Monday, October 31, 2011

Uselessly comparing Patton and Montgomery

One of the things I most dislike about bad comparisons from World War Two, is romantic comparisons that take the public imagination, but serve no useful relation to reality. The Western Allies tendency to idealise Rommel as the best German general for the simple reason that he was the sexiest or most dramatic general THEY fought is such a useless statement. In practice they were beaten by von Runstedt and Guderian and many others in 1940, and had a hard time matching the far less resourced von Kluge and Model in 1944. Still it hangs around more for its popular romance than any useful purpose.

Such is the idea that Patton and Montgomery were the great rivals of the war. Please!

The great rivalries amongst the Allies that made a real imact were Marshall and Brooke over war policy, Nimitz and MacArthur over resources, Eisenhower and Montgomery over strategy; and then between Percival and MacArthur for incompetence, Patton and O'Connor for aggressiveness, MacArthur and Clarke for vainglory, (and possibly Clarke and Wavell for the stupidity of letting defeated enemies escape), were the issues that defined the war for the Western allies. The idea that a competition between Patton and Montgomery was more important is cute, but niave.

I am not even sure where the idea comes from. Much is made of the bet between Patton and Montgomery over reaching Palermo in Sicily first, but in practical terms that was the only time in the war that Patton ever appeared on Montgomery's radar. For the rest of the war Monty was so much higher up the food chain than Patton that he was unaware, or disinterested in Patton's opinions.

Montgomery was, by 1944, an experienced general who very successfully fought extensively in both combat and staff roles for 4 years throughout World War One. (Patton got a combat command for a few weeks when the Germans were already collapsing.) Montgomery led a division very successfully through the Battle of France, and a corps through the crucial Battle of Britain training and rebuilding years. He led an army in combat for two years, through many successful battles both on defense and in attack. By 1944 Patton had led a corps for a few months, and an army for a few weeks. For the very brief period of the Sicily compaign they were theoretically equals in command, but probably only in Patton's mind. (Montgomery saw Patton as an enthusiastic if amateurish old man.)

Montgomery saw his HQ 'betting book' as a bit of fun (and was delighted when bet a B17 by someone who should have known better). When he and Patton met and co-ordinated the Sicilian campaign Alexander seemed not interested in co-ordinating, Monty saw Palermo as a similar bit of fun to pursue, no bigger or smaller than the hundreds of other bets in the book. Patton saw it, as he saw anything relating to his persona, as the most vitally important challenge of his whole life... up until the next one. Montgomery lost a bet and moved on to the next challenge. Patton won but didn't. (Or at least that is what bad writers have tried to suggest. I think he moved straight on to the next challenge anyway.)

That was the last time Monty and Patton were in direct competition, no matter what revisionists or romantics would say. The next time Patton was allowed in the field he was one of half a dozen army commanders in Monty's Normandy army group, and, familiarly, he did not arrive until the Germans in Normandy were already collapsing. Very soon afterwards Eisenhower split off Bradley's army group, and Monty had no control, nor much interest, in what Patton was up to thereafter.

The romantics like to suggest that therafter Monty railed against Patton's supplies, and that Patton railed against Montgomery's caution. The truth is less foolish for both of them.

In fact Montgomery railed against Eisenhower's broad front strategy regardless of which of the other sub-commanders was benifitting (to the point of Montgomery making an offer to serve under Bradley as long as someone got single control to pursue a single strategy). He railed against the diversion of resources anywhere not at the main point where a thrust might have achieved early victory. Leaving aside whether that victory could have happened, Montgomery's beef was with Eisenhower first, his appalling chief of supply Lee second, fellow Army Group Commanders who couldn't control the excesses of their subordinates like Bradley (and to a lesser extent) Devers third, and only then with the several army commanders who each tried to do their own thing.

In practical terms Montgomery seemed more appalled by the negative effects of the incompetence of Hodges (1st US Army,) and the obnoxiousness of De Gaulle's orders to 'his' army (French First Army), and perhaps even the ineffectiveness of his own subordinate Crerar (Canadian 1st army) , than he did by Patton's enthusiasms. There is hardly a mention of Patton in his diaries through this period, compared to several comments on Bradley and De Gualle, and endless ones on Eisenhower.

Patton too is being maligned by the pretense that his war was taken up with a vain competition with Montgomery. Patton, like Montgomery, was totally concerned with the main issue of defeating Germany. But unlike Montgomery, he did not have Brooke - the Chief of Imperial General Staff - to rely on for support against Eisenhower's broad front strategy. Patton too was convinced that this was the wrong way to go, but to get his version of a thrust (with him at the front) happening, he had to be a bit more manipulative than Montgomery.

Every word Patton used to wheedle and manipulate support, or at least a blind eye to what he was doing, was designed to get more resources from his superiors. Indeed, if he couldn't get them from Eisenhower, he was willing to steal them wherever he could, and then get Bradley to pretend to not know what he was doing. In this he was quite willing to encourage Bradley's inferiority complex in relation to Montgomery, and to happily manipulate Bradley into tantrums to get what they both wanted, but it seems likely that Patton was more interested in getting his way by making his superiors compete with Montgomery, than in competing with Montgomery himself.

Patton is actually a more complex and clever character than the romantics give him credit for. His 'kill them even if they try to surrender' speeches in Sicily were part of his stage management of troops, not part of his innate personality. HIs 'us against the world' propaganda was more manipulative, not so much like Bradley's inferiority complex. He wanted to win, and he would use anything to get what he needed to win, even ramping up his superiors to distrust their allies. But his genuine competitiveness with Montgomery at this stage was less about him and Montgomery, and more about him and how he could maneouvre others to support him. He would have shown the same level of competitiveness, and the same willingness to undermine, any competitor at this point. British, French, Russian or even American.

Montgomery on the other hand only saw Patton as one more junior general syphoning supplies from an inadequate source. Montgomery was in competition with Eisenhower for control, and possibly with Bradley for resources. Minor army commanders in other people's army groups only registered on his horizon if he could get their armies assigned to his army group.

Just for amusement, it might be fun to consider how Montgomery and Patton might have worked together?

Montgomery was notoriously superb to serve under, no matter what your nationality. British, Australian, New Zealander, South African, Indian, Canadian, French, Polish, and American troops who served under him were all very happy to do so. So were their generals. Bradley certainly learned more about being a field commander from a few months of Montgomery's distant mentoring than from anything Eisenhower ever did for him in their much closer relationship. There is no doubt that Montgomery preferred effective subordinates to ineffective ones, and it seems possible that Patton would have made a preferable subordinate to Crerar or Bradley in his mind.

As for Patton, he would have served anyone who got him what he wanted. Had Montgomery offered him the chance to spearhead the attack into Germany, there is virtually no doubt that Patton would have jumped at the chance. Patton was not the racist that Bradley or Eisenhower were, and was happy to have black troops. He was not the American supremacist that Roosevelt or MacArthur were, and worked well with others (as long as they let him have enough lime light). Had Montgomery been left as land forces commander, there is little doubt that he would have used Patton's aggression in a way that would have made Patton much happier than Eisenhower's broad front strategy ever allowed.

It is fun to imagine Montgomery as land forces commander using Patton's 3rd Army in conjunction with British 2nd to leapfrog ahead at top speed into Germany. The best British tactics were never the broad front strategy that the worst American's like Marshall and Eisenhower fancied. They were always the 'hold the enemy, crumble the enemy, breakthrough the enemy, and pursue with as much force as fast and far as possible' skills that had worked since the development of mechanised warfare in 1918. (As demonstrated by the Germans in Poland and France and Russia, the British and Germans in North Africa, the Japanese and British in Asia, and the Russians in Eastern Europe.) Montgomery would have used his traditional two corps up, one back, one resting deployment, adapted to armies, to keep up the momentum. Patton's preferred tactics were almost exactly the same, and he and his 3rd Army would have fit it like a glove into Montgomery's thrust strategy.

Personally I think that the limited reality behind their competitiveness paid trumps in Sicily, and I wish that it had been repeated in France. Patton could not have been a worse Army group commander than Bradley was, and would almost certainly have been better. It is amusing to think of him and Montgomery effectively conspiring to destroy the broad front strategy while they got on with winning the war in the best spirit of competition. Although I have a sneaking suspicion that one of Patton's biographers was right to suggest that by 1945 he had suffered a few too many hits on the head, there is little doubt that he would have been almost as valuable to the Allied cause in Bradley's place against Eisenhower's policies directly, as he would have under Montgomery's army group. That might have been a useful version of rivalry.

But I still wish people would get over the big Montgomery versus Patton beat up. By 1944 Patton would have competed against anything or anyone to get his way, and co-operated with anyone who would support him. Anyone. Aw for Montgomery, he simply did not see Patton as competition.


  1. Three words in response to your adulation of Gen. Montgomery: "Operation Market Garden."

    As for Monti's opinion of non-British forces, consider this statement he made in the aftermath of Operation Market Garden's failure review: "I reckoned the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong ............. In my — prejudiced — view..." He also claimed, vainly so, that Operation Market Garden was "90% successful". He was a terrible general. Montgomery made Polish 1st Parachute Brigade commander Major-General StanisÅ‚aw (who had been ignored) and the Poles the scapegoat (source: D'Este 2002, pp. 615–618.)

    1. One word on Patton: METZ

    2. The "Dream Team" would be replacing Horrocks with Patton. Had Patton been driving the forces up the road to Arnhem, they might have made it in time.

    3. The thing about Metz was that Eisenhower stopped Patton's advance towards Germany through orders and denial of resources, allowing the Germans to build up their defenses in and around Metz... in essence, creating the very situation that Patton's previous aggression had been successful in avoiding... being forced to assault a heavily supplied and fortified location. The length of the Metz campaign is on Eisenhower's head. But unlike Montgomery's Market Garden... Patton was able to achieve success. Monty's war winning gambit ended up being an unmitigated disaster and he tried to scapegoat some of the divisions that were used to try to salvage his own public image.

    4. The thing about the 'broad front' strategy is that Eisenhower stopped the Allies from winning the war in 1944. The useless constant diversion and rediversion of resources made BOTH the Metz AND Market Garden fail. So I will agree that it is largely on Eisenhower's head.

      As to the Metz being a success and Market Garden being a failure, that takes pretty selective understanding.

      Both 'pincers' made it a long way. Both were a bit late and with too few resources when stopped. Both were stuck for months before they advanced again. Both were Eisenhower's fault. Both became launching pads for the final advances. But how anyone could imagine that makes one a success and one a failure, I do not consider very logical.

  2. Hmm, my adulation for Montgomery and Patton will be put into context when I do an analysis of each individually. At that point I will go properly into the weaknesses of each.

    Montgomery had certainly reached his ceiling as an Army Group Commander or Ground Forces Commander. he was later to be a terrible CIGS. But his experience and reliability was later admitted even by Eisenhower and Bradley (usually after years of whinging about him). His disgust with the Canadian Crerar is something I commented on, though you will note he just seems sad the Canadians failed, not doing the lavish poisonous pen that was the more usual comparison between Allied generals.

    Not a great general, not a nice person, just the most experienced commander present, and certainly the most effective 4 or 5 star.

    Patton, as I said, was potentially a much better Army Group commander than his inexperienced junior Bradley, though I am serious about wondering if he had been hit on the head too many times by 1945. Also not a great general, and very not a nice person, but a better general than Bradley and Eisenhower by a long shot.

    As for Market Garden, I stick by the idea that it was worth trying. I agree with the only one of Eisenhower's many contradictory statements over decades (some listed in those pages you quote in D'Este's biography of him), that the weather was the main issue.

    IN fact of the 17 rapidly planned and rapidly discarded plans for using the airborne army between June and December 1944, this one was no better or worse than any other. Yes Browning was overoptimistic, yes Brereton was foolish to refuse two drops a day, yes it was unfortunate that 2 panzer units were reforming at the vital point, yes it was a shame some things worked and some didn't, and yet through all of it, better weather might have made it work.

    War is about risk, not certainty. D-Day had more things that could have gone wrong, but again, the decisive thing was the weather. Anything that close that has that potential payoff is not only a god idea, but criminal not to attempt.

    As for all the recriminations thrown around, none of the generals involved covered themselves with glory. Montgomery is an arse in this regard, but so are most of the others. One of the best comments on this is in Wrigley's book Eisenhower's Lieutenants (, where he points out that unimportant middle class officers got very pompous and self righteous when suddenly made heroes... a fair comment on democratic armies and their generals...

    None of which alters my point that claiming some great rivalry between Montgomery and Patton is cute, but naive.

  3. Yep, "cute, but naive", because your supposition of "Monty-Patton rivalry" is a shaggy straw man-cliche compared to the historical reality. There was indeed no rivalry, let alone "great rivalry", because Patton knew that Monty and his ilk were dangerously incompetent.

    Patton's own records, and 3rd party press memoirs, reveal clearly that Patton regarded Monty with utter contempt. It seems Patton's contempt for Monty first became publicly apparent during Monty's pompous, condescending post-Tunis "command & staff training" tedium.

    Matt Davies (not stalking you here, Nigel! All just good fun)

    1. Montgomery was the best general in the European Theatre. Hammered Rommel out of Africa. Eisenhower later said that Montgomery was "the only one who could have got us and kept us ashore on D-Day, whatever else you say about him."

      And if you toss out Market Garden, it almost worked. Compare that to Patton slogging away at Metz and losing 40,000 troops over three months.

    2. Dear Anonymous,

      I would not go so far as to say Monty was the best. I think quiet highly of Brooke, Juin, Truscott and a few others who might have actually been better than Monty. (Or at least almost as good in most areas, and better in some vital other ones...).

      I do agree that Ike and Bradley showed a modicum of humility to later admit that they would probably have failed at Normandy if not for Monty. Certainly any sensible soldier on the ground would prefer to be under Monty than Patton (and only people who do not know the details of the Metz campaign can possibly ignore the manifold weaknesses that dogged Patton being at least as great as those that dogged Monty... ).

      I also think that Patton's 'hatred' of Monty was as much a pose as his 'kill them all' speeches about Germans or his ivory handled guns. I suspect that if he had had a chance to write anything post war he would have been a bit less outrageous. (He certainly showed more strategic sense than his bosses in Africa and Germany, and that argues he wasn't as stupid as his public statements sometimes pretend.... I suspect that in geo-political terms he was streets beyond the equally outrageous Monty...)

      Patton was of course playing catch up. Having been relegated by his own superiors to being junior to his previous corps commander, he had no chance whatsoever of competing directly with Montgomery as an Army group commander, so he had to make as much noise as possible where he was. Being anti-Monty was just his easiest way of getting incompetent superiors to listen to him sometime, and I am pretty sure he played it far harder than he actually believed.

      PS. You can pretty much ignore Matt's anti-Btritish reflex's, they are apparently too ingrained to allow him to discuss anything that challenges his world view.

  4. It's worth noting that Montgomery and Patton were similar in character and personality in some ways; both had an understanding of the necessity of proper training, and both are reported to have had a mania for ordering physical training (Montgomery famously making no friends among his senior commanders when he turned out his brigadiers for morning runs on taking command of 8th Army in the desert). I think they may have been more like each other than some casual observers may be willing to admit. "Media" hype being what it is, it is no surprise that the rivalry aspect has been played up over the years, and unfortunately, many people get their history from Hollywood, which magnifies the problem. The British and American army groups had a very similar "way of war" in North-west Europe in 1944-45 - which Stephen Ashley Hart talks about with respect to 21st Army Group in his book Colossal Cracks. The British may have been more casualty and resource-management conscious but both relied on firepower. It's hardly an indictment; in the end, it worked. I don't know who the "best general" was, but certainly the hardest working of them all had to be Eisenhower, who kept that coalition of American, British, French, Canadian, Dutch, Belgian, Polish and you-name-it soldiers welded together, placating their governments (and governments-in-exile) while catering to the whims of his own senior commanders.

    1. Happy to agree with all your points on M and P.

      Not so keen on being impressed by Ike's work ethic. Frankly working hard is not often a sign of success. Cunningham worked himself to collapse in the desert, as did Admiral Pound, and a couple of the French generals in 1940, and Eisenhower in 1944-5. All of them could be considered failures as commanders, particularly when it became clear that things were starting to get away from them (as in the Bulge). in fact no one worked harder, or with more disastrous impact on their forces, than Adolf Hitler. Hard work does not a successful leader make.

      Eisenhower was a chain smoking nervous wreck after just a few months in France. Compare that to Brooke taking days or even a few hours off to birdwatch during his several years of endless grind. Or Montgomery going to bed every night with instructions that he only be called in an emergency, and probably that it would be pointless then.

      I also have quibbles about his effectiveness as a leader. HIs HQ was a cesspool of intrigue, his broad front strategy was a directionless mess, and most of his subordinates worked on whatever they could get away with (or simply avoiding taking his calls).

      Frankly I can think of many many generals who would have done a better job as SCAEF despite their own various limitations... Alphabetically a few might include: Alexander, Auchinlek, Brooke, Blamey, Cunningham (the Admiral not the general), Eichenberger, Juin, Nimitz, Sikowski, Spruance, Truscott, Wavell... the list goes on and on. All these men had more experience than Ike, all of them had at least the skill set of Ike, all of them had at least similar workloads (often for much longer), and all of them had far far more functional work ethics.

    2. Very interesting response. I've said once or twice that I never quibble when the C.O. of my reserve army unit gets a cot to sleep on in the field (while the rest of us recline in the mud), because as the commander, I want him well rested when he is making decisions that may affect the life and limb of the rest of us. Montgomery certainly had the right idea.

      The SHAEF command is an interesting point to ponder, but I'm not sure if there is a good measure of "diplomacy" that can be applied to your list of candidates. This seems to be the standard that Eisenhower is held to, and any failings in grand strategy are dismissed based on strengths in that area. I would agree that Eisenhower could not have been the only possible candidate for the job. But the question re: work ethic one might ask is whether or not Eisenhower was a "nervous wreck" as a result of the stresses on him - and if those stresses might not also have reduced an Alexander, a Brooke, a Truscott etc. to the same state, or worse. Would anyone really have been immune?

    3. Dear Michael,

      thanks for the response.

      My particular gripe with Ike here is that he decided to be his own ground forces commander at the same time he was doing a more complex diplomatic job than any of the other theatre commanders. Check the list - Wavell, Auchinlek, MacArthur, Nimitz, Mountbatten, Wilson, Alexander - who else tried to do both jobs at once? The closest is Alexander in 1945, and he did not have a fraction of the issues Ike was trying to handle all at once. I agree that anyone might have failed under that workload, but don't think anyone else was stupid enough to even imagine that it was possible to do both jobs effectively.

      Going beyond that simple fact, Ike was not qualified to be a ground forces commander, and did not do it well.

      Finally, I am less than convinced that he did a good job of the thing he was supposed to be concentrating on - diplomacy. I don't think Wavell had a less difficult mess of allies and governments and causes to deal with in 1941(ME) or 1942 (ABDA) than Ike did in 1944-5; nor Stilwell in '42-'44, nor Wilson in '44 nor Alexander in '45. Only MacArthur and Nimitz probably had it easy on that front.

      Which just reinforces the point that even MacArthur and Nimitz didn't try to do the impossible.

  5. I consider Montgomery a compatent theater commander and a keen eye of strategy , training , planning logistics and balancing of his forces and their capabilities. His tactical sense was outdated though (WW1 infantry attritional tactical sense with minding to preserve a huge reserve , combatting with big unit structures ) and very little importance on pursuit and exploitation of breakthrough. His specialty was set piece battles

    Patton was at the other hand did not give much thought to set piece battles but he was an outstanding cavalry commander with a skill unmatched among Allies in open manuever fast pursuit exploitation operations. Like Montgomery he was an effective motivator of troops. Plus he was very good in encircling , bypassing , getting rear of enemy tactics.

    1. Dear Anonymous,

      yes, and no.

      Montgomery's pursuit of broken enemies was as fast, or faster, than Patton's best efforts in both North Africa (where he was very cautious not to overextend his troops and offer Rommel a chance to mount his preferred counter-attack option), and in Northern France (where 2nd Army moved faster pursuing retreating Germans than Patton did even wandering around empty countryside).

      Patton's reputation is based on wandering around the parts of Sicily where there were no Germans taking the surrender of Italians who desperately wanted to be out of the war, or swanning around vast tracks of empty French countryside against no opposition. He had a lot of fun doing so, and I would agree that he pushed harder and faster than most others were capable of. (Though I would rank O'Connor as better at this, in both North Africa and France).

      Patton's weakness, as you say, was that on the one and only occasion when he came up against a real fight - the Metz - he demonstrated what you call WWI attrition tactics… except that he failed repeatedly, to the point of abandoning the front to sulk in Paris. (All this within days of his 'shit through a goose' nonsense.)

      In practical terms Monty was a bit too cautious with his set piece attacks (which did use the absolute best of WWI tactics - the succesful ones from 1918), partly because his own public profile was built on never making mistakes, and his understanding of his troops was built on keeping them confident that he never would. Unfortunately this was more necessary for the overtired British troops who had already fought for 4 or 5 years than for the fresh American ones. (Only the Big Red 1 showed similarly understandable war weariness in France after two years of regular combat.)

      In fact I am not joking when I say that Patton was too inexperienced to be let loose on his own, but would have been a vital asset if kept under Montgomery's control. I really mean that.

  6. I'm not going to pretend to know what Generals were more or less capable..all I have to go on is an author's writing skill of events 60 years ago. With that, I thought parachuting British troops behind German lines with a likelihood of tanks in the area was not too keen
    such as Market Garden. I don't know what Patton was up against at Metz, but it must have been ugly. I think Eisenhower's broad front strategy was somewhat politically driven. I will always think that Hitler's decision to fight on two fronts was suicide, and his orders to fight to the last breath was insane. I think the best weapon in the war was the Winter of '44 in Stalingrad. Aside from that, I admire all WWII Generals, good or bad, who fought with their troops to keep us from German and Japanese domination. Jim Talbot, Baton Rouge, Louisiana

  7. Dear Jim,

    war is about balancing risk and opportunity. Assessing generals is rally a matter of assessing whether they can see opportunity, and whether the risks they take are reasonable. That does not mean taking no risk, and it does not mean taking excessive risk.

    On the two you quote, Arnhem was a reasonable risk considering the results that might have been. If it had worked (and it came closer than most people think except for exactly the sort of weather problems that might have also seen D-Day fail), then we would be acclaiming it as brilliance. (I heard a German quote bemoaning that their greatest disaster was winning at Arnhem and dooming much of central Europe to Russian occupation for decades.)

    Patton at the Metz fails in that he did not recognize the problem he faced, and his only solution was to keep repeating attrition attacks until the Germans finally left (not thrown out, left to rejoin the rest of their army on the German border).

    Montgomery accepted the need for attrition when their was no alternative (Alemein and Caen), and frantically tried to avoid it when there was an alternative (Tunisia, Italy, Arnhem).

    Patton was usually assigned the outflanking role, but signally failed to think of an alternative when he lacked that opportunity.

    Neither were bad, both were in fact much better than the average, but lets not pretend either were perfect. Of the two Montgomery was more experienced, and Patton less experienced. With more experience Patton might have been as good as Montgomery, but I don't think there is much argument that he was better in any major way.

    But as you say, a lot of it is hindsight.

  8. Ah, a reference to my old dad;

    "-if he couldn't get them from Eisenhower, he was willing to steal them wherever he could

    I asked the old sarge if he was ever wounded in the war, when I was about eight, if he had ever been shot in the war.

    "Yep" he said, "by the Americans, I was shot in the ass, Patton sent us back to steal gas from Eisenhower.".

    He said Patton "kicked him in the ass" one time. But that is another story. He never explained if it was the same cheek as the one "Eisenhower" shot.


  9. I have linked your post to one I wrote, National Security Act of 1947 – A Horse of a Different Color, at Just wanted you to know in case you have any objections.

    1. No objection, always happy to be cited as a 'delightful romp' by someone who doesn't take what I say too seriously. That's the response I am looking for.

      Interesting article by the way.

  10. I'll take issue with your statement, “Western Allies tendency to idealise Rommel as the best German general for the simple reason that he was the sexiest or most dramatic general THEY fought...”. Rommel was unique in many ways: Foremost, while perhaps not the strategic thinker on par with von Manstein or Kesselring (perhaps), his tactical brilliance is beyond dispute. He was one of those generals whose mere presence on a battlefield could change its outcome. Second, he was very much a self-made man. But what I think accounts most for Rommel's high historical esteem is that he is one of the very, very, very few whose reputation is unmarred by “the taint” of Nazism. He was a man of decency and morality and honor. Indeed, his convictions ultimately cost him his life.

  11. Sexiest, most dramatic, most decent, certainly happy to add that.

    But 'untainted by Nazism'. He may have lost his infatuation by late in the war, but he had got his first division through commanding the Fuhrer's bodyguard! He was not promoted over the heads of many others because he was indifferent to the Fuhrer, or the Fuhrer to him.

  12. Very biased. Wrong about Patton and Normandy, and very wrong on "Monty's" arrogance as the best best commander as well as his very British centric concept of war.