If the war had not started until December 1941: Part III – Naval Power Summary

 Same Intro as Part I & II - I recently started looking at the issue of what would have happened if a second 'Munich Agreement' in 1939... a 'Warsaw Agreement' perhaps (presumably because France and perhaps a couple of Dominions refused to support a declaration of war), meant that Britain and France did not actually declare war on Germany on September 3, 1939. 

Might the World War have started in December 1941 instead? Probably not, but that needs explaining. It looks like being a fun topic, but it requires a lot of background. So I thought I would start with an analysis of where naval power would be in December 1941 if the European powers had not kicked off early. Even that is too big a bite for one go, so part I looked at Battleships, and Part II will just looks at aircraft carriers. (I will also look at land and air power in another article, then consider how – or if – any war might have developed on that basis as I progress.) 

If the war had not started until December 1941: Part III – Naval Power Summary

The previous posts - on Battleships and Aircraft Carriers - were getting a bit long, so I am doing a third to summarise the effects of the delay of a start of World War Two from September 1939 to December 1941 on the construction, re-builds, and new orders, of Britain, France, Germany and Italy, just to see what they would have brought on line to match what the US and Japan had on line by December 1941.

[A lot of the previous discussion is based on the 1938 NSF - New Standard Fleet – plan for the RN, which started to replace the 1935 DRC - Defence Requirements Committee – plan in 1939, only to be cut short when war started early.]

The main changes between the two RN plans were:

                        1936 DRC fleet       1938 NSF fleet

Battleships                    15                20

Aircraft Carriers            10                15

Cruisers                           70                100

Destroyers                    16 flotillas        22 flotillas

Submarines                    55                    82

Capital Ships.

Part I pointed out that in the intervening two years, the British would have rebuilt Barham, Malaya, Hood and Repulse to the same standards as Queen Elizabeth, Valiant and Renown (plus engine and AA upgrades to Nelson, Rodney, and at least some of the Revenge class, which would have reduced weight and increased range even with the extra armour and armament upgrades). They would also have commissioned all 5 KGV, and probably have 2 Lions working up, 2 more Lions due to commission 1942 and another 2 1943, as well as Vanguard fitting out and possible 2 more battleships building for commissioning in 1944. (And I assumed that Britain would curtail construction of any other orders there, as they would be unlikely to complete any additional ships during the war... matching the US's actual practice of continuing the 3rd and 4th Iowa's, but cancelling the 5th and 6th Iowa's and all 5 Montana's.)

It also notes that France would have bought on line 2 of the 4 new Richelieu, with a third fitting out and a fourth possibly being cancelled half complete. Germany would have completed the 2 Bismarck's, but probably cancelled the H class incomplete. And Italy would have 3 Vittoria-Venetto's commissioned, with another fitting out.

That leaves Britain with about 20 Capital ships in commission, with 3 more due in 1942 (it's New Standard Fleet target of 20 modern or modernised, plus the 5 old Revenge's in support roles being due to complete 1943) and 2-4 likely to complete for a total of of 27-29 planned. The US with 20 in commission and perhaps 5 more likely to complete over 1942 -1944. Japan with 9 in commission and perhaps 3 likely to complete, 2 in 1942 and perhaps another in 1944. France with 9 in commission and another 1 likely to complete in 1943. Germany with  4 in commission, but unlikely to complete any others, and Italy with 8 and one likely to complete.

Similarly with aircraft carriers. Britain would have had 12 in commission (and a couple of escort carriers) and another half dozen of each type likely to complete (still 3 short of it's NSF – New Standard Fleet – target of 15, but likely to meet that in 1942), Japan 9 with one fleet carrier (and a few conversions) likely to commission. The US 7, with 6 fleet and 5 Independence (and a number of escort carriers) likely to complete. (Germany may also have had 1 carrier in commission, but with even worse problems dealing with Luftwaffe disinterest in providing aircraft than the RN had faced in 1938 before taking back control of the Fleet Air arm. A second still under construction would be unlikely to be finished. Italy would still only have a barely started carrier conversion, unlikely to ever commission.)

I'll take a moment to play with Escort Carriers too. 

The admiralty had put together designs for 'trade-protection carriers' either by conversion, or new build, as early as 1936. But lack of funding prevented experimentation, even in the first year of war. The first in service escort carrier – the converted cargo liner Audacity, with only 6 or 8 aircraft – actually served (and was sunk) prior to December 1941. But Audacity was not the first commissioned, with the first American conversion of a C-3 merchant hull beating her by days. 

Both navies had in fact started experiments as soon as funding and resources were available, with the British trying Fighter Catapult Ships and Catapult Armed Merchantmen (40 odd ships with one or more Hurricanes on a catapult), and  later19 Merchant Aircraft Carriers – flight decks on top of existing tankers and grain carriers (often capable of handling 12 - 20 aircraft), before both navies ordered considerable numbers of proper Escort Carriers in 1941, for completion in 1942 or 3 (or 4). The first American built Escort Carrier commissioned into the RN - Archer - was actually in November 1941.

Given that the USN was doing this in peacetime, it is unclear that there is any reason to believe that the RN would not have been doing same as soon as opportunity arose. So we have to assume that at least some of these Catapult, or Merchant Carriers, or even a few more proper Escort Carriers would have been on line for the RN had they been given another 2 years of peace to prepare. How many is hard to say, so let's just leave it at 2 Escort Carriers that in fact were in service then, and perhaps half a dozen each of Catapult Ships and the Merchant Carriers, with possibly twice that many again on line for similar conversions. The USN presumably would also have a few Escort Carriers already in service, with probably at least a dozen more in production.

More importantly, The USN's promise of speedy production of the new designs, which was initiated in mid-1941, would certainly not have made the process of the USN or the RN receiving those ships any slower than it was in reality, and almost certainly a bit faster if the designs could be refines in peacetime conditions, before shipping losses pushed other concerns to the fore. In the case of a December 1941 start to the war, the initial impetus may have been no faster, but the process would probably be further developed.

Moving on to Cruisers, Destroyers, Escorts and Submarines...

I will use the tables in one of Antony Preston's many books (An Illustrated History of Navies of World War Two, Bison, UK, 1976) as a starting point, not because I particularly like his work (in fact I found much of it very poorly reasoned), but as a sample of the sorts of tables that have dominated too much discussion for too long.

Preston gives the strength of the RN in September 1939 as 15 battleships (plus 9 building), 6 aircraft-carriers (plus 6 building), 15 heavy cruisers, 40 light cruisers (plus 8), 6 AA cruisers (plus 16), 1 cruiser-minelayer (+4), 113 modern destroyers (plus 24), 68 old destroyers (+ 11 being converted for AS duties), 47 modern submarines (+12); 54 Escorts (plus 80); 42 fleet minesweepers (+10); 2 monitors and 2 net-layers.

Most people would have a few minor quibbles, but this looks approximately correct. In aircraft carriers the experimental model Argus (really reduced to a training ship) is not included, and it appears the 6th aircraft carrier would be Unicorn, (as the last Illustrious was not ordered until 1940). Fair enough.. The 9 capital ships building include the 5 KGV and 4 of the 6 Lions. Also, fair enough. Read Parts I & II for commentary on those. 

Cruisers.

15 heavy cruisers would be the same. Adding Radar, and some additional armour and light AA, being the only likely changes to those. (Though it is interesting to note that the surprisingly swift up-armouring of several of the County class in the late 30's seems to have revealed that they were designed specifically to have a 4" belt bolted on at short notice the moment the 10,000 ton Treaty restrictions could be downplayed... A 1941 start would have probably completed up-armouring all of them.)

But let's look at how the other numbers would have varied by December 1941. I will note that I have to assume the cancellations on start of war in September 1939, and the even bigger dial down of the 1940 program (more than replaced later in the 41 and 42 programs), didn't happen when war didn't happen. So we have to use the established build programs from the 1937, 1938 and 1939 programs to guess at the likely 1940 and 1941 programs...

First the 6 AA cruisers (+16) of 1939. Note that the 6 AA were all converted 'C' class WWI vintage cruisers, and the plan was to re-arm another 6 C class, and all 8 of the D class, as AA, for a total of 20 modernised AA cruisers. Plus of course the 16 new Dido AA cruisers, of which 11 were complete by December 1941, with 5 more to complete 1942. (It is very likely that the lack of 5.25" turrets that led to the latter Dido's being equipped with 4.5" instead, would have been felt earlier if battleship production discussed previously had continued, so we can assume that most of the Dido's would have actually been finished with 10 4.5", rather than 10 or even 8 5.25". Actually improving stability, range, and their AA performance for most of the war, without too much reduction in their anti-ship capabilities.) So 31 AA cruisers in December 1941, with 5 from the 1939 program due 1942, and presumably the 1940 program of another 6 more Dido might be finished, but the 1941 program of perhaps 4 might be either completed or just cancelled?

So of the 40 light cruisers (plus 8) listed for 1939, 13 would have converted to AA. The remaining 27 presumably would have all had some additional light AA (any ships with single 4" AA, having them replaced with twin, and with several others having some 6" or 7.5" single guns also replaced by twin 4" mounts), and presumably a fair number might have radar added. 

Of the '8' cruisers building, 10 Fiji class were actually completed or working up by December 1941 (last one commissioned December 19), with the 6 Minotaurs in each of the 1940 and 1941 programs scheduled for completion during 1942 or 1943. So 37 light cruisers, with 6 more due 1942 and another 6 1943.

This lifts the 1939 total of 61 cruisers (still 7 short of the minimum required for the Defence Requirements DRC fleet of 1936 called for a minimum of 70 cruisers) to a December 1941 total of 83 cruisers, with 11 more due 1942, and perhaps 10 more 1943. The New Standard Fleet (NSF) of 1938 target was 100 cruisers, it appears the NSF was on track for mid 1943. Meaning cruisers would be the last part of the NSF to reach their target, with every other part of the plan exceeding their targets a full year earlier.

Of the mine-laying cruisers, the 4 builds listed in 1939 were all in commission by December 1941, for a total of 5, with 2 more in the 1940 program due in 1942, and probably another 2 from the 1941 program in 1943. (Plus whatever extra 'wartime emergency' orders would have been made after war start in December 1941 of course.)

Submarines. 

Preston lists 47 'modern' (+12). Presumably excluding the old H and L classes used for training, but including the two dozen O, P, R and Thames classes (the big long range boats optimised for the China station, too many of which were lost plugging gaps in the unsuitable Mediterranean waters before they could come into their own in a Pacific war). The 27 or so S, T and U classes in service or working up by September 1939 take the numbers over 47, again, not including the 6 Porpoise class minelayer subs which Preston might think of as seperate (like the mine-laying cruisers?). I make it about 55 in service September 1939 (49 without the mine-layers), with another 37 actually reaching service by December 1941, for 92 in total. (Though again I think peacetime conditions would have lifted that by at least 8 or 10 others.) Say 100 in service, with another 24 or so due in each of 42 and 43. 

As usual the existing designs were immediately standardised when war started in 39, and only slightly modified for the first few years of the war. So the new and improved A class (optimised for Pacific operations again, and a considerably simplified construction that took half as along – only 8 months or so – to build), were not actually entering the production schedule until 43. Meaning the first dozen did not enter service until late 44 and early 45, effectively too late to see much service. So again it is interesting to speculate on whether the 1940 or 1941 peacetime programs might have included some A class style design for Pacific work to replace the old O, P & R class, once the target of 82 submarines for the NSF was clearly going to be passed in mid 1941. It seems likely that some newer Pacific oriented boats would at least be in the pipeline for delivery in 1943 or 44.

Destroyers. 

Of the 68 old destroyers (plus 11 converting), almost all would have been converted to long range escorts by December 1941, so those 79 ships belong in the Escort Destroyer total. 

Of the 113 modern (+24 building) in 1939, the 24 appear to be the L, M and N class, (which finally established dual purpose guns in proto-turrets on British destroyers, though, limited to 55 degree elevation, they still had a long way to go to be anywhere near as good as the 5"/38 with 85 degree elevation fitted on contemporary US destroyers). The J and K class had been particularly good balanced designs, but with only low angle guns. the L and M classes were a bit too big, and a bit too expensive, so the N class returned to a J/K design but still without proper dual purpose. 

When war started in 1939, the next classes dropped back to simpler earlier design 'Wartime Emergency' destroyers, and reverted to 9 classes constructed on an older 4 x 4'7" designs, but whether the same process would have happened for a December 1941 start is doubtful.

Fairly obviously, the return to a J & K class design for the N class was supposed to establish a new standard destroyer type. The ongoing efforts to improve the Dual Purpose nature of armament in follow up N style classes in 1940 and 1941 would almost certainly have seen proper DP guns installed. If N class production had been repeated by another half dozen similar classes (say another 48 ships),  during 1940 and 1941, and become the standard design by December 1941, the N class would probably have remained the main wartime production, in the same way as the contemporary Fletcher design became the default for the USN when it entered the war.

[When exactly the 4.7" DP turrets would have swapped for the superior 4.5" twins is hard to say. Under the 1939 start, they were delayed becoming the main battery until 1943, but it is pretty likely that with a December 1941 start, the advantages of standardising the DP armament of the majority of fleet vessels – older modernised battleships, aircraft carriers, modern AA cruisers, and modern destroyers – so they all used 4.5", might have got them into service, or at least into production prior to December 1941? (Which is the exact process the Fletchers came from.) Some of the British destroyers launched in 1940 or 1941 were actually fitted with twin 4", or single 4.5" anyway. And the 65 odd Z, C  and Battle classes from 1943 on all had DP 4.5". HMS Savage – commissioned 1943 – was actually the first real use of 4.5" DP, with wartime delays responsible.Who can say how much faster things might have developed with 2 more years of peace? But let's assume proper DP mounts, possibly in the P or Q class, and certainly by the S class. Which means proper destroyer DP would starting to be in use by war start in December 1941, not 4 years into the 1939 start war.]

As it was all 24 L, M and N were complete by December 1941, as were the P class, most of the O class, and half of the Q class. Under non wartime conditions, let's assume all of them, for 48 new builds, with perhaps the new 'proper' DP designs, the S and T classes, of another 16 launched and fitting out or working up. 

On top of the 113 1939 destroyers, adding that 65 that comes to 177 destroyers, or 22 flotilla's... (exactly on target for the NSF requirement). In which case another 24 - 32 might be expected in each of the 1942 and 1943 years.

Add the 79 fast escort destroyers from old WWI conversions, for 256. Also, not a single one of the excellent Hunt class fast escort destroyers was ready in 1939, whereas 65 were in service by December 1941, with another 13 due in 1942. 

So about 321 destroyers and destroyer escorts in service in December 1941, compared to 113 two years earlier, (with 24-32 more due in 42, even before 'wartime emergency' builds were started).

Smaller Escorts is where it starts getting tricky. 

Preston lists 43 with 80 building in 39. That 43 appears to be about 8 WWI, and 35 interwar ocean going sloops of the 1,050-1,250 tonne style, including a few new build Egret and Black Swan class. (The 11 600 tonne patrol sloops don't seem to make his list.)

Minesweeping sloops (600-900 tonne) were a particular problem with only about 45 in September 1939, with another 120 or so due to complete by December 1941, for a much more useful 165 available for a December 41 war start (with the same again on order).

The new Corvettes (the famous Flower class) had not started to come into service in September 1939, but about 210 of them, as well as the first half dozen of the new River Class would be in service by December 1941. With a couple of dozen more Flower or modified Flower, and the same of the River class due in 1942 (maybe 50 or 60), and at least the same again in 43 and 44. Then the much improved Castle class and Loch Bay class would start rolling out by the score in 43 and 44. 

So instead of the 220 odd destroyers and escorts actually available in September 1939, by December 1941 Britain actually had put into service about 600 destroyers and escorts. (This would probably be a bit less for a December 1941 war start, as the building rate wouldn't already have seen resources diverted from finishing battleships and aircraft carriers for urgent wartime conditions as yet. But let's be really  conservative and say 500 odd minimum by December 1941 instead of the 220 available 2 years earlier?) 

Even with all 22 flotilla's of Fleet destroyers reserved for fleet work (which never really happened), that allow somewhere between 400 and 500 escort vessels available, compared to the 125 or so available in September 1939. Plus a number of Escort carriers and Merchant carriers. Plus considerably more Coastal Command long range air patrol capacity. Nor did German 'wartime emergency' U-boat production start climbing at any considerable rate until their own Plan Z battleship and aircraft carrier effort was officially abandoned when war started in 1939. Presumably if war had been delayed until December 1941, the Kriegsmarine would have continued to concentrate on producing at least 2-4 of the 8 authorised of the H class battleships, plus 3 or 4 more heavy cruisers and another carrier, etc... leaving U-boat construction to fall far far behind the increases in RN escorts. Frankly, with plenty of resources to make convoys possible from December 1941, it is hard to see how Germany could have even attempted the sort of Battle for the Atlantic that was possible with a 1939 start.

(Let's not even consider the American contributions - the famous 50 '4 stacker' destroyers probably would not have been sent to Britain, or at least not until after war started. Similarly the 10 Coastguard cutters, 34 mine-sweeping sloops, and 110 odd Escort sloops that all arrived in 42 or 43.)

So just to reflect, the New Standard Fleet design of 1938 was predicated on being able to have superior fleets available for facing both Germany and Japan at the same time, with adequate left-over to convince the Italians that war would be a bad idea. 

The New Standard Fleet was predicated on: 

20 capital ships. In fact 20 or 21 would be ready in December 1941, with another 3 due in 1942, and 2 probably more 1943. (But given that the old Revenge class were planned to be restricted to back ups as newer models came on line, the real goal of 20 modernised or new build capital ships would really be achieved 1942-3, with the total number of 25 or more capital ships in commission just being a bonus.)

15 aircraft carriers. 13 ready December 41, with 2 to 3 more due in each of 42, 43 and 44 (not counting dozens of escort carriers etc.) Target to be reached mid 1942.

100 cruisers, of which 80-90 were ready, with a dozen more due in each of 42 and 43. Target to be reached early 1943.

22 flotillas of destroyers would probably be available by December 1941. Target exceeded (plus perhaps 500 escorts!)

82 submarines were required, but more like 100 would be in service by December 1941. Target exceeded (with 30 more due in each of 42 and 43).

Though I note that it is also predicated on the French navy providing the backup to give absolute superiority over all 3 Axis powers - Germany, Italy and Japan. Of course if war didn't start until December 1941, that would still be the case.

So a bit of a summary of other navies builds for a December 1941 war start.

We know the USN and Japan numbers of course, and it is unlikely that there would be much change there had Europe not gone to war earlier. Both were building up at a significant rate, and the US in particular was vamping up as fast as it could in peacetime.

France: would have probably commissioned 2 Richelieu, with a third due perhaps 1943-44.  Also the aircraft carrier Joffre would be close to completion, and her sister Panlieve likely to be cancelled at war start (unless it was war against Japan, not Germany, in which case it would be accelerated rather than cancelled). 

None of the new St-Louis heavy cruisers were in commission, but 2 were planned to be finished in 1943, along with a few light cruisers and a dozen new destroyers.

Italy: 2 Vittorio-Vennetto's, with a third due 1942. Several more cruisers and a couple of dozen destroyers and escorts and submarines would have been added, with the same again in production.

Germany: 2 Bismarck's, and their first aircraft carrier working up, and perhaps another 2 Hipper class cruisers, and a dozen destroyers, and probably another 40 - 50 submarines.  (Possibly another 2 H class launched, and maybe even one approaching completion, though it seems extremely unlikely that more than 1 or 2 were possible to actually complete even if the naval plan had soldiered on into December 1941... The German economy was actually in dire straights even with raiding the Austrian and Czech  – and presumably Polish – economies to keep it going...) Any other major ships were unlikely to complete, with wartime emergency production switching to escorts and submarines. (Though even Doenitz would have to admit that there were still not nearly enough U-boats to take on the expanded RN escort fleet with any chance of war winning success given relative numbers in December 1941.)

Balance of Power December 1941

On the - fairly unlikely - chance, that a war starting in December 1941 might still see the same sides develope, let's look at Allies vs Axis in these circumstances.

Battleships/Battlecruisers:

Britain – 21 (+7 likely to complete), France – 10 (+1 likely to complete), US – 16 (+9 likely to complete). Total 47? (+17?)

Germany – 4 (+1?), Italy – 7 (+1), Japan – 10 (+2). Total 21? (+3 or 4?). 

(Note, without Italy – which would be far less likely to jump onto the Axis team in such circumstances – the real German/Japanese battleship/battlecruiser numbers would be just – 14 (+2 or 3), with potentially Italy now in Allied column making it 54 (+20) on that side... You can do similar calculations for the rest of these types if it amuses you, but note that the Italians are about 40% of the Axis totals in most classes, and if they rejoined the Allies for the Second war, the Allied naval dominance would be even greater than in the First...)

Fleet Aircraft Carriers:

Britain – 13 (+ 8), France – 1 (+2), US – 6 (+11). Total 19? (+20?).

Germany – 1? (+1?), Italy – (+2?), Japan 6 (+1 and 4 conversions). Total 7? (+6-8?)

(Note, Britain, Japan and the US also had 2 or 3 older or lighter carriers each, none really suitable for front line service, and Britain and the US would both have their first few escort carriers coming on line. Japan also had 4 light conversions in process, and a pile of UNRYU class on order (only 3 of which were ever completed), while the USN had 11 cruiser conversions in line for 1943-4 and lots more escort carriers starting in 1942; and the RN would also have had 10 Colossus class in line for 1943-4, and lots more escort carriers starting 1942.)

Cruisers:

Britain – 88 (+24?), France – 23 (+5?), US 37 (+40?). Total 148? (+69?)

Germany – 12? (+3?), Italy – 23? (+12?), Japan 38 (+10). Total 73? (+25?)

(Italy in allied line up  - Allies 171 (+81) to Axis 50 (+13)...)

Destroyers:

Britain –  321 (+64), France – 105 (+30?), US 177 (+188). Total 604? (+282?)

Germany – 34? (+12), Italy –59? (+12?), 108 (+43). Total 188? (+63?)

(Italy in allied line up  - Allies 663 (+294) to Axis 142 (+75)...)

Escorts:

Britain –  500? (plus 240?), France – 120 (+45?), US – 120? (+160?). Total 740 (+445?)

Germany –  35 (+18), Italy – 78 (+15?), 

Submarines:

Britain – 102? (+60?) , France – 113? (+40?), US – 114 (+79). Total 329 (+ 179?).

Germany – 112? (+85?), Italy – 129? (+24?), Japan 63 (+60?). Total 304 (+169?)

(Italy in allied line up  - Allies 458? (+203?) to Axis 175? (+142?)...)

I think you can see where I am going with this. With these respective numbers in December 1941, it is extremely unlikely that Italy would enter the war on Germany's side. 

Even if France was suddenly defeated and knocked out and the French fleet dropped out of the allied count. British naval dominance would be too great for Italy to take the risk. 

And Japan would be unlikely to see an opportunity to take advantage of even if France was suddenly knocked out, given RN and USN combined numbers. Especially if Italy seemed unlikely to assist.

Would war have started in December 1941?

Can't see Italy joining the Axis. Mussolini, like Stalin, was an opportunist: not a genuinely foam flecked ideological idiot like Hitler.

Can't see Japan attacking Britain and the US. (And even less Britain, the US, and France, with Italy potentially now in their column!) Perhaps war against Russia to retake Siberia (which Japan had actually held for most of the 1920's after the White Russian intervention by the Allies of WWI) might look a better option

Frankly Germany would probably still not be deterred from a continental war if the madman still wanted one, as her naval situation – or lack of naval possibilities – would really be no worse than in WWI...

But that assumes the land and air relative strengths by December 1941 would still make a continental war an attractive game for Germany.

I will look at those figures in the next posts.