World War Two Naval statistics - Comparing Apples with Oranges

I have posted before about the difficulties of people writing about a six-year war as though they can make definitive statements on technology based on a dispersed snapshot viewpoints from different years. Such comparisons are extremely misleading. Technology simply moves too fast in wartime to allow such sloppiness.

For instance I commented (here) that the Sherman tank was quite a reasonable combat vehicle when it first appeared on the North African battlefields in mid 1942, but that it was already outclassed by the time it came up against the early Tiger tanks in Tunisia six months later. The idea that it was even remotely good enough to fight competitively in the invasion of Germany two to three years later is just laughable. Even the British Firefly versions - which actually carried a functional gun into Normandy - were still called ‘Ronson Lighters’ by the Allies and ‘Tommy Cookers’ by the Germans for very good reasons. In other words the Americans finished the war with their first generation wartime tank still the main combatant (and it was to remain so in Korea). Meanwhile the British, whose first wartime generation Matilda tank had been probably the best tank in the world in 1940, but whose second wartime generation Crusader was decidedly average in 1942, was rolling out third generation Comet and Centurion tanks in the last days of the war. (The Centurion was certainly the best design of its day. In fact it is still in service as a front line combat tank with regional powers like South Africa today!)

Another example that I have commented on before is the use of Anti-Tank artillery. The British 2-pounder (40mm) was the best anti-tank gun of 1939 and 1940, but was not really up to the mark by 1942 when the Germans had already replaced their 37mm guns with 50mm guns and were starting to use 75 or 88mm, and the Russians were starting to use the 76.2mm. But the reason it had fallen behind the pace was that the much better 6-pounder (57mm) - which had been supposed to go into production in 1940 - had been put off for 18 months because the British were facing imminent threat of invasion. In fact the 6-pounder was more than adequate for 1942 and 1943 (and even for the remainder of the war with special ammunition). Which did not alter the fact that the British already planned to replace it with the much more powerful 17-pounder even before they came across the Tiger in late 1942. In fact the Royal Artillery was using the 17-pounder as standard from early 1943, leaving 6-pounders to the infantry.

This becomes informative when contrasted to the Americans, who arrived in combat in late 1942 with an obsolete 37mm gun, and continued to use it for their infantry formations for the rest of the war. They had of course worked out that they would need to upgrade to a 57mm copy of the British-6 pounder fairly quickly, but these new weapons did not actually predominate in combat units in France until late 1944! (American troops in the Mediterranean fought all through North Africa, Sicily, and most of the way up the Italian peninsula, with an obsolete and useless weapon, which was not replaced until the end of 1944! Resulting casualty rates must have been much higher than they needed to be.) Only in the last few months was there serious interest in upgrading to a 90mm, the sort of firepower that the British had been using for more than two years. But it is hard to find any discussion of the problems of this behaviour in the literature, which simply comments that each upgrade was important… rarely noting that it was even more desperately (and inexplicably) overdue than had been the British upgrade from using the obsolete 2 pounder.

This sort of comparing apples with oranges becomes more visible when comparing naval strengths, because the comparison points given are usually totally different years. I carefully checked more than a dozen versions of naval strength tables in different textbooks produced over more than forty years, and came up with numbers in most of them that made no sense, until you work out what the authors have compared. British, French and German naval strengths ‘at the start of the war’ are always figures for 1939. But Italian numbers are usually listed for 1940, and American and Japanese numbers are for 1941. (Actually I have found a few books that list American numbers as of the morning of 7 December 1941, but seem to include in Japanese numbers battleships that were not commissioned for months afterwards!)

Astonishingly, the commentaries then seem to become biased by the incorrect comparisons. British ‘rebuilds’ of World War One vintage battleships are often criticised for not going far enough in 1939, while Italian rebuilds are congratulated for what was not commissioned until late 1940. Some commentaries even make comments about how good American rebuilds were, by sampling ships sunk at Pearl-Harbor and not re-commissioned until 1943!

Again the comparisons are unfortunate. Certainly Britain would have liked to get more rebuilds done before getting into a war, and would have, had her war waited until 1941. But the rebuilds she did get done in 1939-40 were considerably better than most other nations produced in time for Pearl-Harbor, or even after Pearl-Harbor. The rebuilt Queen Elizabeth, Valiant and Renown had, in 1940, more advanced and efficient anti aircraft batteries than any similar vintage French, Italian, Japanese or US ship (until some of those were rebuilt after Pearl-Harbor, in a few cases after being sunk and refloated.) Certainly British ‘tower-bridge’ rebuilds were considerably better developments for fighting a ship than brand new German, Italian, Japanese or American construction coming on line years later.

Consider also the effects on building programs. It takes two or three years of combat before a nation develops enough new ideas and experience to start a new generation of warships. So Britain and the US both had ‘design holidays’ for their aircraft carriers, where they just worked over existing designs – British Illustrious and US’s later design Essex’s – for three years. Fortunately for the Allies a couple of years into the war the Royal Navy started a very useful experiment with Escort Carriers, and had begun the process of ordering large numbers from US yards in time for America to adapt the program to war purposes. (The equivalent very useful American improvisation was the converted cruisers of the Independence class that Roosevelt had suggested be looked at as stop gaps before Pearl-Harbor. These arrived in 1943.) The first new design allied carriers were the British ‘light fleet’ carriers of the Colossus and Majestic classes that went into production in 1943 (which were so successful that many were still in service in the 1980’s and 1990’s). By the time the Americans developed their first new class – the Midways (also, thanks to Reagan’s 600 ship navy, in service into the 1980’s and 1990’s) – in 1945, the British were on their second wave – the Centaur, Audacious, and Malta classes. Note that this sort of lag reflects, almost exactly, what happened with the development of tanks and anti-tank guns for the two nations!

So what if Britain had enjoyed the luxury of not entering the war until December 1941? What would her navy have looked like? How would the modernisations and numbers have stacked up against the Japanese and American figured that everyone is quoting?

First conversions. In battleships only Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were modernised (along with Warspite to a lesser extent), whereas Barham, Malaya, and probably Warspite again would have been rebuilt in the intervening years. Here they would have been joined by Battlecruisers Repulse and Hood, both of which were scheduled to go through the refits that made Renown such an effective ship. In addition they would have been joined by a couple of the four new Lion class battleships (contemporaries of the American Iowa’s), with the last two almost ready. That is before any further construction had been authorized (at a probably rate of another 2 – 4).

This is important to remember, because every nation that joined the war halted new construction when it joined. The King George V class were finished, but the Lion’s (ordered before the war) cancelled. Just as the Bismarck, Yamato and Iowa classes were at least partly finished, but any follow up classes (like the American Montana’s - ordered before Pearl-Harbor), were cancelled.

Run the other way, if Japan and the US had joined the war in 1939, it is likely that the Iowa classes would have been cancelled, leaving the Americans with the South Dakota class as their only modern class. The Japanese might have finished at least one Yamato class simply because they had no modern battleships at all (the most modern being the two ships of the 1920 vintage Nagato class), but there it would have stopped.

Look at aircraft carriers too. Britain entered the war with 7 aircraft carriers (Argus, Hermes, Eagle, Furious, Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal), of which the last four were big, fast, powerful, well equipped models with significant antiaircraft firepower. (Eagle was a proper fleet carrier, but only as fast as the old battleships, whereas Argus and Hermes were little better than escort carriers.) The only reason these carriers carried less planes than the equivalent Lexington or Akagi/Kaga classes was that the British considered permanent Pacific style deck-parks unsuitable for Atlantic conditions or continental waters close to enemy airbases. (Noticeably, British carriers deployed to the Indian or Pacific oceans quickly adopted air wings on average 50% larger than their ‘designed capacity’, coming much closer to Japanese and American ‘designed capacity’. But also note that most carriers lost to air attack in the Pacific suffered explosions amongst such deck-parks, while British carriers in the Mediterranean regularly survived bombings because their aircraft were hidden away under armour.) These 7 carriers were only inadequte for British needs because the first three named were outdated experimental models (rather like the USS Ranger, or the Japanese Hosho), so they should not really count as proper fleet carriers.

Had Britain entered the war in December 1941 they would have also had the rest of the Illustrious class - Victorious, Formidable and Indomitable - already in action, with Indefatigable and Implacable about to commission. As a result they certainly would have had another four or six modern carriers in the pipelines. That amounts to 10 large, fast, well armed and well armoured aircraft carriers, with several more in the pipeline, against the six that Japan had by that date, with only conversions planned (or indeed the five that the US had by that date with another half dozen planned).

People overlook the fact that the Royal Navy experimented with 3 carrier (Furious, Courageous, Glorious) fast strike task groups in the mid 1930’s. The Fleet Air Arm was re-established in 1939, too late to be ready for a war in 1939, but excellently timed to be ready for a war in late 1941. People also compare the British 1939 biplanes with 1942 American aircraft, somehow failing to note that the British were using the Hurricane and Wildcat fighters as their main carrier fighter by the time of Pearl-Harbor, whereas the Americans were still using many of the dreadful Buffalo fighters as well as the newer Wildcat at Midway. The British Gladiator biplane fighters, Fulmar monoplane fighter/bombers, and Swordfish biplane or Skua monoplane bombers of 1939: were in no way inferior to the equivalent Japanese Claude monoplane fighter and Susie biplane bomber, or the American F3F biplane fighter, Buffalo monoplane fighter, or Devestator bomber of the same period. In fact these British fighters were still effective in defence of Malta against the Italians and the Luftwaffe in 1941 (as, interestingly, was the Buffalo when used by the Finns against the Soviets), whereas the Devestator was a death-trap when used as the main American torpedo bomber at Midway. (In fairness to the Devestator - and the Fulmar - Wikipedia notes that even the vaunted TBF Avenger that replaced it was a death-trap in daylight hours until adequate fighter support was available.)

(Note: The British continued using biplane strike aircraft throughout the war, even after good monoplanes were easily available, but they had found a way to take advantage of their strengths - ruggedness, manouevrability, stability, excellent take off and landing abilities on small carriers, load capacity, and flexibility; and obviate their main weakness – speed – which made all attack aircraft - and biplanes in particular - so vulnerable to day fighters. By 1941 they were radar equipped night strike aircraft with proven track records against the Germans and Italians. Not only were the Japanese and Americans incapable of night ops in 1941 - let alone 1939 - they were still regularly crashing dozens of aircraft that got lost in the dusk in 1942 and 1943!)

So again, lets look at 1939 for the Americans and Japanese. In 1939 America had two big old Lexington carriers and the newly commissioned Yorktown and Enterprise, plus the failed experiment Ranger that never saw combat, while Japan had two big old Akagi/Kaga carriers, two smaller modern ones (Hiryu and Soryu), a their own little experimental one (Hoshu). So four and a bit carriers each compared to the British four and three bits. All were still using biplanes in 1939.

Had Britain entered the war in December 1941 her ten modern carriers (plus three old spares) – all with more modern aircraft – and half a dozen more carriers nearing completion; plus her seventeen new or effectively modernised battleships (plus five old spares), with two to six more in production: would have given her a much easier war. Particularly considering that the extra years of peacetime construction of steadily increasing numbers of cruisers, destroyers, escort vessels and submarines would have substantially improved her greatly reduced interwar shipbuilding capacity. The same goes for aircraft. (Note that Britain started mass producing anti submarine escorts before war in 1939, whereas the US and Japan did not start similar programs until well after Pearl-Harbor.)

In practical terms a good historian must be very careful in using references that compare information from different periods, and therefore make highly contentious assumptions as a result. The problem is that there are many examples that slip past even quite dedicated historians unless they have the time and knowledge to assess each statement to see if its assumptions are justifiable. If they do, they regularly find that the commentator is, often unknowingly, comparing apples and oranges.

But the really amusing thing that comes out of such an analysis is to note that had Britain not been sucked into war in 1939, Japan probably could not have attacked the United States in 1941. Pearl-Harbor was Japan’s only chance to take advantage of the brief window offered by Britain being busy elsewhere to get what she wanted. An uncommitted Britain, particularly with the sort of naval buildup not going to war in 1939 would have allowed, would have deterred Japan from even considering such an attack in 1941!

Declines and Falls 1: International Power

I mentioned in a recent post (about eugenics), that I was something of a sceptic on the “decline and fall” understanding of certain events in history. This inspired me to re-read a modern reprint of Michael Grant’s 1976 book in “The Fall of the Roman Empire”, which I picked up a copy of second-hand in Cambridge a few weeks ago. It contains a convincing argument that the Roman Empire did in fact in decline and fall, largely due to its own interior politics.

Now the decline component is almost unarguable, as we have so many readily accessible measures that relate directly to decline. The Roman civilization was definitely in decline, just from the fact that civilization - from the Greek word ‘civitas’ which means city - can be measured by the size and stability of the city’s. At its peak the Roman Empire had hundreds of cities in the hundreds of thousands of people class, and several pushing the million mark. Those numbers had usually halved by the time the Roman Empire was staggering to its doom; and with a couple of centuries after that collapse it would have been difficult to find many cities in western Europe with more than 40,000 people. De-civilisation in its most simplistic form of de-city-isation.

There are many other samples that convince but the Roman civilization declined. Trade, measured by the number of shipwrecks, was in steady decline for the last few centuries of Roman rule. Productivity, measured by production of pottery - a vital component of any trade or storage item we currently use plastic for - was also in steady decline: and completely collapsed along with the Romans. Even the size of cows in places like Britain went down for a couple of consecutive centuries during the period of collapse.

So it is possibly fair to argue that the Roman Empire did in fact decline and collapse. However, it is not so simple to argue that more recent empires have suffered the same thing. This would be a case of comparing apples and oranges.

From the Australian perspective, the greatest focus is on the “decline” and “fall” of the British Empire. This may seem a given concept, considering that the British Empire did in fact fold itself up and depart the scene. However when you look at the statistics to back up the so-called decline, there is no real evidence that anything like what happened to Rome was relevant in the circumstances.

There was for instance, no decline in city-isation through the British Empire as it was wound up. On the contrary, population, productivity, and city-isation were all running ahead by leaps and bounds in the lead up to the independents granted to most parts of the empire. This is as true for Kenya in the 60s, and India in the 40s, as it was for the original Dominion’s in the 1890s. There is no measurable decline in this so-called fall.

Nor is trade much of an issue - though on sheer statistics of shipwrecks, there is a certain amount of somewhat unavoidable evidence that the first and second world wars had a major negative effect on imperial trade - or indeed world trade. Despite those blips, productivity and trade rose through out all components of the Empire, except for the motherland, which did in fact suffer greviously from carrying a much of the burden of the world wars. A large part of the assumptions that people have made about the decline of the British Empire is based on the theory that Britain could not recover from the financial effects of the two greatest wards mankind has ever seen, and that therefore the collapse of her empire was inevitable. (This is not particularly related to the facts, which seemed to show was in the 1930s British international trade and commerce was undergoing a staggering revival, particularly in non-imperial countries such as the South Americas.) Judging by the increased health of the rest of the Empire and Commonwealth, it is hard to imagine that Britain could not have recovered much of her financial position, had the maintenance of the empire been of importance to its components. ( Many people would argue for instance, that London has reasserted itself as the financial capital of the modern world.)

Certainly there are no records of living conditions collapsing to the point that cows get smaller!

In fact, at the end the maintenance of the empire was not an important issue for its components. Every country with in the Empire or Commonwealth came out of the war without no an obvious external threat on its horizon (internal threats from racial subdivisions, or communist insurgencies may have been another matter). The main purpose of the Empire and Commonwealth - mutual protection - was now a distant need, and one that seems to be covered by the new United Nations. In fact the naval supremacy of the United States, Britain, and France (the good guys), made the prospect of international peace and safe trade almost inevitable. Unlike an Empire required for defence, a Commonwealth to encourage good international relations and good trade, seemed to be more than adequate.

A key point about the so-called collapse, was the fact that Britain abandoned the remaining colonies as fast, or faster, than was practical (or decent). Not only the countries which had already been prepared to independence - such as India which had long been established with a good stable bureaucracy and internal elections of parliaments; but even countries which were not remotely prepared with an infrastructure ready for independence. Everybody was thrown out on their own as quickly as possible.

This was the decision of the British taxpayer and governments, neither of whom were willing to pay the costs of remaining in the role of “the world’s policeman”. Frankly, they felt that they had done enough, and if the Americans wanted to have a go, good luck to them. (The refusal of the British taxpayer and government to pay this price is fairly clear from the interwar period as well. Modern analysts point out that Britain during the interwar period could, for approximately a 1% fee on their overseas trade, have had the largest navy and air force in the world, with a modern mechanized army as well... Which compares to normal insurance rates on peacetime trade that were actually 3% It was not so much that Britain couldn’t afford the cost of Imperial Defence, but that the British taxpayers didn’t want to pay it.)

This is not a measure of an empire declining and falling. It is an indication of an empire that has successfully achieved much of what it wants, and now feels safe to move on to new internal reconstructions and reorganizations. An argument for decline and collapse, should hopefully have a few indications of falling population, collapsing industry and commerce, and shrinking trade. The British Commonwealth of Nations had none of those indications (except to the localized effects of the two world wars on Britain herself). Instead the Commonwealth was evolving into stronger, better organized, and more competently run independent regions, that usually fully deserved to graduate to independent rule.

Indeed, although it has only been 50 - 100 years (or 200 if you count the United States, possibly longer - see for instance Dominion of Virginia before 1776), since the Anglo-sphere started hiving off independent seed cultures, there has never been a more successful example of a culture growing and expanding; stabilizing and becoming the norm; and successfully dominating the international landscape.

Whereas the collapse of the Western Roman Empire left behind shattered remnant states with reduced populations and impoverished economies; the conversion of an Empire into a Commonwealth of Nations left behind more than 50 stable and independent nations with good infrastructures, growing populations, expanding industries, and ever-increasing trade opportunities. (Unfortunately it also left behind the 15-20 prematurely abandoned undeveloped states, particularly in Africa, which have in fact fallen into chaos since. But the key point here is that their collapse was largely self-inflicted after independence, rather than the product of a collapsing empire.)

Hardly a good way to define a decline and fall.

Perhaps it would be possible to argue that the successor states to the Roman Empire maintained a semblance of Roman administration and law, or even that the Roman language and cultural heritage played an important part for centuries to come. This is still a far cry from being able to state that the English language is now the international standard for communication; that the rule of law and habeus-corpus is now the international standard applied by the UN and by all non ‘rogue states’ (yes, don’t look too closely at China); that some form of Westminster style Parliament is the dominant form of government aspired to by ‘modern’ states; that democracy is the international goal; that universal franchise regardless of sex or race is an international requirement; that free trade is considered by most to be a universal good; that freedom of religion is considered important; and that freedom of speech is considered vital.

Where did these concepts come from if not the British Empire? (I will acknowledge that a less stable form of unfettered democracy was also French in origin... but not necessarily that their version was a good thing.)

If the decline and fall of an empire is a bad thing for its citizens, and for those in the world around them: then it is not really sensible to say that the British Empire had a decline or a fall.

If World War II didn't start until December 1941: Part 1 WWII Battleship Construction

I recently started looking at the issue of what would have happened if a second 'Munich Agreement' in September 1939... a 'Warsaw Agreement' perhaps (presumably because France and perhaps a couple of Dominions refused to support a declaration of war in 1939 the same way they had refused at Munich), meant that Britain and France did not actually declare war on Germany on September 3, 1939. 

Might the World War have started in December 1941 instead? 

Probably not, but that needs explaining.

It looks like being a fun topic, but it requires a lot of background. So I thought I would start with an analysis of where naval power would be in December 1941 if the European powers had not kicked off early. Even that is too big a bite for one go, so Part 1 just looks at battleships - and itself is largely based on a preparatory posts on What defines a battleship for WWII  and The best 'Re-builds' of WWI Capital Ships for WWII, Part II will do aircraft carriers, and Part III naval expansion overall.

This first part is actually based on a re-work of a draft article I did in 2010, under the title 'Comparing Apples and Oranges', but with a lot more new research data...

If WWII didn't start until December 1941 - Part One - Battleships:

What if Britain had enjoyed the luxury of not entering the war until December 1941? What would her battleship fleet have looked like by then? How would the modernisations and new build numbers have stacked up against the Japanese and American figures available for that year?

More importantly, if Britain (and France, Germany and Italy), had continued their peacetime build rates to the end of 1941 the way the Japanese and Americans did: what would total battleship numbers look like.

And would that new perspective change anyone's attitude to declaring war? 

The RNs 1935 DRC build plan vs the 1938 NSF plan

First I will note here that the RN's DRC plan (Defence Requirements Sub-Committee 1935 plan), is the default pre war build plan, until replaced by the NSF (New Standard Fleet) plan in 1938, which really came too late to have much effect on a 1939 start to the war, but would have had very considerable effect on a 1941 start. 

Most commentators pretty much assume that the DRC was more accurate, given that building of the NSF - in battleships at least - was never completed. But for comparison, the 1935 DRC which led to the KGV and Lions it is roughly the equivalent of the American Naval Act of 1938 which led to the South Dakota's and  Iowa's, and the 1938 NSF is 'expansion program' roughly equivalent of the USN Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940 - which included the last 2 Iowa's and at least a further 5 Montana's. Roughly. But in each case 2 years earlier, with subsequent advance in build rates.

The fact that the first 6 Lions of the 1938 NSF expansion didn't get completed because Britain went to war in late 1939 so they were cancelled: completely matches the last 2 Iowa's and the 5 Montana's of the USN 1940 Two Ocean Navy act being cancelled when the US went to war in late '41. 

Real costs versus fantasy propaganda costs

I will also note that the RN and Treasury had actually analysed the often quoted but ridiculous propaganda claim of 1,000 bombers for the price of each battleships, and come out with a more realistic (over lifetime) 43 medium bombers! 

The NSF program could add an extra 3 capital ships, 4 fleet carriers, 10 large cruisers, 4 small cruisers, 6 flotillas of destroyers (that's 48 destroyers) and 21 submarines to the already existing DRC build, (that's about 90 ships in all), for about the cost of 500 medium bombers all up. 

(Note that point 'over life'. A 1937 medium bomber - a Hampden for instance – needed replacement with a Blenhiem in 1941, and another replacement with a Mosquito in 43 or 44 – compared to a naval ships life expectancy of 15 - 20 years. 'Over life' is a way of emphasising how cost effective long term items like ships are compared to short term items like bombers. Another way of saying that might be: better to build say 75% as many Battle light bombers –1600 not 2200 –  and 75% as many medium Hampden's – 1050 not 1400 – between 1937-40, and get 80 or 90 extra ships in return!)

Cost is a bit of a red herring.

(Note - 500 less light and medium bombers available in December 1941 would have been about 20% reduction to the actual RAF front line bomber fleet that month... which is a useless statistic in terms of war starting December 1941 rather than September 1939, as it included all wartime production - thousands - and all wartime losses - also thousands - dating back to September 1939. But the raw number 20% reduction of total bombers, for attaining a far bigger and far far more modern fleet, would very definitely be a win for Britain overall. See below.)

Real constraints

The main issues of such increased NSF naval production for Britain would not actually be cost, but the limitations of dockyard availability and armour production. (The 2 Ocean Navy Act faced similar restraints, with the Wikipedia article noting that, "The expansion program was scheduled to take five to six years, but a New York Times study of shipbuilding capabilities called it, "problematical" unless proposed, "radical changes in design" were dropped.")

And, of course, the fact that the RN was not throwing nearly as much subsidy to industry as the RAF... in 1938...  

But under this NSF plan that subsidy balance would change dramatically, with RN subsidies being increased substantially, even if it cost a small reduction of the frankly fantastic RAF subsidies being thrown about in 1938.

There was also plenty of capacity for private expansion of dockyards of course. (Literally hundreds had been closed during the Depression, and many could fairly easily be re-opened with not too much extra expense). But many companies were waiting for confirmation of a bigger naval build program before committing, so didn't do so until after the war started. 

The NSF should have provided that assurance, and advanced the re-opening of many of these dockyards a year or two earlier. (Though the NSF had a shaky start in the '38 budget, with some of the lighter units like destroyer squadrons delayed. But this was clearly not going to be repeated in the '39 budget after Munich...)

Better Investments?

Certainly the lack of success of the RAF bomber force in the first years of the war would argue that a few more major warships would have been a better investment? 

Indeed the same argument could be made that less expensive multi-engine bombers, and more cheap one engine fighters would have been a better investment in 1938. (The RAF was spending 5 times as much on bombers as on fighters in 1938, and there was considerable strength in an argument for say 600 less bombers - that is a 25% reduction – in return for 250 more fighters – which is a 25% increase – and still fitting the entire NSF program into the spare change of almost the same total budget?

Finally, it should be noted that the RN rebuilds were an extremely cost effective fix compared to new builds. The 1920's partial modernisations and refits of all 12 Revenge, Queen and Renown class ships costing just 2.7 million pounds compared to 7 million for a single Nelson new build. And the estimates for the late 1930's rebuilds were similarly cost effective. Warspite at 2.3 million, or even Renown at 3.3, still meaning 3 or 4 rebuilds could be done for the price of a single new ship. All 8 Queen Elizabeth, Renown and Hood class vessels could be completely rebuilt for about the cost of 2.5 new KGV's, and at a fraction of the time and effort. Let alone the increases in effectiveness of these rebuilds! 

Queen Elizabeth's new engines for instance, meant that her boilers had been reduced from 24 to 8: which allowed a 30% reduction in volume and weight; which allowed substantial increases in deck armour; and tripling of range; let alone the vastly more effective DP armament... (Japan achieved almost as much with their complete rebuilds of the Kongo class – though they still didn't move to DP secondary batteries.) 

Which makes it all the more surprising that the USN did so little modernisation. (The much longer Great Depression in the US torpedoed most of the USN's plans for reconstructions or additions of DP batteries, but on the other hand why modernise 21 knot ships... The RN had decided the Revenge class 21 knot ships were simply not big enough or fast enough to be worth the effort, and concentrated on the 24+ and 30+ knot ships. Perhaps it was sensible for the USN to leave their old 21 knot ships unmodernised and concentrate on faster new builds?)

The New Standard Fleet and the 2 Ocean Navy

The main changes between the two RN plans were:

                        1936 DRC fleet       1938 NSF fleet

Battleships                    15                20

Aircraft Carriers            10                15

Cruisers                           70                100

Destroyers                    16 flotillas        22 flotillas

Submarines                    55                    82

For (very rough) comparisons of build plans - 

RN DRC build programs (with the small NSF additions in brackets) compared to USN 2 Ocean Navy plans.

1935    2 KGV                    2 Washington  

1936    3 KGV                    2 Sth Dakota        

1937    2 Lion                      2 Sth Dakota           

1938    3 Lion (+1)                2 Iowa

1939    Vanguard, 1 Lion (+1)      2 Iowa

1940    2 (+1) all cancelled            2 Iowa, 2 Montana (all cancelled)     

1941     2 (+1) cancelled                3 Montana (cancelled)

So, if the RN hadn't entered the war until December 1941, there would have been another 7 or 8 battleships on line or working up (though I presume the RN's 1940 program would be cancelled at December 1941 war start, just as the USN one was). With other ships like Barham, Malaya, Hood and Repulse all completely modernised, and the other 7 battleships considerably improved - at least in AA.

RN Battle fleet December 1941

First modernisations. In capital ships only Queen Elizabeth, Valiant and Renown were modernised for the September 1939 start (along with Warspite to a lesser extent – new engines, bridge and aircraft facilities, but no proper DP battery). Whereas Barham, Malaya, Repulse and Hood would all have been modernised (or half finished anyway) by December 1941. 

Nelson and Rodney might also have had a refit by December 1941, including probable significant increases in anti-aircraft armament. (Either the basic refit replacing their 6 4.7" single AA with 12 4" in 6 twin turrets in the same places and 4-6 octuple 2 pounder if they were considered too valuable to take off line for long; or - circumstances allowing – the full rebuild option with the six twin 6" and six single 4.7" AA probably replaced with a Renown style 8 or 9 twin 4.5", and 6-8 octuple 2 pounder mountings and a couple of dozen 20mm added). 

Of the 5 Revenge class, although all would have received some sort of engine and new boiler refits; probably some extra range as a result; some more deck armour; and probably a little more 4" and octuple or quad 2 pounder mounts: no more substantial rebuilding work was really considered particularly worthwhile given that they were  – in Churchill's words during the 1937 Program debates – support vessels, purely for convoy escort and bombardment purposes. (Note that under the original 1935 plan the Revenges were to be retired in turn as each KGV came on line, but the 1937 debates make clear that 'plans to retire them will depend on changes to circumstances'. The NSF plan apparently assumed that they would be kept, even if in reserve.)

The King George V and Prince of Wales  (from the 1936 program) and Duke of York, Anson and Howe (1937 program) would all be in service by December 1941. (In reality the last three were slowed down by the 1939 start by the urgent need to focus on other work like escorts, and commissioned in August 1941 and April and June 1942. Presumably 6 to 10 months earlier under peacetime conditions seems very likely if the RN's steady increase in build rate during ongoing peacetime worked out similar to the USN's experience of those extra precious years of peacetime builds before more urgent work slowed things.)

As a nice extra the 1939 program 'quicky build' bonus - Vanguard, using old 15" turrets to speed build time - would also be fitting out for completion in mid 1942.

The 1937 program Lion class – Lion and Temeraire –  would also, under peacetime conditions, be coming a bit faster, working up to enter service in within a few months, and probably the four 1938 program Lions   – Conquorer, Thunderer, Bellerophon and Vengeance (equivalent of last 2 South Dakota's in build process) – due for 2 to complete in late 1942, and the other 2 by mid 43.

The 1939 Lions – Tiger and Agamemnon (equivalent of first 2 Iowa's in build process) – also due late 1943.

The 2 1940 program 'Improved' Lions – Orion and Monarch (equivalent of last 2 Iowa's) – and the third NSF 'bonus' 'Improved' Lion  – Thunderer – would all be only half complete (the last possibly even less), so 1 or 2 might be completed like the last 2 Iowa's, with 1 or 2 likely to be suspended for possible completion at a slower pace... more as Vanguard actually was. (Note names were never assigned to these last few Lions, but there has been a lot of speculation of which alternatives the RN might have used, and I just collated the most popular picks). 

The 2 authorised 1941 program new design battleships – Colossus and Hercules –  and any planned later ships, presumably being cancelled: just like their contemporaries in the pace of the build process: the Iowa's 5 & 6 - Illinois and Kentucky – and the 5 Montana class – Montana, Ohio, Maine, New Hampshire and Louisiana. 

Wartime building cancellations

It is important to remember that every nation that joined the war halted new construction, and cancelled or delayed barely started construction. From a September 1939 start the 1935 and 1936 program King George V class were finished, but the 1937 and 1938 program Lion’s were cancelled, and the 1939 ones never even started. 

Just as the 2 1936 Bismarck's were finished but any of the later H class cancelled. 

For the Italians, a mid 1940 start to the war meant that the third Littorio – the 1938 program – Roma  –was also completed. But the 4th ship  – Impero – also a 1938 start, and actually launched pre-war, was never completed.

For a December 1941 start to the war the 1937 Yamato and 1938 Musashi were finished, but the1940 Shinano was only sort of finished... as a carrier in 1944. 

For the USN the 2 1939 program and 2 1940 program Iowa's classes were all finished (though the 1940 ones not until the war was almost over), but the 2 1941 ones not finished, and all 5 1940/41 program Montana’s were all suspended when war came, and finally cancelled in mid 1943. 

For amusement, let's run the concept the other way. 

Let's say Japan and the US joined the war in September 1939 too!

If Japan and the US had joined the war in 1939, it is likely that of the American battleships, the 1937 program - Washington and North Carolina, would be completed, but almost certainly some of the mixed 1938 and 1939 programs of the South Dakota and the Iowa classes – ordered at the same time as the Lions –  would have gone the same way as the Lions and been cancelled. 

The 4 South Dakota class (all designed to complete in 1942) might well have been kept to schedule, (giving a matching 6 modern ships to the 6 equivalent the RN completed – 5 KGV and Vanguard). But presumably even the Iowa and New Jersey (both started mid 1940 but not even scheduled to launch until late 1942, for completion 12-18 months later) might have been suspended, and certainly the Missouri and Wisconsin (not expected to complete until late 1944 or early 1945), along with the fifth and sixth Iowa's and the 5 1940 program Montanas, would all have been cancelled if the US had joined the war in 1939.

Had the Japanese entered the war in 1939 they might have attempted to finished at least one or two of the Yamato class simply because they had no modern battleships at all (the most modern being the two ships of the 1920 vintage Nagato class), but frankly their ability to do so under wartime conditions is even more questionable than the German H Class. Realistically even completing one of them might be a stretch, and they might have finished up just floating hulks like Impero or Graf Zeppelin.

So lets list the real 1939 stats for comparison - 

RN 15 capital ships:

5 Revenge Class - WWI - 21 knot (minimal modification)

5 Queen Elizabeth - WWI - 25 knot (3 completely rebuilt, 2 not)

2 Renown - WWI - 32 knot (1 completely rebuilt, 1 not)

1 Hood - WWI - 32 knot (not)

2 Nelson - 20's - 23 knot (modern...ish)

For comparison purposes:

USN 15 capital ships –

1 12" Wyoming – Arkansas, and 2 14" – New York & Texas, all 21 knots. (The last of pre-war Dreadnoughts). 

9 14" 'standards' - Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Mississipi, Idaho, Tenessee, California - WWI builds - all 21 knots

3 16" standards - Colorado, Maryland, Washington  - 20'S - all 21 knots.

None of them substantially modernised.

France - 8 capital ships (though 3 of those, like Arkansas, pretty marginal):

3 12" Courbet, Ocean, Paris (pre-WWI - 21 knot dreadnoughts equivalent to Arkansas)

3 14" Bretagne, Provence, Lorraine (WWI - 21 knot. Roughly equivalent to Texas or early USN WWI 'standards')

None of them substantially modernised. Plus

2 13" Dunkerque, Strasbourg (30'S - 30 knots, but only battlecruiser grade armour)

Japan - 9 capital ships

4 14" Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise, Hyuga - WWI - 22 knots (roughly equivalent to Revenge's or USN standards)

3 14" Kongo, Kirishima, Karuna - Modernised WWI - 30 knots 
(a fourth ship, Heie, had been demilitarised in 1929, but was being reconstructed in 1939)

2 16" Nagato, Mutsu - 20's - 25 knots (roughly equivalent to Queen's or Colorado's)

Germany 2 capital ships:

2 11" 'fast-battleships' - Scharnhorst, Gneisenau - 30's - 32 knots

Italy 4 capital ships (cruiser killers really):

4 12" Conti de Cavour, Giulio Cesare, Andrea Doria, Caio Dulio - WWI - 26 knots

(Most of them substantially modernised, but as battlecruisers, and simply not capable of taking on proper battleships.)

So by Sep 1939 

ALLIED TOTAL: 38 with up to 14 more likely to complete.

AXIS total 15, with possibly 9 more.

By contrast...

Theoretical December 1941 start to the war: 

RN 20-21 capital ships (with 3 more completing '42, 2 more'43, and perhaps one more later - total 27-28 perhaps):

5 Revenge Class - WWI - 21 knot (minimal modification)

5 Queen Elizabeth - WWI - 25 knot (all completely rebuilt)

2 Renown - WWI - 32 knot (completely rebuilt)

1 Hood - WWI - 32 knot (completely rebuilt)

2 Nelson - 20's - 23 knot (modernised)

5 KGV - 30's - 28 knot (new)

3-4 Lions - 40's - 30 knot (new) due to complete in 42 

1 Vanguard -  40's - 32 knot (new) also completing 42?

2-3 more Lions due for completion 43?

1 more Lion possibly to complete in 1944? (Rest cancelled)

For comparison - USN 17 capital ships (4 more due 1942, + 2 1943, +2 1944 - total 25)

1 12" Arkansas and 2 14" New York and Texas - 21 knots (last of pre-Great War dreadnoughts)

9 14" standards - Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Mississipi, Idaho, Tenessee, California - WWI - 21 knots (all pretty much unmodernised)

3 16" standards - Colorado, Maryland, Washington  - 20's - all 21 knots (unmodernised)

North Carolina, Washington - 30's - 28 knots (new)

4 South Dakota and 4 Iowa completing over next 3 years.

France - 10 capital ships (though 3 marginal, 2 more building - possible total 10 or 11):

3 12" Courbet, Ocean, Paris - WWI - 21 knot dreadnoughts (unmodernised)

3 14" Bretagne, Provence, Lorraine - WWI - 21 knot (largely unmodernised)

2 13" Dunkerque, Strasbourg 30's - 30 knots (new, but 'cruiser killers')

2 15" Richelieu, Jean Bart 40's - 32 knots (new)

Remaining 2 Richelieu's likely to be cancelled.

Japan: 10 

(Hiei having been re-armed) - with Yamato commissioned only days later on 16/12/41, and Musashi 5/8/42 (total 12)

Germany - 4 capital ships (+2 H class started, but unlikely to finish):

2 11" 'battlecruisers'? - Scharnhorst, Gneisenau - 30's - 31 knots (new) - possibly one or both of them back in refit to have her 11" turrets replaced with 15"?

2 15" Bismarck, Tirpitz - 30's - 30 knots (new)

Italy - 6 capital ships

4 12.6" Conti de Cavour, Giulio Cesare, Andrea Doria, Caio Dulio - 26 knots (WWI - completely rebuilt, but only to battlecruiser standard)

2 15" Littorio, Vittorio Venetto - 40'S - 30 knots (2 more building, 1 – Roma  – might be finished?)

So by Dec 1941

ALLIED TOTAL: 51 with up to 14 more likely to complete

AXIS TOTAL: 20, with possibly 3 more likely to complete.

I imagine that might have changed some people's outlooks on going to war?

Starting too early...

The RN's biggest problem with starting a war in 1939 was that - with the Revenge class really being only suitable for backup purposes, and Barham, Malay, Hood and Repulse all still desperately needing modernisation, they really only had 6 modern/modernised capital ships Warspite, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Repulse, Nelson and Rodney, to face potentially Germany, Italy and Japan all at once. 

Which is almost fine with France's 2 fast modern back ups (plus 6 older battleships) in the war on their side, but becomes a real problem in 1940 when they dropped out.

Unfortunately the 5 new build KGV's Britain added to the fleet during the war came no faster than 5  losses - Royal Oak 1939, and Hood, Barham pre December 7/8 1941, and Repulse and Prince of Wales post. (Note - 4 out of 5 losses were largely unmodernised ships.)

By contrast, in a December 1941 start to the war 19 of the RN's 24 available capital ships would have been modernised or new builds. (Still with the 5 Revenge class for backup, and at least 3 or 4 more new builds expected within another year or two.) 

Compared to a total of 20 Axis capital ships (4 of them only 12.6" dreadnoughts and 2 others only 11" - all 6 of those unable to face even the unmodernised Revenge's.)

Just visualise likely December 1941 deployments for the RN under NSF plan.

(And noting that if no one is at war, the RN would deploy for  best counter to maximum threat. So presumably enough modern ships – and new ships working up – to intimidate Germany just in case; several modernised ships facing Italy – with plenty of French support to make that threat look overwhelming to Italy; and a fast modern fleet facing Japan which – with USN potential support – should be enough to make them consider the army's plan for expansion in Siberia over the navies to tackle Britain and the US!)

Planned Deployment: (though some ships would still be finishing refit, working up, or en- route.)

Gibraltar 'just' 2 or 3 old capital ships - 3 Revenge's –  say Ramillies, Royal Oak and Royal Sovereign  – assigned to support the the 5 older battleships of the French fleet in the Western Mediterranean, and/or to undertake Mediterranean or Atlantic convoy escort duty. (Though the Dunkerques would probably be better to handle the South Atlantic convoy protection if Germany looked genuinely threatening... or to deploy to Indochina if the Japanese appeared more threatening...) 

Mediterranean Fleet - 4 capital ships, the 4 rebuilt Queen Elizabeth's – Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Warspite and Barham. 

Eastern Fleet 8-9 capital ships - 5 KGV's – King George V, Prince of Wales, Duke of York, Anson and  the still to arrive Howe  – and 2 rebuilt Renown's – Renown and Repulse. With 2 Revenge – Resolution and Revenge – for Indian Ocean escort duty. (Potentially with USN support? Would Roosevelt follow through on the plan to rebase some of the USN to Singapore to help intimidate the Japanese in these circumstances? Would the RN and USN be doing joint exercises in the Pacific as well as joint neutrality patrols in the Atlantic?)

Home Fleet 5 or 6 active capital ships (plus 3 fitting out and 2 still in dock for rebuild). Including:

– 2 short ranged but powerful Nelson class (though Rodney might still be working up post refit)

– Perhaps with French support of a Richelieu or two?

– presumably with Howe still working up before heading East

– 1 or 2 1937 program Lions – Lion & Temeraire – working up towards commission, 

– and the first 2 1938 program Lions – Conquorer and Thunderer – due to commission in late 1942. 

– Vanguard would also be launched and fitting out. Due for commission in mid 42? 

– The last two 1938 program Lions – Bellerophon and Vengeance – also due for commissioning in mid 1943. 

– also 2 ships still in dock for rebuild: the last of the Queen Elizabeth's – Malaya – and the Hood. (Presumably both half way through their complete rebuilds, and both due back in service in late 1942 and mid 1943 respectively. For amusements sake I will suggest that Hood's long delayed refit had finally been forced into effect by her 'stripping a turbine' in July 1940 - let's say it was 'exercising' with the Strasbourg, rather than chasing her at Mers el Kebir...)

The 3 1939 program 'Improved' Lions –  being 60% or more complete, would probably be completed, but more slowly.

The 3 1940 program Improved Lions, probably at about 30%, 20% and 15% build respectively, would all suspended. Probably all to be cancelled, or possibly the most advanced ships to be completed more slowly to trial new technology like the power loaded 5.25" turrets. (The ones actually used for the final version of Vanguard.)

The 1941 program for 3 more ships of a completely new 50,000 ton class would certainly have been cancelled.

Naval Security?

Which means that for a December 1941 start to the war, the RN alone would have parity or superiority in capital ships over all potential foes in every theatre, regardless of whether they received any French or US backup. With the full backing of the French, and the potential backing of the USN, it would actually look more like 2 to 1, or even 3 to 1, odds against potential aggressors!)

In fact, as long as France  - now with 4 modern and 6 older battleships - remained in the war, Britain could fairly easily reinforce the Eastern Fleet with the 3-4 more ships from the 15 odd in the Gibraltar, Mediterranean or Home fleets, bringing the Eastern Fleet fleet to 12-14 capital ships once Howe arrived too. (Potentially 7 or 8 of them modern KGV's or Lions, with the 2 Renowns added, giving 10 modern or modernised fast battleships, all with completely modern DP batteries unmatched by anything in the world except the 2 recently commissioned North Carolina and Washington.)

And the USN would also have at least a dozen capital ships in its Pacific Fleet, mostly old 'standards', but including those two modern ones.

While the Japanese would still only have 8 from WWI, 2 from the early 1920's, and a Yamato due in a few days (and Musashi not due until August 1942).

December 6 1941 = 10 Japanese capital ships (4 of them only battlecruisers, unable to face any Allied battleships), versus say 20-22 British and American capital ships? Not including any Richelieu's or Dunkerque's that might turn up?

Looking at a few months later in mid 42 = perhaps 11 or 12 Japanese (only 2 modern, and none with proper DP armament) versus 24 to 26 Allied (probably 14 or 15 of them with modern DP armament)?

Would Japan or Italy have been willing to fight the Allies in December 1941?

Anyone think Japan was likely to even consider going to war with even Britain alone, let alone Britain and the US and France combined under those conditions? (The preference of Foreign Minister Matsuoko and the Japanese Army Council to go north to invade Siberia again – rather than the navy's preference to go south – suddenly looks much more likely doesn't it? Perhaps a combined Japanese-German attack on the Soviet Union might look a better option?)

How about Italy? (A traditional British ally, who had fought on the Allied side in WWI, and who only took the opportunistic, and frankly stupid, decision to join the Germans in WWII after France collapsed unexpectedly.) Any chance of Italy joining the German side in those conditions? 

Interesting, isn't it... It will become more so when I look at the Aircraft Carriers... next episode.

Statistical confusion – whose troops actually did the fighting in World War Two

I was recently researching how many divisions were in action for which nations, at what time and for how long, during the Second World War: and came up with some astonishing misconceptions. (Coincidentally backed up by a recent readers question about who ‘Frenched’… not a term I am familiar with, but I can hazard a guess at its meaning.)

China for instance had theoretically more than 300 divisions, though in fact most were lucky to have the combat power of a Western battalion, perhaps Regiment if they were one of the best equipped. Some of their best ‘Armies’ might have matched a poor Japanese division… maybe. When Stillwell was assigned to rebuild a more useful force on American lines he felt he might assemble about 30 lightweight divisions out of the resources actually available, with no pretence that any of the end products would actually match a Japanese division in the field (even if the Chinese would have let them fight).

The Eastern Front is also a bit fanciful in this regard. Although some German units started each campaign season at or near full strength, for most of the war the vast majority of divisions on both German and Russian sides were perhaps the equivalent of a Western Brigade or Regiment. Many were far weaker (particularly those of Germany’s ‘allies’). As a rule a Soviet Corps might match a weak German division, but you would probably need a small Soviet Army to match a fully mechanised Western division in combat power.

So talk of the Germans having 200+ divisions on the Eastern Front compared to only 80 facing the West tends to hide the fact that a large majority of the Eastern Front units were undermanned infantry, and a far more significant percentage of the units facing West were mechanised, and often at or near full strength. In sheer combat power, the removal of ten percent of divisions (say 20 divisions) from the Eastern Front to face the Western Allies (happened 3 times – Tunisia/Mediterranean 1942, Sicily/Italy 1943, and France 1944) looks a lot more significant if it involves moving 50% of the available Panzers and 70 or 80% of the high quality, full strength, specially equipped, Paratroop or Mountain or Waffen SS divisions. (Though far more Germans – and their Axis Hungarian, Rumanian, Finnish, etc allies – died on the Eastern front than in the west. See my post here for a discussion of the numbers fallacy on the Eastern Front.)

But the really interesting thing was working out the numbers of Western Allied divisions deployed at any point in the war. I, like most others I suppose, knew that American units were not relevant until late1942, but I assumed they formed a large percentage of units in action fairly quickly after that. Certainly I had subconsciously fallen for the idea that by the time of the D-Day invasion the Americans were providing the bulk of the combat troops for the Western Allies. But apparently that is just another example of letting your pre-conceptions run away with you.

Throughout 1942 British Comonwealth troops were fighting, or seriously expecting to be attacked, in French North Africa, Libya, Egypt, Cyprus, Syria (torn between expecting airborne assault, and preparing to reinforce Turkey if that country was attacked), Iraq and Iran (German invasion from the north was attracting more British troop deployment until after Stalingrad than those facing Japan and Rommel combined), Madagascar (fighting the Vichy French to prevent them from inviting the Japanese in as they had done in Indochina), Ceylon (at the time of the Japanese naval raid that looked like it might prefigure and invasion), India, Burma, outposts of the East Indies, New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and other Pacific Islands. A total of 30+ divisions in combat, and another 30+ expecting imminent attack. (This does not include yet another 30 odd British and Canadian divisions in the UK.) Apart from the Philippino forces surrendered early in the year, the Americans had a couple of divisions in action at Gaudalcanal after August, one in New Guinea by November, and late in November a few arrived in French North Africa.

In 1943 the Americans managed to get their numbers up to half a dozen divisions at the front in Europe and the same in the Pacific, but still not matching the British or Indian armies respectively, and barely matching the combined efforts of minor allies like the Free Poles, French, Greeks and Italians etc.

The breakthrough in American numbers was not until after the middle of 1944, when American units started arriving direct to France (which admittedly, was what Marshall had been trying to do all along).

But although American troops may have outnumbered British and Commonwealth troops in France by late 1944, the total of Allied troops, including the Free French, Poles, Czech, Dutch, Belgians, ensured that it was never quite as clear cut a domination as it appears. Devers ‘American’ 6th Army Group that come up from the South Coast was half French after all. In fact in 1945 it became a race to see if the Americans could import new divisions faster than the French could commission theirs (France had 1.3 million men in the field by VE Day). But the Americans fielding 60 divisions in France compared to only 20 British Commonwealth/ minor allies is the figure waved around as significant. (Ignoring that 15 of the American divisions did not get there until 1945, and by the end the liberated French had mobilised a couple of dozen divisions too, making the non-American total more like 40).

So the Americans did predominate in France, but the war was spread a bit further than France. If you take Europe as a whole, then the situation gets more interesting. The Americans in combat in Europe possibly didn’t start to outnumber the total other Western Allies until about the time of the collapse of Germany’s frontiers, and only weeks before the final surrender.

In Italy American troops never played more than a subsidiary part to the operation, and throughout the war even the ‘American’ 5th Army usually had as many (if not more) British, Canadian, New Zealander, Polish, Italian or French troops in it than Americans. Again, it was not until almost 1945 that even the 5th Army was majority American. They rarely made up more than a third of Allied ground forces in Italy.

If we include the Mediterranean/North African/Middle Eastern forces fighting the ‘anti-German’ half of the World War in a combined ‘European Theatre’ (which was one American generals fanciful suggestion when they wanted Marshall in charge of all ‘European’ operations), then American troops do not dominate ever. There are just too many British and French and Polish and Canadian and New Zealand and South African and Indian and Italian and Greek and Brazilian and other troops garrisoning recently liberated places from Morrocco to Iran and Ethiopia to Belgium; and still fighting to secure Greece, Austria, Denmark and Norway. (Note: The Soviets were starting to pile on pressure in Iran and throughout the Middle East already, and Greece was in serious danger of falling behind the Iron Curtain until British troops did some hard fighting.)

The war against Japan is even more deceptive, particularly if you fall for the fantasy that it was a ‘Pacific’ war. Leaving aside the supposed millions of Chinese, the British Empire and Commonwealth already had more than a million men at the front in India, Burma, Malaysia, New Guinea, Indonesia, and in the Pacific Islands, before the Americans had introduced more than a few divisions. Again, it is almost 1945, less than 10 months before the Japanese surrender, before the Phillipines campaign actually saw an entire American army (the 6th) deployed at a single time, instead of just a division fighting on this island for a month, and two or three on that for a few months. Until well into 1943 the Australian Army alone deployed more ground fighting troops against the Japanese than the Americans. The Americans never put more troops into combat against the Japanese at any point than just the Indian Army (which had a total of 32 divisions at its height, several in Europe or the Middle East, but many of which eventually faced Japan).

On a worldwide scale, the point at which the Americans fielded more troops than just the other Western allies (leaving aside the Russians and Chinese, the Hungarians, Rumanians, Yugoslavs, and all the others who fought the Axis), was… well never. The British Commonwealth alone fielded over 100 divisions in 1942 (though admittedly many were weaker garrison forces than proper mechanised field divisions), compared to the American total of 88 by the end of the war. The French had fielded 100 in 1940, and were to field 20+ again just in France by the end of the war. In fact the largely forgotten minor allies, the Free Poles, the Free Italian combat Groups, the Brigades of Free Greeks, Belgians, Dutch, etc, and the South African divisions, the New Zealand divisions, and the Brazilian division, had between them outnumbered the total American commitment to combat in Europe before the last four months of 1944. Add in the British, Canadians and Free French, and the American commitment before mid 1944 looks rather less impressive than is justified by the hype.

I will even go as far as quoting the figures, taken mostly from John Ellis’ World War two - A Statistical Survey, with a little reference to the microfilm archives of the CCOS deployment figures. (Though I foresee problems with comparing apples and oranges, so please do not consider these numbers as more than a very rough calculation. Particularly as some units have to be estimates. The British Commonwealth uniquely deployed ‘independent armoured brigades’ with roughly the same tank strength as most American armoured division, or some German Panzer Corps, or Russian Tank Armies, which I have accepted in John Ellis’ category and loosely called ½ a division. The same goes for the Italian ‘combat groups’ which I have also ranked as half a division. Many Pacific islands were invaded by a couple of American Regiments, which again could be loosely considered ½ of a division. When I say ‘rough’ estimates, I really mean it.)

The United States divisions were ‘deployed overseas’ for a total of about 1,150 months. Of that: Infantry in Europe about 500, infantry in the Pacific 312, armour 158, marines 128, airborne 37 and cavalry 19… roughly. But ‘deployed overseas’ is a bit different from everyone elses ‘in combat’ definition. For instance US 82nd Airborne is listed in Europe for 19 months from July 1943 to May 1945, but it was out of combat more often than in during that time. By comparison the British 6th Airborne, which was also ‘in Europe’ for all those months, gets listed as actually being in combat for three operations – June - September 1944 for D-Day, December - January 1944 for The Bulge, and March 1945 for The Rhine - and only gets credited with 6 months in combat.

This sample is much worse in the Pacific, where more than 20 American divisions are listed as ‘in Pacific’ for several years, regardless that usually only one or two were actually fighting anywhere at any given time. 1st US Marine Division for instance, probably the hardest fighting US dicvision in the Pacific, is listed ‘in theatre’ for 37 months, August 1942 – August 1945: but apparently fought on Guadalcanal for about five months, then on Cape Gloucestor in New Britain between 26 December 1943 and 16 January 1944 (call it two months?); then on Pelelui for a month, and on Okinawa for three months. Total 11 months, or a bit less than 30% of time 'in theatre' actually in combat.

So compared to a grand total of 1,150 months ‘overseas’ for all American divisions of all types, make what you will of these numbers, all months actually ‘in combat’:

Infantry divisions - British 284 months in combat, Indian 282, Australian 183, Canadian 44, African empire troops 68, South Africa 33, New Zealand 35 (Commonwealth total 935 months in combat). Also Free French 75, Free Poles 34, Free Italians 28, Brazilians 10 and Free Czechs 6, + Greeks, Jews (Palestinian Jews), etc. (Total of minors 153+). Total of just the infantry divisions of the non American Western Allies comes to almost 1,100 months in actual combat. (Although the Americans come up with almost 500 months ‘in Europe’, and 312 ‘in Pacific’, it would be extraordinarly generous to suggest that the total number ‘in combat’ came to more than 60% of that. In real terms it is unlikely that the American total in combat came to half of everyone elses 1,100 months.)

How about armour? British armoured divisions/brigades 245 months ‘in combat’, Indian 18, Australian 25, Canadian 31, New Zealander 9, Free French 27, Free Poles 18, Free Czechs 6. (Total 379 months in combat.) American armoured divisions 158 months ‘in Europe’. Again, even being hugely generous, the American total ‘in combat’ is unlikely to be much more than a third of everyone elses.

(By the way I think the Australian and New Zealand numbers in the Pacific theatre are as woolly and questionable as the American ones, but their African/European numbers are definitely correct, and I think the point is adequately made.)
Total non-American Western Allies army troops in combat about 1,500 months. Somewhere between two and three times total American Army and Marines combined.

Now I am not suggesting that the Americans didn’t contribute. They contributed an awful lot. By the end of the war they contributed more fighting divisions than any one of these named nations (finally equalling the combined total of the reduced numbers of full strength units deployed by the British Comonwealth). But over the total course of the war the United Kingdoms of the British Isles alone had more divisions actually at the front for more combat months than the Americans, as indeed did the French Army before their collapse in 1940… In fact India and Australia combined probably put in more divisional combat months than the US, and throwing in either the South Africans, or the Canadians, or even the New Zealanders, let alone all of them, would make it a certainty. (The Americans should be grateful that the Poles collapsed within a few weeks in 1939, because otherwise they too would have contributed more to the total divisional combat effort in the war than the Americans in Europe too. 47 divisions/brigade groups for – lets give American style generosity and call it 2 months each in the 1939 campaign – plus 127 months later by British or Russian aligned forces thereafter, for a total of 221 months.)

[I would be really interested to see if anyone can provide good evidence against any of these numbers. There must be some other good sources out there?]

Nor am I suggesting that the war could have been won without the Americans… though the total troop numbers do make it seem a far closer concept than most pretend. (And I should note that the American ‘in theatre’ concept would make the comparisons ridiculous if it was equally applied to everyone else. More British and Indian divisions were deployed in Iraq and Iran and ready to go to Turkey in 1942 – just in case of the very real threat that the Germans would break through the Soviets at Stalingrad – than the Americans had ‘overseas’ that year, or indeed the next. If you added all the troops waiting for an invasion of Britian in 1940-41, or Ireland, or Iceland; or Cyprus in 1942, or Syria, or Persia, or India, or Madagascar, or Ceylon, or Australia or New Zealand: the British Commonwealth numbers ‘in theatre’ jump to over three times the total American time ‘overseas’.)

I am suggesting that total American contribution to ground combat is vastly exaggerated by most of the literature. Through the war as a whole it amounted to about a quarter of the Western Allied total all up. Until mid to late 1944, the American contribution was minimal, and could have been replaced with other troops. In Europe their contribution really became important starting in June 1944, and in Asia starting November 1944. (But by 1944 there were more French and Italian and Indian and Polish volunteers than could be trained and equipped, so an idle side thought is that perhaps a lot of this American manpower might have been more valuably deployed as an arsenal of democracy workforce from 1942 - 1945, rather than spending years in training as infantry divisions that only got into action in 1945?) It was not until the end of 1944 when the large majority of American divisions started to make their presence felt worldwide (well, Northern Europe and the Pacific at least, if still not the Mediterannean, Middle Eastern or mainland Asian theatre’s)… at about the time when the European battles were mostly won, when Germany was already falling apart, and when Japan was trying to get the Soviet Union to be a go between in surrender discussions.

As usual, the problem is beware of statistics. Impressive sounding numbers of divisions do not necessarily relate to an actual combat value, particularly if they are not often in action. In terms of contributing to winning the war Chinese ‘divisions’ were a joke, Russian ‘divisions’ were an exaggeration, and the vast majority of American divisions were too late to see fighting in the critical years – early 1942 to late 1944 – when the tide was turned.

Comparing naval aircraft of World War II

As another instalment on the problems of comparing apples and oranges, I thought it would be a useful to make sense of some of the ludicrous claims made about naval aircraft during the Second World War.

All navies entered 1939 with a combination of biplane and monoplane machines, all of which were behind the performances of equivalent land-based fighters and bombers. By December 1941, when the Japanese and American Navy’s joined the war, things had moved on a bit for all combatants, but not nearly as far as most books would have you believe. Bad historians for instance - scathing about the British still using biplane torpedo bombers, and the Japanese still using fixed undercarriage dive bombers - often claim that the Americans had already moved too far more advanced aircraft. The magnificent Avenger torpedo bomber, is often mentioned, regardless of the fact that the first half dozen were not in action until the Battle of Midway, and that they did not appear in any numbers until 1943. By that time of course, both Britain and Japan had their own new torpedo bombers entering front-line service.

So it would be sensible to make some comparisons between what was available to whom at what time.

By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, most 1939 aircraft were obsolete. Britain had already retired the Blackburn Skua dive bomber, despite it’s having equivalent performance to the Japanese Val dive bomber, and superior performance to the American Devastator torpedo bomber, that were both still in service. So Pearl Harbor was carried out by a combination of quite effective modern aircraft like the famous Zero fighter, reasonable torpedo bombers like Kate, and elderly but still competent dive bombers like the Val. They were faced by American carriers largely armed with reasonable dive bombers like the Dauntless, elderly and inadequate torpedo bombers like the Devastator, and relatively recent but very uncompetitive fighters like the Buffalo – which was in the process of being replaced by the workmanlike but uninspiring Wildcat. At the same time British were working with the reliable but uninspiring Sea Hurricane fighter (and were also starting to use Wildcat’s), the powerful but slow Fulmar fighter reconnaissance plane, and the latest version of the venerable Swordfish torpedo bomber, the Albacore biplane. All of these aircraft had a serious limitations which had already been recognised. All of them (except the Dauntless for some reason) had replacements already in the pipeline.

Aircraft being phased out since 1939

Despite the claims that the United States Navy developed the best and most advanced interwar aircraft, the tubby little Grumman F3F biplane fighter [264 mph, 1 x .5 and 1 x .303 mg, 980 miles range] that had served until 1941 had been by far the least adequate carrier-borne fighter of 1939. Its performance was comparable to the Gloster Gladiator [257mph, 4 x .303 mg, 440 miles range] which was almost completely fazed out by the British in 1940 (but which served valiantly against the Italian airforce when 4 crated examples were found in storage on Malta). It’s inadequacy for front line carrier operations can be assessed by the fact that naval airmen were expected to rejoice when the inadequate F2A Brewster Buffalo [321mph, 4 x .50 mg, 1000 miles range – sounds better than it actually was], turned up in mid 1940. (When the British received some Buffalo’s at the same time, they found that even removing the heavy naval equipment like landing gear and life rafts left them inadequate as land fighters for European service, and ironically sent them to the Far East instead.)

The Japanese fighter of 1939, the Mitsubishi A5M ‘Claude’ [280mph, 2x x7.7mm mg, 750 miles range] also had no great performance characteristics to recommend it for the Second World War, and was being phased out of front line operations by December1941.

The Japanese Torpedo bomber was the Yokosuka B4Y 'Jean' [171mph, 1 x 7.7mm mg, 1,600 lb torpedo or bombs, 978 miles range]. The most complimentary thing that can be said about it was that it was no worse than the American Devastator or British Swordfish, but at least it was due to be phased out by December 1941, whereas the Devastator would still be the main American torpedo bomber until after Midway. (In fact the Jean continued to serve on smaller carriers until 1943, and some served at the Battle of Midway.)

The British torpedo bomber was the Fairey Swordfish [138mph, 2 x .303mg, 1,600lbs torpedo or bombs - later rockets, 1,030 miles range]. A slow but reliable biplane, with more lift and range than the Devastator, and more combat survivability than the Jean. (It frequently astounded even the crews how much damage a Swordfish could absorb and keep flying. Ragged anti-aircraft holes in the wings and tail and fuselage, lines of tracer holes across various surfaces, broken struts, cut control cables, the Swordfish would absorb them all and make it home.) Nevertheless the Swordfish was quickly proved to be a deathtrap for daylight operations against an enemy with fighter cover, and was scheduled for replacement by a more modern torpedo bomber for combat ops. Yet, amazingly, the Swordfish was the only allied pre-war naval carrier aircraft still in production when the war ended.

There are three reasons for this feat. The first is that the British were early adaptors of night operations, and performed successful Swordfish strikes (such as the amazingly successful strike at the Port of Taranto which crippled or sunk several major warships – becoming the Japanese model for Pearl Harbor), and successful night attacks at sea once the second innovation came in. This was the development of airborne radar, which was first operational on Swordfish operating on British carriers six months before Pearl Harbor. The British were to hold this unique ability to use radar for carrier aircraft operations for a couple of years before the Americans deployed similar concepts in 1943. They were to hold their unique advantage of night-time strikes also. (Both the Japanese and Americans lost many pilots over the next few years in strikes that failed to get home before dark!) So the Swordfish could soldier on under the cover of night, and continued to be useful as a strike aircraft long after its use in daytime had been demonstrated to be suicidal by the easy slaughter of those attempting to attack the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau during the Channel Dash in 1941.

The third, and unexpected reason, why the Swordfish was still in production at the end of the war, was that it’s unrivalled flying characteristics made it the only aircraft capable of surviving operations from small escort carriers operating in the Arctic Circle in bad weather. Whereas more modern, higher speed aircraft, like the Hurricane and Wildcat and Avenger could work from escort carriers in calmer seas, none of those would even consider operations under the sort of conditions that a Swordfish could easily manage. So the venerable old bus continued to serve successfully purely as an Anti-Submarine role until the final days of the war. This was not because there weren’t many better aircraft available, but simply because no other aircraft available could do the job as well. An example of a World War Two aircraft still having a (slightly reduced) role, long after being technically obsolete - see the many inadequate fighters that lived on as very successful night fighters. (Though the fact that ‘modern’ B-52’s are scheduled to still be operational 80 or 90 years after their initial deployment shows that new roles are always possible for reliable old aircraft, even when their technology is fifty years out of date.)

Another British multi-role aircraft was not so fortunate. The Blackburn Skua [225mph, 4x .303, one 500ln bomb, 760 miles range] had been discarded as a dual purpose fighter/dive bomber because it was not a good enough fighter, and the Armoured Carriers the British favoured for European operations had smaller air-groups that made a dedicated dive bomber too much of an investment. (British carriers had already moved to 40/60 fighter/ torpedo bomber mix by 1941, whereas the inexperienced Japanese and Americans were still trying to use 20/40/40 fighters/ dive/ torpedo bombers. Though it should be noted that because the British had dropped a type, the total number of fighters and torpedo bombers were more comparable than one might expect despite the smaller air-groups.) In some ways this was a shame, because the Skua had been a very good dive bomber (16 of them easily accounting for the German cruiser Konigsberg in April 1940), and had a superior ability to that later noted by the Japanese Val dive bomber, to defend itself as a limited fighter after having dropped its bombs. (In fact it was an excellent bomber killer, and only failed to stack up against modern German fighters.) As a dedicated bomber, the Skua would have been right at home amongst the Devastators, Kate's and Val's in the Pacific battles of 1942.

Aircraft still soldiering on in December 1941

The most obsolete first line strike aircraft in any carrier force in 1942 was the American Douglas Devastator torpedo bomber [206mph, 2 x.303 mg. 1,000lb’s of torpedo or bombs, range 716 miles]. Despite – or because of - being the first monoplane on any carrier air-wing (1937!), it had never been a very good aircraft. Fully loaded with a torpedo (a much lighter torpedo than used by anyone else), it had a hard time getting off the deck, and a much reduced speed and range. In fact it’s attack speed was actually slower than a Swordfish, and it lacked the Swordfishes maneouvrability or capacity to take damage. Used in daylight (the only way it could be used), it was an absolute death-trap if there were any airborne opposition at all. In fact the role played by the Devastators at the Battle of Midway was as kamikaze decoy targets to draw the Japanese fighter forces out of place. A point made even clearer by the fact that the few Devastators which had managed to attack at Coral Sea had usually seen their torpedo’s fail to work anyway. (The American carrier fleet would not get a successful airborne torpedo until mid 1943!)

The next most obsolete was the Japanese Aichi D3A Val dive-bomber [266mph, 3 x 7.7 mg, 1 x 500lb and 2 x 60lb bombs, 970 miles range] which had also entered service in the mid 30’s. It was a fixed landing gear dive-bomber modeled on the famous Junkers Ju 87 [183mph, 1 x 7.7mm mg, 1,000lb bomb, 621 miles range], and was just as good a dive bomber… if there was no opposition. Unlike the J87 (and like the Skua) the Val also had the ability to defend itself as a second rate fighter once the bombs had been dropped. Still the Val relied for success on clear skies, and achieved excellent results under those conditions at Ceylon (cruisers Devonshire and Cornwall and unarmed old carrier Hermes) and Coral Sea (carrier Lexington). Under even moderate air pressure at Trincomalee and Midway the performance fell of markedly, and later in the war the phrase that comes to mind is ‘Great Mariana’s Turkey Shoot’. Nonetheless they had to soldier on because their replacement aircraft was too fast for the smaller carriers that were to become the majority of the Japanese carrier fleet after Midway.

The next in line for obsolescence was the British replacement for the Swordfish, the Fairey Albacore [161mph, 3 x .303 mg, 1,610lb torpedo or 2,000lb’s bombs, range 930 miles], which was merely an improved biplane, and looked quite odd against the monoplanes being introduced by everyone else. However the Albacore was one of those compromises forced on a nation fighting on too many fronts to modernize everything at once: an interim design while awaiting the monoplane replacement due in 1943.

In spite of being a slow death-trap by day, the Albacore proved a more than capable stopgap, for the reasons raised by the Swordfish. The Albacore was not actually expected to mount a strike against an enemy fleet by day, but to use it’s radar guided strikes to find and destroy by night. Here it was undoubtedly successful, as it would be another two years before even the Americans worked out how to mount night-time fighter defences from their carriers, and the Japanese never got that far. The Albacore was to continue to operate successfully by day under adequate fighter cover in the Mediterranean, making excellent use of it’s reliability, stability, good payload, and resistance to damage. But as a front line carrier strike aircraft against enemy fleets with aircover, it was only good for night ops, and would have been slaughtered almost as easily as the Devestator had it come up against serious daytime opposition. The reason why the British specialized on night actions like Taranto and Matapan for naval air attacks, was A) because day time was close to suicidal if there was any possibility of enemy fighter cover, and B) because night was the environment that gave them an advantage over everyone else. That was why at Ceylon the Japanese advanced their airpower by day and retreated at night, and the British advanced their radar equipped battleships and strike aircraft by night and retreated by day. (As a result neither could get a decisive victory without a strong and unlikely element of luck.)

Also in the ‘thank God a replacement is starting to happen’ class is the American Brewster Buffalo [321mph, 2 x .50 mg, 1,000 miles range] fighter. This poor excuse for a fighter was unsuitable for the European theatre even in a land based mode, with much of the heavy naval equipment like landing gear and life-rafts removed. The RAF and RAAF units in Malaya had been forced to strip out armour and equipment, fit lighter guns, and reduce ammunition and fuel loads, in an attempt to make it more competitive, but nothing really worked. Given that the land based Marine squadron at Midway was easily slaughtered, the even slower navalised versions still on the carriers were even more of a deathtrap than the Devastators. (At least the job of the Devastators was to avoid enemy fighters, not take them on!)

[Note that the Buffalo did have considerable success for Finnish units fighting against the Russians. There were three reasons for this. First, Finnish engineers fixed the engines to make them work better. Second, the cold weather made for much better performance than the tropics. Third excellent Finnish pilots were fighting very poor Russian conscripts, who stuck to useless standard formations despite the Finns picking them off one by one. This last suggests that the Buffalo might have actually done better later in the war against less experienced Japanese pilots.]

The right aircraft for the right time – and their weaknesses

Some aircraft at the time of Pearl Harbour were recent innovations, and quite good for their time. But even these had their weaknesses.

The famous Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter [331mph, 2 x 20mm, 2 x 7.7mm mg, 1,190 miles range] was light, reasonably fast, maneouvrable, and long ranged. It was a shock to the Allies because in level flight it could practically run rings around most American fighters. In a dogfight it could turn inside even the British Hurricane, which was considered exceptional an exceptional dogfighter. It built up an enviable and terrifying reputation. On the negative side, it was un-armoured, had no self-sealing fuel tanks, and a tendency to fall apart or burst into flames from just one or two little hits that any Western plane would most likely shrug off. Its very lightness also meant that it was unable to match Allied aircraft in dives, and this was the way to beat it. Allied pilots quickly learned to dive through formations for best effect. Allied pilots also became good at working together in pairs and fours in defensive weaves. It would be too much to claim that the Zero was the best naval fighter of the period, because no sensible Western pilot would be caught – pardon the expression - dead in such an unsafe fighter. Still it had a frightening impact on Allied morale until techniques to deal with its weaknesses were developed.

The American Grumman F4F Wildcat fighter [331mph, 4 x 0.5 mg, 840 miles range] had been in operation with British carrier forces since mid 1941, and was becoming the main American carrier fighter at the time Pearl Harbour. By the time of Midway the majority of the American fighters present were Wildcat’s, and the British fleet at Ceylon several months earlier had used them as well. The next model [6 x .5 mg, but 320 mph and 770 miles range] of these rugged little fighters were not as fast or manoeuvrable as the Zero, but they were heavier and much tougher. They could dive through the Zero’s and absorb much greater damage in dogfights. These were the backbone of the force that broke the IJN’s naval airpower in the crucial middle years of the war, and they did this because of their durability and good tactics, rather than because of any superiority as aircraft.

As well as Wildcat’s (which they called ‘Martlet’s), the British fleet at Ceylon had the tried and tested Hawker Hurricane fighter (the mainstay and highest scoring fighter of the Battle of Britain), in it’s new Sea Hurricane IIC mode [342mph, 4 x 20mm cannon, range 460 miles – 970 with drop tanks]. This excellent fighter was getting a bit long in the tooth for land operations, but was still performing competitively in Egypt, Russia and Burma against Italian, German and Japanese opposition. The heavy 4 cannon armament was particularly useful for shattering opponents with just a few rounds, and would become the standard for most British and American fighters later in the war. It’s arrival on carriers gave the British a dog-fighter superior to either the American alternatives, and one for which the tactic of diving through formations (which American pilots were still adapting from the experiences of Chennault’s Flying Tiger’s in China), was well established and practiced. The great disadvantage of the Hurricane was that it was extremely short ranged for naval operations on just internal tanks, limiting it largely to a defensive interceptors role. On the other hand the British had enormous experience with vectoring radar controlled fighters against attackers from the most useful angles. Whereas the American and Japanese fighters tended to attack head on for most of the war, which led to a single pass at best; the British fighters would come out of the sun diving across the line of attack and hopefully hitting a couple of fighters before taking on two or three of the bombers several thousand feet below. Against durable German planes this had been moderately effective. Against vulnerable Japanese aircraft it proved brutally efficient. (Indeed, as late as 1945 the British Pacific Fleet carriers needed far smaller Combat-Air-Patrols than American carriers because of these tactics learned in the Mediterranean before America entered the war.)

In lieu of not using Dive-bombers, the British had an alternative type not used by the Japanese or Americans. A fighter/reconnaissance aircraft. The Fairey Fulmar [272mph, 8 x .303 mg and 1 x .303, 830 miles range] was a two seat fighter based on a much improved version of the Fairey Battle bomber (which had been the fastest bomber in the world pre-war). This concept was originally to allow an additional navigator to support the pilot during long flights over water, and led to a slower and less manoeuvrable fighter than most of its opposition. However it was also an incredibly rugged and stable carrier aircraft, with far fewer flying accidents than most other naval fighters. It’s size and durability also allowed it to carry much more fuel, and to take on a heavier bomb-load, than other fighters of its time, and the second seat was soon equipped with radar (something far to bulky for most fighters until very late in the war). The Fulmar therefore became an excellent long range recconnaissance/strike aircraft to back up its fighter role.

Suprisingly, the Fulmar was also quite successful as a fighter. Despite being slower and much less of a dogfighter than German or Italian opponents, it was remarkably successful at defending fleet operations against continuous large waves of Axis attackers in the Mediterranean. The secret was that successful naval attacks need relatively unobstructed approaches to get good accuracy and results. Even a limited number of fighters can break up the effectiveness of such attacks if well handled. Carriers like the Ark Royal or Furious could only keep 4 to 6 Fulmars at a time in the air against the constant waves of attackers from Sicily and Italy during convoys to Malta, but those few fighters could use the radar vectoring and dive through tactics described above to disrupt Axis attacks to the point of greatly reducing their effectiveness. Fulmars regularly shot down superior numbers of Axis bombers and fighters during their Mediteranean operations (scoring the highest number of kills of all Fleet Air Arm fighters!), and most Royal Navy aces achieved some or all of their scores flying Fulmars.

Moving on to bombers. Apart from the Fulmar, which usually had more important tasks, the British were stuck with the ‘soldiering on’ Albacore. But the Japanese and Americans had some more modern toys.

The Japanese Nakajima B5N Kate [235mph, 1 x 7.7mmm mg, 1760lb’s torpedo or bombs,1,075 miles range] torpedo bomber had been introduced in 1941, and was the mainstay of the early years of the wartime Japanese carrier operations. It had good range, was reliable, and had a good payload. But it still lacked armour or self sealing fuel tanks. As a result it was desperately vulnerable to daytime operations against reasonable fighter opposition.

Almost exactly the same could be said for the American Douglas Dauntless dive bomber [255mp, 2 x .5 and 2 x .3 mg, 1,200lb’s bombs, 1,115 miles range]. Arrived at the same time, same strengths, similar weaknesses. Like all American aircraft it could absorb considerably more damage than any Japanese plane, but like all daylight attack aircraft, its top speed made it a sitting duck against organized fighter defenses. The greatest success of the Dauntless was at Midway, where the sacrificial run of the Devastator torpedo bombers fortuitously arrived just far enough in advance to pull the entire Japanese fighter cover away and allow the Dauntless’ exactly the sort of unopposed attacks that the theoretically inferior Japanese Val dive bombers had enjoyed at Ceylon and Coral Sea. The increased success of the Dauntless later in the war was in direct parallel to the increased ability of American fighters to clear a path. By the time of the sinking of the Yamato in 1945, Dauntless’ always had almost completely unopposed runs. (Perhaps that is why it continued in operation when every other contemporary aircraft had been replaced?)

Planes in the pipeline

The replacement for the Val was en-route, but not to be in service much before 1943. It was far faster and therefore more effective Yokosuku D4Y Judy [360mph, 3 x 7.7mm mg, 1,100lb’s bombs, 790 miles range], but suffered the durability weaknesses of all Japanese aircraft. Nonetheless, had it been available for the crucial battles of 1942, there is little doubt that American losses would have been far greater. It was much faster than The Dauntless, and carried a heavier bomb, though for a shorter range. Unfortunately it was so fast that it could not be used on the smaller carriers that dominated Japanese operations after the Midway losses. Restricted to the few big fleet carriers left, this just meant that mixed carrier groups had aircraft of mixed performances, leading to more dispersion of attacks. The vast majority of these aircraft produced finished up operating from land bases.

Similarly the replacement for the Albacore was en route, but the Fairey Barracuda [245mph, 2 x .303 mg, 1,600lb torpedo or bombs, 1,150 miles range] was put back once alternatives became available. The Barracuda was slower than most other naval strike aircraft from later in the war, but was a reasonably flexible and durable aircraft. Not only could it operate efficiently as either a torpedo or dive bomber (it did so to devastating effect against the Tirpitz in 1944), or with rockets, it could use rocket assisted take-offs to operate from the smaller escort carriers unsuitable to most more modern aircraft. It’s main fault was experienced during the raids on the Netherlands East Indies, where its cold weather optomised engine had greatly reduced performance in the heat, particularly attempting to climb over mountain ranges. For Pacific operations it was usually replaced with Avengers, and it served out its operational life in the Atlantic.

Which brings us to the Grumman TBF Avenger [271mph, 2 x .5 and 1 x .3 mg, 2,000lb’s torpedo or bombs, 1,450 miles range], fairly regarded as the best torpedo bomber of the war. An excellent and very durable aircraft, with enough space to be the first American naval aircraft mount radar (some two years after the British Swordfish did so). An excellent aircraft quite capable of delivering torpedos or reasonable bomb-loads, and later adapted for depth charge/radar attacks on submarines. Unlike most other aircraft of this period, the ASW versions at least remained in service well after the wars ends.

On the other hand the Avenger’s have also been oversold. Yes they were fast and efficient for their types, but that did not save them against reasonable opposition. At Midway, the half dozen available suffered five losses, a higher percentage of losses than the obsolete Devestator’s they were replacing! In fact anywhere they met fighters in daylight, they were almost as vulnerable as any other bomber of the war lacking suitable fighter cover. There is certainly no suggestion that their greater speed and ruggedness gave them any sort of immunity if an enemy fighter got on their tail. They too were equipped for radar directed night attacks by 1944, though by that time American air superiority usually allowed them to operate with relative impunity, with their main danger being from the anti-aircraft firepower of the ships they were attacking.

Later in the war

The upgrade of the Wildcat was the Grumman F6F Hellcat [375mph, 6 x .5 mg, 1,590 miles range]. Faster, tougher, much longer ranged, and more maneouvrable, when it arrived in late 1943 it gave the Americans a distinct edge over the Japanese. (Though the British using it found the Germans a tougher opponent.) Hellcat’s were nonetheless being outclassed by other Allied aircraft by the end of the war.

Also in 1943, the British deployed the Fairey Firefly [316mph, 4 x 20mm cannon, 2,000lb bombs or rockets, 1,300 miles range], a much improved Fulmar fighter/reconnaissance plane. Long ranged, fairly fast, extremely rugged, and with an impressive range of abilities. It was radar equipped, and allowed strike leaders (which other nations still had to put in torpedo bombers) to be in faster and more survivable aircraft. Despite being a two seat fighter, its unique air brakes made it a superb dog fighter easily capable of facing Japanese fighters. It could act as a dive bomber, or use its rockets and cannon to pound targets while covering other attacking aircraft. (8 rockets – sometimes 16 on later versions – gave it a broadside like a heavy cruiser.) It proved devastating in the Atlantic, Indian Ocean and Pacific campaigns, and served in a variety of roles for many years after the war.

In early 1944 the British tried out a new aircraft the Americans had deployed with the Marines, but considered too dangerous to use on carriers. The Vought F4U Corsair [417mph, 6 x .5 mg, 1,015 miles range] proved a magnificent success, and in late 1944 the Americans started deploying them to carriers too. The Japanese had no answer, not least because they were running out of large carriers and of pilots. It would often carry bombs or rockets later in the war, and could match most Japanese fighters even without ditching them. The British homemade upgrade, the Hawker Sea Fury [460mh, 4 x 20mm cannon, 2,000 lb rockets or bombs, 700 miles range], like the equivalent American upgrade the Grumman F8F Bearcat [421mph, 4 x 20mm cannon, 2,000lb rockets or bombs, 1,105 miles range], started appearing too late to see service (but both performed exceptionally well in the Korean war).

Towards the end of the war the British were also bringing into service a new torpedo/fighter hybrid, the Blackburn B-37 Firebrand II [340mph, 4 x 20mm cannon, 1,850lb torpedo or 2,000lb’s bombs, 740 miles range]. Fighter aircraft had become so big and powerful, that even a torpedo was simply a slightly bigger bomb. The Firebrand was faster than any other torpedo aircraft (or indeed most of the older fighters still in operation), and a reasonably capable fighter in it’s own right once it had dropped it’s torpedo: making it pretty much the first Allied torpedo plane of the war potentially capable of operating in daylight without massive fighter escort… though it would still have needed fighter cover until after the torpedo strike. Results looked promising, but the war ended before they were used in combat. Both Britain and America were starting to look at a new generation of jet aircraft instead, and the British Sea Vampire was actually tested in carrier landings in late 1945, with the American FH1 Phantom being operational by 1947.

Conclusion

You will note from the above that no nation had a dominant lead in naval aircraft at any time. The British possibly had the most advanced dive bombers in 1939 (Skua) and again 1945 (Firefly), and the Japanese and Americans the best torpedo bombers in 1941 (Kate) and 1942 (Avenger) respectively (though the Firebrand might have taken the title in 1945 if the war had lasted a bit longer). The British had the only night strike aircraft for the middle of the war (Swordfish and Albemarle), and the Americans the best by 1944 - the Avenger. The Japanese had the best fighter of 1941-2, the Zero; and the Americans had the best fighters in 1943 (Hellcat) and 1944 (Corsair- but note the British had used it in this role since 1943); but the British Sea Fury was the best by the end of the war. The British had uniquely effective fighter/reconnaissance planes in 1941 (Fulmar – but it suffered from being their only fighter too) and again in 1945 (Firefly – used in partnership with Sea Spitfires and Corsairs), while the Americans had such air superiority that they could use some fighters mainly as strike aircraft (Corsair again).

By contrast each nation had plenty of ‘worst’ category too. The Swordfish was a terrible day torpedo bomber by 1941, and the Devestator even worse by 1942. The Val was an obsolete dive bomber by 1942, and arguably the Dauntless only escaped the same fate through massive fighter cover later in the war. The Fulmar was an inadequate fighter pulling above its weight in 1941, as was the Wildcat in 1942 and the Zero by 1943. (The Buffalo was just inexcusable even when introduced in 1940.) The Albacore was only saved from being useless through being refitted for night operations from 1941, and the Kate and even Avenger were hopelessly vulnerable to daytime fighter opposition even when they were the best torpedo bombers available.

In other words don’t fall for the line that a particular aircraft was ‘the best naval such-and-such of the war’. All have their time and their place. Arguably the Albacore biplane was a more dangerous torpedo bomber in 1942 because of its ability to find and destroy targets by using radar at night: in comparison to the much better Kate, or infinitely better Avengers, of the same period, which had to survive opposition fighters in daylight to stand a chance. It is not the really the fastest or sexiest aircraft that is the best, but is the model that can carry out its job most effectively. It should also be the model that gives the crew the best chance of survival. That is what really makes an aircraft ‘the best’ for its time.