capacity’, coming much closer to Japanese and American ‘designed capacity’. But also note that most carriers lost to air attack in the Pacific suffered explosions amongst such deck-parks, or in un-armoured hangars, while British carriers in the Mediterranean and Pacific regularly survived bombings because their aircraft were hidden away under armour. A bomb hit on a plane on the deck of any Japanese or American carrier, usually led to fires that often put the entire air group out of operation, if not outright disabling or sinking the ship. A bomb hit on a British carrier usually left the majority of the air-group relatively untouched, and the ship able to resume combat operations. To paraphrase one American observer in 1945 "A Kamikaze hit on a US carrier puts it in dry-dock for 6 months... whereas on a British carrier it's a case of 'sweepers, man your brooms'...") 

Also note that when 'Halsey's Typhoon' hit the Pacific optomised US fleet, the USN had 30+ ships damaged , with 9 requiring major repair (see Princeton and Essex class ships put out of action) and 3 sunk, and 145 or so planes destroyed. When Halsey radioed the British Pacific Fleet asking about storm damage, the somewhat cheeky reply from an Atlantic optomised force was "what storm?". (In reality a couple of dozen RN planes were damaged or written off when their tie-downs broke, but nothing worse than that.)

So the designed 'under-cover' aircraft numbers listed for British carriers usually went up by 50% once deck parks were used in the Indian or Pacific Oceans. Illustrious, Victorious and Formidable, designed for 36 under armour, carried 54 aircraft in the Pacific. Indomitable, designed for 48, carried 72, as presumably would Courageous and Glorious had they survived for work in the Pacific. Implacable and Indefatigable, designed for 54 under armour, carried 81. And Ark Royal, theoretically designed for 72, but really suitable for 60 under cover, presumably could also have carried about 80 or 90 in the Pacific. 

(Perhaps it should also be noted that, regardless of supposed design numbers, ships like Saratoga, Yorktown, Wasp, Akagi, Soryu and Shokaku – all of them designed for 80 - 100 aircraft in ideal conditions, usually actually operated about 65-75 aircraft in Pacific actions like Coral Sea and Midway. Although accepted numbers vary a little: at Coral Sea Lexington had 69 and Yorktown had 66, while Shokaku had 66 and Zuikaku 65. At Midway the Yorktown class - design 96 - actually carried, Yorktown 71, Enterprise 78, and Hornet 76. From the Japanese end the numbers at Midway were Akagi 60, and Kaga 71, Hiryu 54 and Soryu 56. Later in the war – when the percentage of smaller and lighter fighters over heavier attack aircraft went from a starting 25%-30% to an eventual 75% - 80% – obviously the total numbers carried went up a bit. Theoretical number capacity and actual numbers used operationally vary a lot.)

RN carriers in 1939 

So in 1939 these 7 available carriers were only inadequate for British needs because the oldest two were outdated experimental models (rather like the USS Ranger, or the Japanese Hosho), so they should not really count as proper fleet carriers. The Eagle, although a good conversion design. was a bit small and a bit slow, and Furious, though fast, was also a bit small. Really leaving only Ark Royal, Courageous and Glorious as proper modern fleet carriers. (Note - Courageous lost 1939, Glorious 1940, Ark Royal 1941... Meant that situation didn't actually improve much despite commissioning of Illustrious, Formidable, Victorious and Indomitable during the same period...)

Under the DRC (Defence Requirements Committee 1935) fleet requirement for 10 modern aircraft carriers, the 1936 program saw the first 2 Illustrious laid down, with another 2 in 1937, a fifth – plus the support carrier Unicorn – in 1938, and a final Illustrious in 1939. 2 more were planned in each of the 1940 and 1941 programs, allowing all the 'over age' – over 25 years old – designs to not be included in that '10 modern' list by about 1944. (Though Courageous and Glorious at least were likely to be modernised rather than scrapped, even if Furious and Eagle were retired to training carriers, with Hermes and Argus completely scrapped or put in reserve.)

But the NSF (New Standard Fleet 1938) plan lifted the requirement to 15 modern aircraft carriers, which would have seen an extra fleet carrier, or two, ordered in each of the 1939, 1940, and 1941 programs, with presumably another 1 or 2 more for the 1942 plan. (With further modernised designs taking advantage of the naval escalation limits being dropped, to lift the 23,000 ton standard/ 28,000 ton full load limits of the Illustrious class to more like the 27,000 tons standard/ 33,000 ton full load of the Essex class.) 

Given that the heavily armoured Eurocentric Illustrious design varied from the Pacific oriented Ark Royal because of the perceived need for heavier armour for Mediterranean operations, it is also sensible to think the 6 extra 'Eurocentric' fleet carriers becoming available by 1941 would have allowed for a more Pacific friendly design on the next 5 or 6. Presume larger ships with bigger air-groups but somewhat reduced hangar armour. (See the Audacious class for what really happened in the 1941 program, but in that case only after the 2 year order holiday caused by the 1939 start. The Audacious were 'improved Implacable's with proper double hangars', and should actually have been started in the 1940 program, and half complete by a December 1941 start to the war.)

RN build progress in December 1941

Had Britain entered the war in December 1941 they would have also had the 4 Illustrious class - Illustrious & Victorious (1936 program), Formidable (all 28,000 ton full load), & upgrade design I - Indomitable (1937 - 30,000 tons) - and probably Unicorn (1938 - a 20,000 ton 'maintenance carrier'), already in service. With the upgrade II ships - Indefatigable (1938 - 32,000 ton) about to commission, and Implacable (first of 5 in the 1939 plan) working up. 

The other two 1939 program upgrade II Illustrious ships from the 1936 DRC plan - Irresistible and Irrepressible, plus hopefully the two bonus 1939 upgrade II Illustrious of the 1938 NSF plan - Inflexible and Incomparable (now pushing 34,000 tons) - would be launched and fitting out for service between mid 42 and mid 43. 

The 1 DRC aircraft carrier and bonus NSF carrier - Audacious and Africa  -  of the new 38,000 ton Audacious class 1940 program would be due in late 1943, and the single DRC and single NSF ships of the same class of the 1941 program would be due in 1944 (and traditionally might adopt names of any aircraft carriers sunk in the war so far).

Designs for a 3 ship 50,000 ton Malta class (the size the Audacious class actually finished at after all their delays), 2 for 1942 - Gibraltar, Malta - and  1 for 1943 programs -  New Zealand  - would have been well advanced, and the even larger design for a 56,000 ton class for the 1944 and 45 programs would be in the works.

Meanwhile the 10 ship 18,000 ton Colossus class of 'light fleet' carriers would probably have entered the process contemporary with the USN's light cruiser carrier conversions alternative. With 3 or 4 arriving in 1943, and 5 or 6 in 1944, by which time the first of the 6 slightly enlarged Majestic's would also be starting to appear, and the 4 28,000 ton Centaur class would be in production. (In fact I am only assuming these about 12-18 months in advance of when they actually happened even during the wartime slowdown.) These Centaur 'light fleet' carriers of the 1944 program had actually grown as big as the 1937 Illustrious Class fleet carriers, while the equivalent Malta class fleet carriers had doubled in size to 57,000 tons over the course of the war!]

[Note - When war started in September 39, Britain cancelled future battleships builds, and put aircraft carriers on an 18 month to 2 year delay, while concentrating on urgently needed escorts. When war started in December 41 for the United States, the USN also cancelled new battleships builds, but kept the aircraft carrier process going (though the assumption that the allies had enough escorts in 1942 was severely tested by the U-boats as a result). However if Britain had not entered the war until December 1941, and had still stopped new battleship construction then, the RN might also have been able to continue their aircraft carrier program anyway. Certainly by December 1941 the RN escort build program would have been increased by over 300 ships in advance of its 1939 strength, and they would not have needed to slow so much construction elsewhere... see the next article on naval balance overall.]

RN carriers in December 1941

So the new fleet carriers Illustrious, Formidable, Victorious and Indomitable, already in service; and Indefatigible working up (and Implacable due mid 42); along with Ark Royal, Furious, Courageous and Glorious (last two both possibly re-fitted, with flight decks and hangars extended to the bows bringing them to a capacity of about 56 under cover, and 76 with deck parks), that amounts to 9 large, fast, well armed and - in most cases - well armoured aircraft carriers available, with several more in the pipeline... with the modern Unicorn, and older Eagle, Argus and Hermes to back them up. 

The first couple of experimental escort carriers would probably have also come on line, to support a number of Merchant Catapult ships, or Aircraft Armed Merchant Ships (usually oil or grain carriers suitable to having a small flight deck installed for half a dozen aircraft... ) These would be in partial replacement of the Armed Merchant Cruisers that Britain had needed in 1939, but would not have needed had the NSF lifted the number of cruisers available from 70 to more like 100.

Comparative numbers for December 1941:

Britain:

Fast Fleet 8 or 9 - Courageous, Glorious, Furious, Ark Royal, Illustrious, Formidable, Victorious, Indomitable, (with 2 more – Implacable and Indefatigable - fitting out, and 8 more fleet carriers under construction. 3 or 4 due in 1942, 2 or 3 in 1943, 2 in 1944, for 18 – if no more were ordered... the 15 'underage' from Ark Royal forward required for the 1938 NSF plan, and the 3 'over age' rebuilds still – like the Lexington and Saratoga – too good to just scrap.)

Others 6? - Argus, Hermes, Eagle and the new Unicorn, with say 2 escort carriers. (With several more escort carriers fitting out and several more escort carriers and a few 'light fleet' carriers on order. Say 2 dozen, if no more were ordered? Though Argus at least would probably have been honourably retired to depot ship in these circumstances...)

United States:

Fast Fleet 6 – Lexington, Saratoga, Enterprise, Yorktown, Hornet and Wasp. (With 11 Essex class on order or under construction, for 17 – if no more were ordered?)

Others 2 - Langley and  Ranger. (With 4 Independence, and several escort carriers building and several more on order. Say two dozen, if no more were ordered?).

Japan:

Fast Fleet 6 – Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku (with Taiho under construction).

Others - Hosho, Ryuho, Ryujo, (with conversions to Chitose, Chiyoa, Hiyo and Junyo in progress).

Other Nations:

Although France, Germany and Italy would all have one new carrier 'launched' by December 1941, and another building, actual completion is more dubious. 

The French Joffre would almost certainly not be completed yet. Perhaps late 1942 to early 1943. Her sister ship Panlieve, running 2 years later, would probably be cancelled at wars start. (War with Germany anyway. If it was war with Japan only, no doubt she would be accelerated.)

The Italian Aquila, a liner conversion rather than a new build, would only have started the conversion a few months previously, and be no where near completion. 

The German Graf Zeppelin might be completed, and even possibly in service, but might still lack an air-wing of suitable aircraft. (The planned Junkers 87 scout/dive bombers were probably quite workable, as were the fascinating Feiseler F 167 torpedo bombers – surprisingly effective biplane equivalents to the British Albacore – but the suggested BF109 fighters were definitely not suitable for deck landings – at least in Atlantic conditions – so exactly how that would have been sorted remains dubious. Without a fighter arm, she would be extremely limited in operational capacity.) The first of her 3 proposed sisters would probably also be launched, and might be completed in 1943, but it seems likely the remaining two would be cancelled.

If Graf Zeppelin was operational, the RN would certainly want at least 2 modern carriers available for the Home Fleet. If not, well that depends how threatening Japan looks...

Notes - Wartime plans/additions

Britain ordered 10 Colossus in 1942, 6 Majestic, and 4 Audacious in 1943, and 4 Malta in 1944, but, although all 16 Colossus and Majestic, and 2 of the Audacious, were eventually completed, only half a dozen Colossus were serving with the fleet by wars end. (4 of them with the British Pacific Fleet.)  

Had the war started in December 1941, some of those new orders would probably have been a year or two earlier, and the number completed would almost certainly have been increased due to less urgency to divert effort to build emergency escorts. (Given that the NSF would have received another 50-70 plus destroyers and more than 200 other escort vessels by December 1941!) Let's assume perhaps 6 or 7 more fleet carriers and a dozen of the Colossus/Majestic class in action by 1945, with the same number of each due by 1946, even if no additional orders were made.

After Pearl Harbour the US ordered 5 more Independence (all completed in wartime), and 15 more Essex (only 6 of them commissioned during wartime - Bennington, Bon Homme Richard, Shangri-La in late '44, and Boxer, Antietam, and Lake Champlain in early-mid 1945 - which meant that they -  like some of the RN's Colossus class, were simply too late too see any real combat). Of 34 Essex's ordered only 24 were actually completed, and only 14 saw wartime service, if not actual action for some, while the others were really post war ships. Plus 6 Midway class, of which, like the British Audacious, half were completed post war.

Japan ordered 16 Unryu class (budget copies of Soryu), most of which were later cancelled. Only 3 saw wartime service. Also converted the last Yamato class, Shinano, into a huge HMS Unicorn style support carrier, and half a dozen other escort carrier style conversions.

First a few more side notes for context...

1. People overlook the fact that the Royal Navy experimented with 3 carrier (Furious, Courageous, Glorious) fast strike task groups in the mid 1930’s. (The first plan for raiding the Italian fleet at Taranto was based on 1930's exercises by these 3 ships.) 

2. Also overlooked is that the Fleet Air Arm was re-established in early 1939, too late to be ready for a war in 1939, but excellently timed to be ready for a war starting almost 3 years later! (The RAF 'assigned' planes on RN carriers pre the hand-back had drastically restricted RN preparations for modern carrier work, both in numbers and technique. Huge advances in naval aviation were being made under RN control, but numbers and techniques were still 2 years behind where they needed to be. December 1941 would have seen a very different fleet air arm.)

3. People also tend to compare the British 1939 biplanes with 1942 American aircraft, somehow failing to note that the British were using the Hurricane and Wildcat fighters as their main carrier fighter by the time of Pearl Harbour, whereas the Americans were still using many of the dreadful Buffalo fighters as well as the newer Wildcat, even at Coral Sea, and Midway.

The British Gladiator biplane fighters, and Swordfish biplane torpedo bomber, or Skua monoplane fighter/dive bombers of 1939: were in no way inferior to the equivalent Japanese Claude monoplane fighter and Susie biplane bomber, or the American F3F biplane fighter, the just introduced Buffalo monoplane fighter, the Vindicator dive-bomber, or Devastator torpedo bomber of the same period. In fact Gladiator fighters were still surprisingly effective in defence of Malta against the Italians and the Luftwaffe in 1941 (as, interestingly, was the Buffalo when used by the Finns against the Soviets in 1942), whereas the Devastator was a death-trap when used as the main American torpedo bomber at Midway in 1942. (In fairness to the Devastator - and the Swordfish and Albacore - even the vastly superior TBF Avenger that replaced the Devastator was a death-trap in daylight hours until adequate fighter support was available.) 

See a full article on comparing naval aircraft here.

4. Also, amusingly, the British continued using biplane strike aircraft throughout the war, even after good monoplanes were easily available, but they had found a way to take advantage of their strengths - ruggedness, manouvrability, stability, excellent take off and landing abilities on small carriers, load capacity, and flexibility; and obviate their main weakness – speed – which made all attack aircraft - and biplanes in particular - so vulnerable to day fighters. By 1941 they were radar equipped night strike aircraft with proven track records against the Germans – see Bismarck – and Italians – see Taranto and Vittorio Veneto at Matapan. Not only were the Japanese and Americans incapable of night ops in 1941 - let alone 1939 - they were still regularly crashing dozens of aircraft that got lost in the dusk in 1942 and 1943! But a December 1941 start to the war would probably have seen the first monoplane Fairey Barracuda torpedo/dive bombers, and possibly even the first American built Avenger's, arriving to replace the older Swordfish and Albacore's on fleet carriers. (Probably at about the same rate the Avengers were replacing Devastators on US carriers in 1942.)

RN Deployments in December 1941

So if Britain had had 8-9 fleet carriers available in late 1941, compared to the US or Japan with 6 each, how might they have been deployed? 

(Noting that in December 1941 the primary naval threat would probably be Japan, with Germany a poor second – at least in heavy units – and Italy probably quite unlikely to take the risk of war in these circumstances.)

Home Fleet 

3-5 battleships - 2 Nelson's (Rodney just out of refit), with the new KGV Howe just commissioning, and the first 1 or 2 Lion class battleships, and possibly even the new Vanguard working up. 

With another 2 Lion launched but still fitting out (and Malaya and Hood still in dock for major rebuilds). 

Plus the possibility of a Richelieu or two for backup if the Germans look genuinely frisky.

2-3 Fleet Aircraft Carriers and perhaps 2-3 smaller carriers -  Victorious and Formidable in service, and perhaps Implacable fitting out, plus perhaps Argus as training carrier, and at least 2 new escort carriers on North Atlantic escort duty.

Gibraltar 

3 old battleships - 3 Revenge class, mainly to back up the 5 older battleships of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, but also for a bit of South Atlantic escort duty.

(Plus the possibility of a couple of Dunkerque 'cruiser killer's' for South Atlantic patrolling if Germany looks dangerous?)

1-2 aircraft carriers - Eagle, plus the French carrier Bearn?

Mediterranean 

4-5 battleships - 4 fully modernised Queen's, with the still in rebuild Malaya expected later.

1-2 aircraft carrier - Illustrious, with one of the Home Fleet carriers like Formidable likely to join if Italy looked genuinely threatening.

Far East 

8-9 capital ships - including 4-5 fast battleships, 2 slow battleships, and 2 battlecruisers - 4-5 KGV (though Howe would probably still be working up or en-route), plus 2 fully modernised Renown's, and 2 Revenge on Indian Ocean escort duty.

(Plus perhaps a Richelieu or two, and possibly both Dunkerques in Indochina, if Japan looks more threatening than Germany/Italy?)

A completely modernised Hood (possibly as flagship), and 2 or 3 of the new Lion class, also expected to join this force in the next year or so.

4-5 fleet aircraft carriers and one or two smaller - Indomitable, Ark Royal, and the somewhat modernised Courageous and Glorious (all about 70 aircraft each if deck parks had been adopted for service in the Indian or Pacific oceans?), and the new support carrier Unicorn (33 operationally) probably en-route.

Also Hermes and/or Argus, and perhaps a new escort carrier or two, for Indian Ocean escort duty.

Indomitable or Implacable and maybe some more escort carriers expected to join this force in a few months; with Indefatigable joining late 1942, and another 3 or 4 large fleet carriers and several more escort carriers due in 1943. 

Naval Security?

Had Britain entered the war in December 1941 her 8 or 9 modern carriers in service, 2-4 more expected in 1942, and at least 4 more in 1943/44 (plus three older carriers, and a steady stream of escort and light carriers expected), the RN would have had a much easier war. 

Combined RN and USN build rates, even without French support, would have already simply swamped the build capacities of the Axis powers.

Particularly as these new carriers would  be fitted with Sea Hurricane and Wildcat/Martlet fighters, Fulmar strike-fighters and probably still Albacore bombers, (while waiting for deliveries of TBM Avenger and Barracuda Dive/Torpedo bombers), rather than the Swordfish and Gladiators of September 1939. 

Also, the 8-9 available Japanese battleships would be facing potentially 20-24 RN, French and USN battleships – most of them more modern or more effectively modernised, and generally faster than anything the Japanese had in service. 

Likewise the RN and USN's 8 or 9 fast modern fleet carriers (plus 2 or 3 small), with several more expected in 1942 and again in 1943, compared to Japan's 6 (plus 2 or 3 small) carriers, with only one significant vessel – Taiho – in the pipeline, and that only laid down a few months earlier – and no emergency Unryu having even been started yet.

In fact if Japan had even considered declaring war without Germany, or – considerably less likely – at least Italy, also declaring war: then the odds would look much worse.

Without genuine threats from Germany or Italy, several more RN battleships – say the 2 Nelsons and 2 of the Queens – and a few more carriers – Illustrious, and  eitherVictorious or Formidable most likely – might have been transferred from the Home or Mediterranean fleet much earlier if needed (in return for Hermes and Argus returning to home waters while Implacable and Indefatigable completed...)

Giving the RN alone complete superiority over the Japanese in battleships: with 12-14 RN fast battleships/battlecruisers available – almost all of them more modern and considerably faster than most Japanese ships – even without any of the 4 modern French fast battleships, and possibly even both modern US battleships – North Carolina and Washington. (Leaving 'just' another 10 or so older and slower USN battleships, for potential support in secondary defensive and escort roles...) 

Note that would still leave the Allies with superior numbers in the Atlantic/Mediterranean area, with the British (7 or 8 - including a couple of Lions and/or Vanguard working up with Home Fleet and 2 or 3 more battleships due in each of 1942, 43 and 44), the French (5 with possibly a 6th due 1943), and USN neutrality patrol (5 or 6 - including the first 2 South Dakota's working up, with 2 more battleships due in each of 1942, 43 and 44). These 'Allied' 18-20 capital ships numbering about twice as many capital ships as Germany (4, with possibly a 5th starting fit out anda 6th just launched but 18 months from completion... If the H plan had got anywhere) and Italy (6 with a seventh working up) combined... not that Italy would be likely to try anything stupid in these circumstances.

In fact I would expect the Italian numbers to move back towards the Allied column in such circumstances.

The RN would also have at least parity, if not superiority, in carriers in the Far East: with 6 or 7 fast fleet carriers, most of them armoured; plus the Unicorn, and another couple of older carriers in support.

Again, this would be even without counting potential USN support. (Britain and the US had serious discussion under Rainbow V in 1941 about moving at least part of the US fleet to Singapore to support the British fleet in intimidating the Japanese away from war – anything from a carrier and several cruisers, to a major battle fleet. Or at least rebasing the 'Asiatic' – read Philippines – submarines, destroyers and cruisers there if they had to be withdrawn. It was sadly unworkable in the circumstances where Britain had already been at war for 2 years – and France had fallen already – but if all 3 nations were still at peace?)

The combined RN, French, USN force in the Pacific in late 1941 to mid '42 might be 30+ battleships to Japan's 10 or 11, and more than a dozen large modern carriers to Japan's 6.

Again, I ask, 'Would Japan have risked war with the Allies under these circumstances?' Or would she have gone looking for easier targets like the Japanese army's preferred opponent Russia?

In such circumstances, is there any realistic chance at all Italy would have even considered joining in a war, except on the Allied side?

More on the overall naval balance of power in Part III. After that we will consider Air and Land.