In the afternoon of December 7, 1941, Admiral Nagumo's staff debated whether a third strike should be made on Pearl Harbour?
The answer should have been, "Yes, we must completely control the air before Admiral Yamamoto arrives with the main body and the invasion fleet..."
That after all, had been the original plan supported by Fuchida and Genda and many others...
This fun little conception started from my previous post, which looked at how the Battle of Midway might have turned out if Japan had not been attacking Britain, Thailand, the Netherlands and Australia as well as the US, and had actually concentrated her forces on a proper defeat of the US.
In that article I started with Midway at the time of Midway, but without the distraction and attrition of fighting Britain, the Netherlands and Australia over the prior six months.
Obviously, the results would not have been good for the USN.
Then I considered the likelihood's of having to fight the 'decisive battle' earlier, say at the time of Coral Sea (May); or of the Indian Ocean Raid (April); or of the Darwin Raid (March); or of the Java Sea (February); or of the Makassar Strait (January).
But when I actually looked at alternative Japanese plans, it became clear that the real challenge would have been if the Japanese had followed through on their proposed invasion of Hawaii in the first attacks.
Here is the summary of that option from my last article:
Pearl Harbour, but no allies
If Japan wasn't trying to attack everywhere at once, and could concentrate the forces allocated against the British, Thais, Burmese and Dutch against the US, why not follow through? Even Nagumo would have been willing to take a third strike against Pearl in these circumstances. Particularly with his boss Yamamoto and his main body (with more support tankers) were following close behind, and carrying the 3 crack divisions no longer needed to invade for Malaya for an invasion of Hawaii!
It is worth quoting the entire Wikipedi entry on the planned Japanese invasion (referenced 11 May, 2021):
Concept of a Japanese invasion of Hawaii[edit]
At several stages during 1941, Japan's military leaders discussed the possibility of launching an invasion to seize the Hawaiian Islands; this would provide Japan with a strategic base to shield its new empire, deny the United States any bases beyond the West Coast and further isolate Australia and New Zealand.
Genda, who saw Hawaii as vital for American operations against Japan after war began, believed Japan must follow any attack on Pearl Harbor with an invasion of Hawaii or risk losing the war. He viewed Hawaii as a base to threaten the west coast of North America, and perhaps as a negotiating tool for ending the war. He believed, following a successful air attack, 10,000-15,000 men could capture Hawaii, and saw the operation as a precursor or alternative to a Japanese invasion of the Philippines. In September 1941, Commander Yasuji Watanabe of the Combined Fleet staff estimated two divisions (30,000 men) and 80 ships, in addition to the carrier strike force, could capture the islands. He identified two possible landing sites, near Haleiwa and Kaneohe Bay, and proposed both be used in an operation that would require up to four weeks with Japanese air superiority.[40]
Although this idea gained some support, it was soon dismissed for several reasons:
- Japan's ground forces, logistics, and resources were already fully committed, not only to the Second Sino-Japanese War but also for offensives in Southeast Asia that were planned to occur almost simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor attack.
- The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) insisted it needed to focus on operations in China and Southeast Asia, and refused to provide substantial support elsewhere. Because of a lack of cooperation between the services, the IJN never discussed the Hawaiian invasion proposal with the IJA.[40][g]
- Most of the senior officers of the Combined Fleet, in particular Admiral Nagano, believed an invasion of Hawaii was too risky.[h][40]
With an invasion ruled out, it was agreed a massive carrier-based three wave airstrike against Pearl Harbor to destroy the Pacific Fleet would be sufficient. Japanese planners knew that Hawaii, with its strategic location in the Central Pacific, would serve as a critical base from which the United States could extend its military power against Japan. However, the confidence of Japan's leaders that the conflict would be over quickly and that the United States would choose to negotiate a compromise, rather than fight a long, bloody war, overrode this concern.[i][41][42][43]
Watanabe's superior, Captain Kameto Kuroshima, who believed the invasion plan unrealistic, after the war called his rejection of it the "biggest mistake" of his life.[40]
What if the invasion had gone ahead?
My previous article assumes that Japan didn't attack Britain and the Netherlands and concentrated on the US instead.
But in fact the plan outlined above just diverted some of the resources from the Philippines invasion, while leaving the other operations in place.
(This would be a version of 'Island Hopping' in reverse... leaving the isolated Philippino garrison to 'wither on the vine', and for easy clean up later... In fact a slightly larger scale version of what actually happened anyway. Where, after the surprisingly easy conquest of Luzon, and the rapid retreat of MacArthur's forces to Bataan: the Japanese pulled most of their best units for other operations against Malaya, Burma and the East Indies for several months. Only returning to finish off the isolated Bataan/Corregidor garrison at a convenient time five months later. So this 'Hawaii first' option would just be a slightly larger version of the same strategy.)
So what was the actual goal of the Pearl Harbour operation?
Piss off the Americans? Tick.
Win a tactical advantage to prevent interference in expansion operations? Tick.
Inflict a comprehensive defeat on the USN? Half a tick.
Destroy Pearl Harbour as an operational base? Fail.
Inflict enough damage to prevent counterattack for years? Fail.
Drive the entire USN out of the central Pacific and back to the US West Coast? Fail.
Allow a genuine threat of air and bombardment raids on the US West Coast? Fail
Win a strategic victory that would give a chance of negotiated peace? Fail.
Frankly, if you are going to kick a sleeping giant awake, best to kick it hard enough to put it out of action for years, and give you a chance of genuine negotiation.
Not just enough to temporarily inconvenience it, and annoy it enough to invite massive retaliation.
In other words, either go full out, or don't do it at all!
"If you insist on doing this damn silly thing, don't do it in this damn silly way". (Sir Humphrey Appleby on Yes Minister.)
Again, we can quote the Wikipedia article on Japanese Planning for the Pearl Harbour attack:
Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by the British action in the Battle of Taranto, in which 21 obsolete Fairey Swordfish disabled half the Regia Marina (Italian Navy). Admiral Yamamoto even dispatched a delegation to Italy, which concluded a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus giving Japan the time necessary to establish a "barrier" defense to protect Japanese control of the Dutch East Indies. The delegation returned to Japan with information about the shallow-running torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised.[citation needed]
The technical aspects of the plan were perfectly sensible, and in fact it worked.
However the more sensible advocates of the plan had expected it to at least involve the third strike against the oil supplies and dockyard facilities that would have put the base out of operation... (Wikipedia - Attack on Pearl Harbour - referenced May 18, 2021.)
If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year";[117] according to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the war another two years".[118]
At a conference aboard his flagship the following morning, Yamamoto supported Nagumo's withdrawal without launching a third wave.[123] In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and the oil tank farm meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.[125]
That decision in itself made the entire operation of dubious value. Temporary advantage gained at immense cost (in pissing of the US): when real advantage could have been gained with just a little more effort.
There are justifications for Nagumo's decision:
Nagumo, however, decided to withdraw for several reasons:
- American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave.[119]
- Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.[119]
- The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers.[119] Nagumo was uncertain whether the U.S. had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against his carriers.[120]
- A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the Royal Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.[121]
- The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer since he was at the very limit of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.[122]
- He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission—the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet—and did not wish to risk further losses.[123] Moreover, it was Japanese Navy practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of the enemy.[124]
But some of these look remarkably like retrospective excuses. In practice losing even half the IJN's carrier plane fleet to completely destroy Pearl Harbour as an operational base would have been infinitely more valuable than this half arsed effort that invited swift and sustained counter attack.
I realise Nagumo's decision could, at least theoretically, be seen as part of a clever long term plan for weakening the USN by attrition as you reeled it in for the final battle where the IJN battle fleet would be able to deliver a coup de gras, but frankly that is fantastically unrealistic thinking. If you can't capitalise on the overwhelming success of actual surprise attack, then you certainly won't be able to make your enemy follow your beautiful little theories to the letter to enjoy their inevitable defeat!
I have said it before, and will say it again. Nagumo was a terrible Admiral, and repeatedly managed to snatch slow agonising long term defeat from the jaws of astonishing short term victories.
A real victory - invasion of Hawaii
After a third wave on December 7 that concentrated on reducing active resistance, the job of the fourth and fifth waves on December 8 would have been purely air superiority over the island, as there would have been no need for further air-strikes against Pearl Harbour itself.
There would have been no need, because half a dozen IJN battleships – most likely the two 27 knot Nagato's and the four 30+ knot Kongo's, (escorted by the 7th aircraft carrier Hosho), that actually did provide distant cover for the operation – would be giving an object lesson as to what Mers-el-Kebir could have looked like if Somerville hadn't consciously decided to do as little damage as possible.
There is not much doubt that the 48 14" and 16" guns of those 6 capital ships could finish the operational destruction of both the US Pacific fleet and the Pearl Harbour base in pretty short order if the IJN controlled the air. (If they wanted to... perhaps leaving the dockyards an oil tanks intact for the invasion force to gather in would have been preferable? In fact it is amusingly possible to re-imagine the Doolittle Raid actually taking place as a USN strike against the captured ships and facilities of an occupied Pearl Harbour!)
In fact the only real threat to a Japanese invasion fleet was potentially any USN submarines that might a) survive, b) manage to get to sea, and c) manage to get past a massive IJN air and surface screen to attack fast moving targets... (Let's be optimistic and suggest that one of them did actually hit one of the Japanese capital ships, and by some miracle the torpedo functioned... unlikely at that time... and damaged, but did not sink it... that is what actually happened later in the war... once the torpedo's were fixed anyway... so let's say it happened almost accidentally here... big deal... Particularly if the damaged ship could sail straight into an occupied Pearl harbour for repairs?)
But the key element of the bombardment of Hawaii by the IJN would not actually have been doing further damage to the port facilities or the disabled ships, which by this point would actually be targets for capture. It would really be counter battery work (along with a dozen cruisers and two dozen destroyers), for suppressing any guns that might try to interfere with the invasion fleet landing two divisions on the morning of December 9 1941.
But by that time the IJN aircraft and surface fleet would have almost completely suppressed much useful resistance, leaving the elite battle hardened Japanese divisions to sweep aside the poorly equipped and badly trained defenders, who might be determined, but whose devastated morale and complete lack of combat experience would quickly tell.
You can fantasise as much as you like about iron jawed John Wayne types mounting a furious resistance, but, to use a phrase, it doesn't amount to a 'hill of beans' when it comes to battered amateurs against experienced professionals with full air and sea dominance and massive fire-power support. If something as strong and well garrisoned as Fort Eben-Emauel can fall to such a shockingly fast and powerful attack, then certainly an unprepared Hawaii can! Singapore was much better prepared, and much more heavily garrisoned 2 months later, but, stuck in a civilian disaster zone, they had no real chance against crack troops with complete dominance of air and sea.
If Japan had made any serious attempt to follow up with an invasion of Hawaii, then it is almost inconceivable that Hawaii would not have fallen.
Could the Lexington and Enterprise have intervened?
If the Japanese Strike Force had hung around instead of leaving, and the Japanese main body and invasion fleet were about to arrive and start further operations: it is hard to imagine the nearby American carriers not trying to intervene? (Though it would probably be more sensible for them to run for the US West coast instead.)
[Saratoga was actually entering San Diego harbour when the attack started, while Lexington was near Midway and Enterprise had just sent 18 of her Dauntless's to Pearl that morning - and had most of them shot down either by a combination of the Japanese fighters and US AA!]
But even had the two carriers actually available been able to link up and co-ordinate somewhat, they could hardly be in organised position to strike back much before the main body (with 6 capital ships, a seventh carrier, a dozen cruisers, and 2 or 3 dozen destroyers) arrived. It is also worth noting that Lexington for instance was still equipped with just 17 Buffalo fighters at this stage! Buffalo's!!!
The USN , could still only really fight in daylight, unlike the IJN, which could also fight at night. (Or the RN, which could fight at night by both surface and air attack... The USN and IJN still lacked the radar guided torpedo bombers the RN had to make air attacks at night possible.)
Both US carriers together, fielding less than 40 fighters, half of them Buffalo's... against 147 Zero's... in daylight... And their Devastator torpedo bombers lacked a functional torpedo! It would be entirely down to perhaps a couple of dozen Dauntless dive bombers against 7 Japanese carriers and probably 6 battleships and God knows how many cruisers, destroyers and submarines as well.
In reality we get this (Wikipedia article on Enterprise sourced 30.4.2021):
Enterprise received radio messages from Pearl Harbor reporting that the base was under attack, and she was later directed to launch an airstrike based on an inaccurate report of a Japanese carrier southwest of her location. The strike was launched around 17:00, consisting of six Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters of Fighting Squadron Six (VF-6), 18 Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers of Torpedo Squadron Six (VT-6), and six SBDs of VB-6.[12]
Six dive bombers against 6 Japanese carriers! The Devastators without functional torpedos are mere distractions. Even had Lexington rendezvoused next day for a joint strike, her 58 total bombers and torpedo bombers also come down to less than a couple of dozen extra dive bombers. Say 30 dive bombers and 40 fighters in total together against practically the entire Japanese navy? That's not even the size of a single strike from either Coral Sea or Midway, and with less advanced planes and way less experienced crews against the Japanese at peak numbers and efficiency!
It is very hard to see any combination of fantastic flukes that might make this a winning proposition for the USN.
Frankly it doesn't bear thinking about.
What else might the Japanese have done, if truly committed.
Occupying the Hawaii islands and bases would be a good start. Particularly if the Americans were in such chaos that they didn't manage to destroy all the oil tanks, dockyards and their supplies, and finish the sinking (or flat blow up) their disabled ships.
It is actually amusing to imagine the Japanese salvaging and returning to service half a dozen of the less damaged US battleships.
The result would definitely have driven the remnants of the US navy back to the West Coast of the US, and thus allowed the occupation of Midway and the Philippines at leisure. In fact places like Guadalcanal could be swept up later with no opposition worth mentioning. The Australians or New Zealanders might have tried to send a battalion or so, but with US naval support cut off, it would be many months before any substantial reinforcements from Britain or the Eastern Fleet would interfere with the IJN doing what it liked in the South Pacific. Port Moresby would probably have fallen for instance.
What about the America's themselves?
The I-400 class submarines, specifically designed to allow submarine born bombers to attack places like the Panama canal, were not even designed yet... but they certainly reveal Yamamoto's thinking.
At the very least, a couple of Japanese submarines could have made an effort to shell the Panama Canal at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbour. With the objective of sinking a ship in a vital place.
More dramatically, an actual block-ship might have been sacrificed. It would have been easy enough to position an old freighter - possibly flagged as if from China or Thailand - during peacetime, at a place where it might have caused considerable damage. Whether it might have been possible to have it actually transiting the canal during the vital point (admittedly the middle of the day peak time for transit), so that it might take out a lock and do serious damage... well that might be optimistic. But it comes pretty close to what the Germans did with pre-positioning ships in their surprise attack on Norway during peacetime, so not necessarily unfeasible.
The question is, how much follow up could the IJN put into strikes against the US West Coast itself?
Obviously no invasion could be contemplated. But arguably the efforts put into at least some of the Darwin Raid, Indian Ocean Raid, Coral Sea and Midway operations: would have been better put into smashing the USN's remaining Pacific reserves (particularly if Panama had been closed). And into attacking both Californian port facilities and industry. Specifically, Californian naval shipyards and aircraft factories.
The argument against this is that the IJN had to remember it was facing a two front war, and be constantly prepared to face the British Eastern Fleet. In fact the whole point of the Darwin and Indian Ocean raids was to try and destroy, or at least limit, that threat.
But in this scenario, it would be far easier to completely finish off the threat from the USN (at least for several years), while reversing the 'final battle' strategy for use against the RN instead. With the USN reduced to impotence, and the main Japanese fleet based at Singapore (which it actually was sometimes, even under the two front threat), then the IJN had a chance of enticing the British into a decisive 'Battle of Tsushima' in mid to late 1942.
Consider a Midway style operation aimed at forcing the British Eastern Fleet to fight at Ceylon, but with no effective USN to threaten its flank? If the Japanese have garrisoned Hawaii and Midway already, and done a couple of Darwin/Indian Ocean style raids on the US West Coast (hopefully reducing the USN to one active carrier the way they actually did in late 1942 anyway), then such a Midway style operation might not even lack Shokaku and Zuikaku? Admittedly the attrition rates of such a series of attacks would still see much reduced squadron numbers, and a lot of less skilled pilots, in the Japanese carriers. But it is still a sobering thought.
Success in negotiating peace?
This is a fun thought. If the USN has been neutralised, then obviously Japan would have to attempt to knock out the Eastern Fleet and make the Allies admit that a negotiated peace is the only alternative.
Frankly part of the plan to occupy Hawaii was the assumption that trading it back in return for peace would be a major attraction to the US. So peace in return for safety for US, New Zealand, Australia, India and Ceylon. With the bonus of the return of Hawaii and Burma, and possibly a neutralised zone Singapore under joint management. All offered when the IJN has achieved total victory, and there is nothing the US or Britain can do about it.
Given that Britain and Russia are still in a desperate struggle against Germany and Italy, it is hard to see what Britain could do about it if the US can't provide any useful support.
But that requires the IJN to defeat the British Eastern Fleet as well as the US Pacific Fleet. and the longer operations continued against the USN, the less chance the IJN would have to catch the Eastern Fleet vulnerably incomplete.
(I think my next article will have to be on 'would a US first strategy have worked any better? for Japan'...)
Let's just re-emphasise the concept of 'allies' here.
Frankly, had the Japanese felt safe to attack the British and Dutch without risking US entry to the war, they would have probably won well enough to force a negotiated peace. But of course they couldn't safely assume that Roosevelt couldn't overcome US isolationism. The USN, particularly based in the Philippines, could simply have cut Japan's supply lines to China and the new operational zones further south any time they felt like it.
Likewise, had the Japanese felt safe to attack the US without fearing British entry to the war, they would probably have won well enough to force a negotiated peace. But of course they knew the British would know who was next in line if the USN collapsed, and that the British would understood absolutely the need to do everything possible to keep their allies in action. (Even Stalin...)
Japan's problem was that they couldn't risk seizing British and Dutch possessions without dealing with their vulnerable flank against the US.
Equally, they couldn't risk dealing with the US without opening their vulnerable flank against the potential British counter operations.
However it is interesting to speculate on whether it would have been more sensible for the Japanese to concentrate their first few months on the Americans, simply assuming the British would not be in any position to mount a counter threat for many months? A pretty realistic assumption in early 1942.
Could that have been more effective than splitting Japanese forces between simultaneous operations against everyone simultaneously?
In reality of course, we know that the impressive looking efforts careening all over 1/3 of the globe trying to take out the USN at one end and the RN at the other end: just meant that neither was really defeated badly enough to be driven from the field. Worryingly strong forces remained to mount Doolittle raids, invasions of Madagascar, and attacks on the Andaman's, or around New Guinea or Guadalcanal. This just lead the IJN rushing backwards and forwards to more and more frantic attempts to achieve 'decisive' results here or there, usually be ever decreasing numbers of planes operating from less and less carriers each time.
The Great Mistake...
In reality, I don't think there can be much doubt that the Japanese screwed up in not following through at Pearl Harbour.
Both Yamamoto and Nimitz stated categorically that a third strike to finish off the dockyards and oil storage at Pearl Harbour would have greatly improved the Japanese position, and slowed US efforts at striking back by at least 2 years.
But the real missed opportunity might have been the invasion of Hawaii.
Let's have that Wikipedia quote again...
Watanabe's superior, Captain Kameto Kuroshima, who believed the invasion plan unrealistic, after the war called his rejection of it the "biggest mistake" of his life.[40]
Amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics.
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