If World War II didn't start until December 1941: Part 1 WWII Battleship Construction

I recently started looking at the issue of what would have happened if a second 'Munich Agreement' in September 1939... a 'Warsaw Agreement' perhaps (presumably because France and perhaps a couple of Dominions refused to support a declaration of war in 1939 the same way they had refused at Munich), meant that Britain and France did not actually declare war on Germany on September 3, 1939. 

Might the World War have started in December 1941 instead? 

Probably not, but that needs explaining.

It looks like being a fun topic, but it requires a lot of background. So I thought I would start with an analysis of where naval power would be in December 1941 if the European powers had not kicked off early. Even that is too big a bite for one go, so Part 1 just looks at battleships - and itself is largely based on a preparatory posts on What defines a battleship for WWII  and The best 'Re-builds' of WWI Capital Ships for WWII, Part II will do aircraft carriers, and Part III naval expansion overall.

This first part is actually based on a re-work of a draft article I did in 2010, under the title 'Comparing Apples and Oranges', but with a lot more new research data...

If WWII didn't start until December 1941 - Part One - Battleships:

What if Britain had enjoyed the luxury of not entering the war until December 1941? What would her battleship fleet have looked like by then? How would the modernisations and new build numbers have stacked up against the Japanese and American figures available for that year?

More importantly, if Britain (and France, Germany and Italy), had continued their peacetime build rates to the end of 1941 the way the Japanese and Americans did: what would total battleship numbers look like.

And would that new perspective change anyone's attitude to declaring war? 

The RNs 1935 DRC build plan vs the 1938 NSF plan

First I will note here that the RN's DRC plan (Defence Requirements Sub-Committee 1935 plan), is the default pre war build plan, until replaced by the NSF (New Standard Fleet) plan in 1938, which really came too late to have much effect on a 1939 start to the war, but would have had very considerable effect on a 1941 start. 

Most commentators pretty much assume that the DRC was more accurate, given that building of the NSF - in battleships at least - was never completed. But for comparison, the 1935 DRC which led to the KGV and Lions it is roughly the equivalent of the American Naval Act of 1938 which led to the South Dakota's and  Iowa's, and the 1938 NSF is 'expansion program' roughly equivalent of the USN Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940 - which included the last 2 Iowa's and at least a further 5 Montana's. Roughly. But in each case 2 years earlier, with subsequent advance in build rates.

The fact that the first 6 Lions of the 1938 NSF expansion didn't get completed because Britain went to war in late 1939 so they were cancelled: completely matches the last 2 Iowa's and the 5 Montana's of the USN 1940 Two Ocean Navy act being cancelled when the US went to war in late '41. 

Real costs versus fantasy propaganda costs

I will also note that the RN and Treasury had actually analysed the often quoted but ridiculous propaganda claim of 1,000 bombers for the price of each battleships, and come out with a more realistic (over lifetime) 43 medium bombers! 

The NSF program could add an extra 3 capital ships, 4 fleet carriers, 10 large cruisers, 4 small cruisers, 6 flotillas of destroyers (that's 48 destroyers) and 21 submarines to the already existing DRC build, (that's about 90 ships in all), for about the cost of 500 medium bombers all up. 

(Note that point 'over life'. A 1937 medium bomber - a Hampden for instance – needed replacement with a Blenhiem in 1941, and another replacement with a Mosquito in 43 or 44 – compared to a naval ships life expectancy of 15 - 20 years. 'Over life' is a way of emphasising how cost effective long term items like ships are compared to short term items like bombers. Another way of saying that might be: better to build say 75% as many Battle light bombers –1600 not 2200 –  and 75% as many medium Hampden's – 1050 not 1400 – between 1937-40, and get 80 or 90 extra ships in return!)

Cost is a bit of a red herring.

(Note - 500 less light and medium bombers available in December 1941 would have been about 20% reduction to the actual RAF front line bomber fleet that month... which is a useless statistic in terms of war starting December 1941 rather than September 1939, as it included all wartime production - thousands - and all wartime losses - also thousands - dating back to September 1939. But the raw number 20% reduction of total bombers, for attaining a far bigger and far far more modern fleet, would very definitely be a win for Britain overall. See below.)

Real constraints

The main issues of such increased NSF naval production for Britain would not actually be cost, but the limitations of dockyard availability and armour production. (The 2 Ocean Navy Act faced similar restraints, with the Wikipedia article noting that, "The expansion program was scheduled to take five to six years, but a New York Times study of shipbuilding capabilities called it, "problematical" unless proposed, "radical changes in design" were dropped.")

And, of course, the fact that the RN was not throwing nearly as much subsidy to industry as the RAF... in 1938...  

But under this NSF plan that subsidy balance would change dramatically, with RN subsidies being increased substantially, even if it cost a small reduction of the frankly fantastic RAF subsidies being thrown about in 1938.

There was also plenty of capacity for private expansion of dockyards of course. (Literally hundreds had been closed during the Depression, and many could fairly easily be re-opened with not too much extra expense). But many companies were waiting for confirmation of a bigger naval build program before committing, so didn't do so until after the war started. 

The NSF should have provided that assurance, and advanced the re-opening of many of these dockyards a year or two earlier. (Though the NSF had a shaky start in the '38 budget, with some of the lighter units like destroyer squadrons delayed. But this was clearly not going to be repeated in the '39 budget after Munich...)

Better Investments?

Certainly the lack of success of the RAF bomber force in the first years of the war would argue that a few more major warships would have been a better investment? 

Indeed the same argument could be made that less expensive multi-engine bombers, and more cheap one engine fighters would have been a better investment in 1938. (The RAF was spending 5 times as much on bombers as on fighters in 1938, and there was considerable strength in an argument for say 600 less bombers - that is a 25% reduction – in return for 250 more fighters – which is a 25% increase – and still fitting the entire NSF program into the spare change of almost the same total budget?

Finally, it should be noted that the RN rebuilds were an extremely cost effective fix compared to new builds. The 1920's partial modernisations and refits of all 12 Revenge, Queen and Renown class ships costing just 2.7 million pounds compared to 7 million for a single Nelson new build. And the estimates for the late 1930's rebuilds were similarly cost effective. Warspite at 2.3 million, or even Renown at 3.3, still meaning 3 or 4 rebuilds could be done for the price of a single new ship. All 8 Queen Elizabeth, Renown and Hood class vessels could be completely rebuilt for about the cost of 2.5 new KGV's, and at a fraction of the time and effort. Let alone the increases in effectiveness of these rebuilds! 

Queen Elizabeth's new engines for instance, meant that her boilers had been reduced from 24 to 8: which allowed a 30% reduction in volume and weight; which allowed substantial increases in deck armour; and tripling of range; let alone the vastly more effective DP armament... (Japan achieved almost as much with their complete rebuilds of the Kongo class – though they still didn't move to DP secondary batteries.) 

Which makes it all the more surprising that the USN did so little modernisation. (The much longer Great Depression in the US torpedoed most of the USN's plans for reconstructions or additions of DP batteries, but on the other hand why modernise 21 knot ships... The RN had decided the Revenge class 21 knot ships were simply not big enough or fast enough to be worth the effort, and concentrated on the 24+ and 30+ knot ships. Perhaps it was sensible for the USN to leave their old 21 knot ships unmodernised and concentrate on faster new builds?)

The New Standard Fleet and the 2 Ocean Navy

The main changes between the two RN plans were:

                        1936 DRC fleet       1938 NSF fleet

Battleships                    15                20

Aircraft Carriers            10                15

Cruisers                           70                100

Destroyers                    16 flotillas        22 flotillas

Submarines                    55                    82

For (very rough) comparisons of build plans - 

RN DRC build programs (with the small NSF additions in brackets) compared to USN 2 Ocean Navy plans.

1935    2 KGV                    2 Washington  

1936    3 KGV                    2 Sth Dakota        

1937    2 Lion                      2 Sth Dakota           

1938    3 Lion (+1)                2 Iowa

1939    Vanguard, 1 Lion (+1)      2 Iowa

1940    2 (+1) all cancelled            2 Iowa, 2 Montana (all cancelled)     

1941     2 (+1) cancelled                3 Montana (cancelled)

So, if the RN hadn't entered the war until December 1941, there would have been another 7 or 8 battleships on line or working up (though I presume the RN's 1940 program would be cancelled at December 1941 war start, just as the USN one was). With other ships like Barham, Malaya, Hood and Repulse all completely modernised, and the other 7 battleships considerably improved - at least in AA.

RN Battle fleet December 1941

First modernisations. In capital ships only Queen Elizabeth, Valiant and Renown were modernised for the September 1939 start (along with Warspite to a lesser extent – new engines, bridge and aircraft facilities, but no proper DP battery). Whereas Barham, Malaya, Repulse and Hood would all have been modernised (or half finished anyway) by December 1941. 

Nelson and Rodney might also have had a refit by December 1941, including probable significant increases in anti-aircraft armament. (Either the basic refit replacing their 6 4.7" single AA with 12 4" in 6 twin turrets in the same places and 4-6 octuple 2 pounder if they were considered too valuable to take off line for long; or - circumstances allowing – the full rebuild option with the six twin 6" and six single 4.7" AA probably replaced with a Renown style 8 or 9 twin 4.5", and 6-8 octuple 2 pounder mountings and a couple of dozen 20mm added). 

Of the 5 Revenge class, although all would have received some sort of engine and new boiler refits; probably some extra range as a result; some more deck armour; and probably a little more 4" and octuple or quad 2 pounder mounts: no more substantial rebuilding work was really considered particularly worthwhile given that they were  – in Churchill's words during the 1937 Program debates – support vessels, purely for convoy escort and bombardment purposes. (Note that under the original 1935 plan the Revenges were to be retired in turn as each KGV came on line, but the 1937 debates make clear that 'plans to retire them will depend on changes to circumstances'. The NSF plan apparently assumed that they would be kept, even if in reserve.)

The King George V and Prince of Wales  (from the 1936 program) and Duke of York, Anson and Howe (1937 program) would all be in service by December 1941. (In reality the last three were slowed down by the 1939 start by the urgent need to focus on other work like escorts, and commissioned in August 1941 and April and June 1942. Presumably 6 to 10 months earlier under peacetime conditions seems very likely if the RN's steady increase in build rate during ongoing peacetime worked out similar to the USN's experience of those extra precious years of peacetime builds before more urgent work slowed things.)

As a nice extra the 1939 program 'quicky build' bonus - Vanguard, using old 15" turrets to speed build time - would also be fitting out for completion in mid 1942.

The 1937 program Lion class – Lion and Temeraire –  would also, under peacetime conditions, be coming a bit faster, working up to enter service in within a few months, and probably the four 1938 program Lions   – Conquorer, Thunderer, Bellerophon and Vengeance (equivalent of last 2 South Dakota's in build process) – due for 2 to complete in late 1942, and the other 2 by mid 43.

The 1939 Lions – Tiger and Agamemnon (equivalent of first 2 Iowa's in build process) – also due late 1943.

The 2 1940 program 'Improved' Lions – Orion and Monarch (equivalent of last 2 Iowa's) – and the third NSF 'bonus' 'Improved' Lion  – Thunderer – would all be only half complete (the last possibly even less), so 1 or 2 might be completed like the last 2 Iowa's, with 1 or 2 likely to be suspended for possible completion at a slower pace... more as Vanguard actually was. (Note names were never assigned to these last few Lions, but there has been a lot of speculation of which alternatives the RN might have used, and I just collated the most popular picks). 

The 2 authorised 1941 program new design battleships – Colossus and Hercules –  and any planned later ships, presumably being cancelled: just like their contemporaries in the pace of the build process: the Iowa's 5 & 6 - Illinois and Kentucky – and the 5 Montana class – Montana, Ohio, Maine, New Hampshire and Louisiana. 

Wartime building cancellations

It is important to remember that every nation that joined the war halted new construction, and cancelled or delayed barely started construction. From a September 1939 start the 1935 and 1936 program King George V class were finished, but the 1937 and 1938 program Lion’s were cancelled, and the 1939 ones never even started. 

Just as the 2 1936 Bismarck's were finished but any of the later H class cancelled. 

For the Italians, a mid 1940 start to the war meant that the third Littorio – the 1938 program – Roma  –was also completed. But the 4th ship  – Impero – also a 1938 start, and actually launched pre-war, was never completed.

For a December 1941 start to the war the 1937 Yamato and 1938 Musashi were finished, but the1940 Shinano was only sort of finished... as a carrier in 1944. 

For the USN the 2 1939 program and 2 1940 program Iowa's classes were all finished (though the 1940 ones not until the war was almost over), but the 2 1941 ones not finished, and all 5 1940/41 program Montana’s were all suspended when war came, and finally cancelled in mid 1943. 

For amusement, let's run the concept the other way. 

Let's say Japan and the US joined the war in September 1939 too!

If Japan and the US had joined the war in 1939, it is likely that of the American battleships, the 1937 program - Washington and North Carolina, would be completed, but almost certainly some of the mixed 1938 and 1939 programs of the South Dakota and the Iowa classes – ordered at the same time as the Lions –  would have gone the same way as the Lions and been cancelled. 

The 4 South Dakota class (all designed to complete in 1942) might well have been kept to schedule, (giving a matching 6 modern ships to the 6 equivalent the RN completed – 5 KGV and Vanguard). But presumably even the Iowa and New Jersey (both started mid 1940 but not even scheduled to launch until late 1942, for completion 12-18 months later) might have been suspended, and certainly the Missouri and Wisconsin (not expected to complete until late 1944 or early 1945), along with the fifth and sixth Iowa's and the 5 1940 program Montanas, would all have been cancelled if the US had joined the war in 1939.

Had the Japanese entered the war in 1939 they might have attempted to finished at least one or two of the Yamato class simply because they had no modern battleships at all (the most modern being the two ships of the 1920 vintage Nagato class), but frankly their ability to do so under wartime conditions is even more questionable than the German H Class. Realistically even completing one of them might be a stretch, and they might have finished up just floating hulks like Impero or Graf Zeppelin.

So lets list the real 1939 stats for comparison - 

RN 15 capital ships:

5 Revenge Class - WWI - 21 knot (minimal modification)

5 Queen Elizabeth - WWI - 25 knot (3 completely rebuilt, 2 not)

2 Renown - WWI - 32 knot (1 completely rebuilt, 1 not)

1 Hood - WWI - 32 knot (not)

2 Nelson - 20's - 23 knot (modern...ish)

For comparison purposes:

USN 15 capital ships –

1 12" Wyoming – Arkansas, and 2 14" – New York & Texas, all 21 knots. (The last of pre-war Dreadnoughts). 

9 14" 'standards' - Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Mississipi, Idaho, Tenessee, California - WWI builds - all 21 knots

3 16" standards - Colorado, Maryland, Washington  - 20'S - all 21 knots.

None of them substantially modernised.

France - 8 capital ships (though 3 of those, like Arkansas, pretty marginal):

3 12" Courbet, Ocean, Paris (pre-WWI - 21 knot dreadnoughts equivalent to Arkansas)

3 14" Bretagne, Provence, Lorraine (WWI - 21 knot. Roughly equivalent to Texas or early USN WWI 'standards')

None of them substantially modernised. Plus

2 13" Dunkerque, Strasbourg (30'S - 30 knots, but only battlecruiser grade armour)

Japan - 9 capital ships

4 14" Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise, Hyuga - WWI - 22 knots (roughly equivalent to Revenge's or USN standards)

3 14" Kongo, Kirishima, Karuna - Modernised WWI - 30 knots 
(a fourth ship, Heie, had been demilitarised in 1929, but was being reconstructed in 1939)

2 16" Nagato, Mutsu - 20's - 25 knots (roughly equivalent to Queen's or Colorado's)

Germany 2 capital ships:

2 11" 'fast-battleships' - Scharnhorst, Gneisenau - 30's - 32 knots

Italy 4 capital ships (cruiser killers really):

4 12" Conti de Cavour, Giulio Cesare, Andrea Doria, Caio Dulio - WWI - 26 knots

(Most of them substantially modernised, but as battlecruisers, and simply not capable of taking on proper battleships.)

So by Sep 1939 

ALLIED TOTAL: 38 with up to 14 more likely to complete.

AXIS total 15, with possibly 9 more.

By contrast...

Theoretical December 1941 start to the war: 

RN 20-21 capital ships (with 3 more completing '42, 2 more'43, and perhaps one more later - total 27-28 perhaps):

5 Revenge Class - WWI - 21 knot (minimal modification)

5 Queen Elizabeth - WWI - 25 knot (all completely rebuilt)

2 Renown - WWI - 32 knot (completely rebuilt)

1 Hood - WWI - 32 knot (completely rebuilt)

2 Nelson - 20's - 23 knot (modernised)

5 KGV - 30's - 28 knot (new)

3-4 Lions - 40's - 30 knot (new) due to complete in 42 

1 Vanguard -  40's - 32 knot (new) also completing 42?

2-3 more Lions due for completion 43?

1 more Lion possibly to complete in 1944? (Rest cancelled)

For comparison - USN 17 capital ships (4 more due 1942, + 2 1943, +2 1944 - total 25)

1 12" Arkansas and 2 14" New York and Texas - 21 knots (last of pre-Great War dreadnoughts)

9 14" standards - Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Mississipi, Idaho, Tenessee, California - WWI - 21 knots (all pretty much unmodernised)

3 16" standards - Colorado, Maryland, Washington  - 20's - all 21 knots (unmodernised)

North Carolina, Washington - 30's - 28 knots (new)

4 South Dakota and 4 Iowa completing over next 3 years.

France - 10 capital ships (though 3 marginal, 2 more building - possible total 10 or 11):

3 12" Courbet, Ocean, Paris - WWI - 21 knot dreadnoughts (unmodernised)

3 14" Bretagne, Provence, Lorraine - WWI - 21 knot (largely unmodernised)

2 13" Dunkerque, Strasbourg 30's - 30 knots (new, but 'cruiser killers')

2 15" Richelieu, Jean Bart 40's - 32 knots (new)

Remaining 2 Richelieu's likely to be cancelled.

Japan: 10 

(Hiei having been re-armed) - with Yamato commissioned only days later on 16/12/41, and Musashi 5/8/42 (total 12)

Germany - 4 capital ships (+2 H class started, but unlikely to finish):

2 11" 'battlecruisers'? - Scharnhorst, Gneisenau - 30's - 31 knots (new) - possibly one or both of them back in refit to have her 11" turrets replaced with 15"?

2 15" Bismarck, Tirpitz - 30's - 30 knots (new)

Italy - 6 capital ships

4 12.6" Conti de Cavour, Giulio Cesare, Andrea Doria, Caio Dulio - 26 knots (WWI - completely rebuilt, but only to battlecruiser standard)

2 15" Littorio, Vittorio Venetto - 40'S - 30 knots (2 more building, 1 – Roma  – might be finished?)

So by Dec 1941

ALLIED TOTAL: 51 with up to 14 more likely to complete

AXIS TOTAL: 20, with possibly 3 more likely to complete.

I imagine that might have changed some people's outlooks on going to war?

Starting too early...

The RN's biggest problem with starting a war in 1939 was that - with the Revenge class really being only suitable for backup purposes, and Barham, Malay, Hood and Repulse all still desperately needing modernisation, they really only had 6 modern/modernised capital ships Warspite, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Repulse, Nelson and Rodney, to face potentially Germany, Italy and Japan all at once. 

Which is almost fine with France's 2 fast modern back ups (plus 6 older battleships) in the war on their side, but becomes a real problem in 1940 when they dropped out.

Unfortunately the 5 new build KGV's Britain added to the fleet during the war came no faster than 5  losses - Royal Oak 1939, and Hood, Barham pre December 7/8 1941, and Repulse and Prince of Wales post. (Note - 4 out of 5 losses were largely unmodernised ships.)

By contrast, in a December 1941 start to the war 19 of the RN's 24 available capital ships would have been modernised or new builds. (Still with the 5 Revenge class for backup, and at least 3 or 4 more new builds expected within another year or two.) 

Compared to a total of 20 Axis capital ships (4 of them only 12.6" dreadnoughts and 2 others only 11" - all 6 of those unable to face even the unmodernised Revenge's.)

Just visualise likely December 1941 deployments for the RN under NSF plan.

(And noting that if no one is at war, the RN would deploy for  best counter to maximum threat. So presumably enough modern ships – and new ships working up – to intimidate Germany just in case; several modernised ships facing Italy – with plenty of French support to make that threat look overwhelming to Italy; and a fast modern fleet facing Japan which – with USN potential support – should be enough to make them consider the army's plan for expansion in Siberia over the navies to tackle Britain and the US!)

Planned Deployment: (though some ships would still be finishing refit, working up, or en- route.)

Gibraltar 'just' 2 or 3 old capital ships - 3 Revenge's –  say Ramillies, Royal Oak and Royal Sovereign  – assigned to support the the 5 older battleships of the French fleet in the Western Mediterranean, and/or to undertake Mediterranean or Atlantic convoy escort duty. (Though the Dunkerques would probably be better to handle the South Atlantic convoy protection if Germany looked genuinely threatening... or to deploy to Indochina if the Japanese appeared more threatening...) 

Mediterranean Fleet - 4 capital ships, the 4 rebuilt Queen Elizabeth's – Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Warspite and Barham. 

Eastern Fleet 8-9 capital ships - 5 KGV's – King George V, Prince of Wales, Duke of York, Anson and  the still to arrive Howe  – and 2 rebuilt Renown's – Renown and Repulse. With 2 Revenge – Resolution and Revenge – for Indian Ocean escort duty. (Potentially with USN support? Would Roosevelt follow through on the plan to rebase some of the USN to Singapore to help intimidate the Japanese in these circumstances? Would the RN and USN be doing joint exercises in the Pacific as well as joint neutrality patrols in the Atlantic?)

Home Fleet 5 or 6 active capital ships (plus 3 fitting out and 2 still in dock for rebuild). Including:

– 2 short ranged but powerful Nelson class (though Rodney might still be working up post refit)

– Perhaps with French support of a Richelieu or two?

– presumably with Howe still working up before heading East

– 1 or 2 1937 program Lions – Lion & Temeraire – working up towards commission, 

– and the first 2 1938 program Lions – Conquorer and Thunderer – due to commission in late 1942. 

– Vanguard would also be launched and fitting out. Due for commission in mid 42? 

– The last two 1938 program Lions – Bellerophon and Vengeance – also due for commissioning in mid 1943. 

– also 2 ships still in dock for rebuild: the last of the Queen Elizabeth's – Malaya – and the Hood. (Presumably both half way through their complete rebuilds, and both due back in service in late 1942 and mid 1943 respectively. For amusements sake I will suggest that Hood's long delayed refit had finally been forced into effect by her 'stripping a turbine' in July 1940 - let's say it was 'exercising' with the Strasbourg, rather than chasing her at Mers el Kebir...)

The 3 1939 program 'Improved' Lions –  being 60% or more complete, would probably be completed, but more slowly.

The 3 1940 program Improved Lions, probably at about 30%, 20% and 15% build respectively, would all suspended. Probably all to be cancelled, or possibly the most advanced ships to be completed more slowly to trial new technology like the power loaded 5.25" turrets. (The ones actually used for the final version of Vanguard.)

The 1941 program for 3 more ships of a completely new 50,000 ton class would certainly have been cancelled.

Naval Security?

Which means that for a December 1941 start to the war, the RN alone would have parity or superiority in capital ships over all potential foes in every theatre, regardless of whether they received any French or US backup. With the full backing of the French, and the potential backing of the USN, it would actually look more like 2 to 1, or even 3 to 1, odds against potential aggressors!)

In fact, as long as France  - now with 4 modern and 6 older battleships - remained in the war, Britain could fairly easily reinforce the Eastern Fleet with the 3-4 more ships from the 15 odd in the Gibraltar, Mediterranean or Home fleets, bringing the Eastern Fleet fleet to 12-14 capital ships once Howe arrived too. (Potentially 7 or 8 of them modern KGV's or Lions, with the 2 Renowns added, giving 10 modern or modernised fast battleships, all with completely modern DP batteries unmatched by anything in the world except the 2 recently commissioned North Carolina and Washington.)

And the USN would also have at least a dozen capital ships in its Pacific Fleet, mostly old 'standards', but including those two modern ones.

While the Japanese would still only have 8 from WWI, 2 from the early 1920's, and a Yamato due in a few days (and Musashi not due until August 1942).

December 6 1941 = 10 Japanese capital ships (4 of them only battlecruisers, unable to face any Allied battleships), versus say 20-22 British and American capital ships? Not including any Richelieu's or Dunkerque's that might turn up?

Looking at a few months later in mid 42 = perhaps 11 or 12 Japanese (only 2 modern, and none with proper DP armament) versus 24 to 26 Allied (probably 14 or 15 of them with modern DP armament)?

Would Japan or Italy have been willing to fight the Allies in December 1941?

Anyone think Japan was likely to even consider going to war with even Britain alone, let alone Britain and the US and France combined under those conditions? (The preference of Foreign Minister Matsuoko and the Japanese Army Council to go north to invade Siberia again – rather than the navy's preference to go south – suddenly looks much more likely doesn't it? Perhaps a combined Japanese-German attack on the Soviet Union might look a better option?)

How about Italy? (A traditional British ally, who had fought on the Allied side in WWI, and who only took the opportunistic, and frankly stupid, decision to join the Germans in WWII after France collapsed unexpectedly.) Any chance of Italy joining the German side in those conditions? 

Interesting, isn't it... It will become more so when I look at the Aircraft Carriers... next episode.