If the war had not started until December 1941: Part III – Naval Power Summary

 Same Intro as Part I & II - I recently started looking at the issue of what would have happened if a second 'Munich Agreement' in 1939... a 'Warsaw Agreement' perhaps (presumably because France and perhaps a couple of Dominions refused to support a declaration of war), meant that Britain and France did not actually declare war on Germany on September 3, 1939. 

Might the World War have started in December 1941 instead? Probably not, but that needs explaining. It looks like being a fun topic, but it requires a lot of background. So I thought I would start with an analysis of where naval power would be in December 1941 if the European powers had not kicked off early. Even that is too big a bite for one go, so part I looked at Battleships, and Part II will just looks at aircraft carriers. (I will also look at land and air power in another article, then consider how – or if – any war might have developed on that basis as I progress.) 

If the war had not started until December 1941: Part III – Naval Power Summary

The previous posts - on Battleships and Aircraft Carriers - were getting a bit long, so I am doing a third to summarise the effects of the delay of a start of World War Two from September 1939 to December 1941 on the construction, re-builds, and new orders, of Britain, France, Germany and Italy, just to see what they would have brought on line to match what the US and Japan had on line by December 1941.

[A lot of the previous discussion is based on the 1938 NSF - New Standard Fleet – plan for the RN, which started to replace the 1935 DRC - Defence Requirements Committee – plan in 1939, only to be cut short when war started early.]

The main changes between the two RN plans were:

                        1936 DRC fleet       1938 NSF fleet

Battleships                    15                20

Aircraft Carriers            10                15

Cruisers                           70                100

Destroyers                    16 flotillas        22 flotillas

Submarines                    55                    82

Capital Ships.

Part I pointed out that in the intervening two years, the British would have rebuilt Barham, Malaya, Hood and Repulse to the same standards as Queen Elizabeth, Valiant and Renown (plus engine and AA upgrades to Nelson, Rodney, and at least some of the Revenge class, which would have reduced weight and increased range even with the extra armour and armament upgrades). They would also have commissioned all 5 KGV, and probably have 2 Lions working up, 2 more Lions due to commission 1942 and another 2 1943, as well as Vanguard fitting out and possible 2 more battleships building for commissioning in 1944. (And I assumed that Britain would curtail construction of any other orders there, as they would be unlikely to complete any additional ships during the war... matching the US's actual practice of continuing the 3rd and 4th Iowa's, but cancelling the 5th and 6th Iowa's and all 5 Montana's.)

It also notes that France would have bought on line 2 of the 4 new Richelieu, with a third fitting out and a fourth possibly being cancelled half complete. Germany would have completed the 2 Bismarck's, but probably cancelled the H class incomplete. And Italy would have 3 Vittoria-Venetto's commissioned, with another fitting out.

That leaves Britain with about 20 Capital ships in commission, with 3 more due in 1942 (it's New Standard Fleet target of 20 modern or modernised, plus the 5 old Revenge's in support roles being due to complete 1943) and 2-4 likely to complete for a total of of 27-29 planned. The US with 20 in commission and perhaps 5 more likely to complete over 1942 -1944. Japan with 9 in commission and perhaps 3 likely to complete, 2 in 1942 and perhaps another in 1944. France with 9 in commission and another 1 likely to complete in 1943. Germany with  4 in commission, but unlikely to complete any others, and Italy with 8 and one likely to complete.

Similarly with aircraft carriers. Britain would have had 12 in commission (and a couple of escort carriers) and another half dozen of each type likely to complete (still 3 short of it's NSF – New Standard Fleet – target of 15, but likely to meet that in 1942), Japan 9 with one fleet carrier (and a few conversions) likely to commission. The US 7, with 6 fleet and 5 Independence (and a number of escort carriers) likely to complete. (Germany may also have had 1 carrier in commission, but with even worse problems dealing with Luftwaffe disinterest in providing aircraft than the RN had faced in 1938 before taking back control of the Fleet Air arm. A second still under construction would be unlikely to be finished. Italy would still only have a barely started carrier conversion, unlikely to ever commission.)

I'll take a moment to play with Escort Carriers too. 

The admiralty had put together designs for 'trade-protection carriers' either by conversion, or new build, as early as 1936. But lack of funding prevented experimentation, even in the first year of war. The first in service escort carrier – the converted cargo liner Audacity, with only 6 or 8 aircraft – actually served (and was sunk) prior to December 1941. But Audacity was not the first commissioned, with the first American conversion of a C-3 merchant hull beating her by days. 

Both navies had in fact started experiments as soon as funding and resources were available, with the British trying Fighter Catapult Ships and Catapult Armed Merchantmen (40 odd ships with one or more Hurricanes on a catapult), and  later19 Merchant Aircraft Carriers – flight decks on top of existing tankers and grain carriers (often capable of handling 12 - 20 aircraft), before both navies ordered considerable numbers of proper Escort Carriers in 1941, for completion in 1942 or 3 (or 4). The first American built Escort Carrier commissioned into the RN - Archer - was actually in November 1941.

Given that the USN was doing this in peacetime, it is unclear that there is any reason to believe that the RN would not have been doing same as soon as opportunity arose. So we have to assume that at least some of these Catapult, or Merchant Carriers, or even a few more proper Escort Carriers would have been on line for the RN had they been given another 2 years of peace to prepare. How many is hard to say, so let's just leave it at 2 Escort Carriers that in fact were in service then, and perhaps half a dozen each of Catapult Ships and the Merchant Carriers, with possibly twice that many again on line for similar conversions. The USN presumably would also have a few Escort Carriers already in service, with probably at least a dozen more in production.

More importantly, The USN's promise of speedy production of the new designs, which was initiated in mid-1941, would certainly not have made the process of the USN or the RN receiving those ships any slower than it was in reality, and almost certainly a bit faster if the designs could be refines in peacetime conditions, before shipping losses pushed other concerns to the fore. In the case of a December 1941 start to the war, the initial impetus may have been no faster, but the process would probably be further developed.

Moving on to Cruisers, Destroyers, Escorts and Submarines...

I will use the tables in one of Antony Preston's many books (An Illustrated History of Navies of World War Two, Bison, UK, 1976) as a starting point, not because I particularly like his work (in fact I found much of it very poorly reasoned), but as a sample of the sorts of tables that have dominated too much discussion for too long.

Preston gives the strength of the RN in September 1939 as 15 battleships (plus 9 building), 6 aircraft-carriers (plus 6 building), 15 heavy cruisers, 40 light cruisers (plus 8), 6 AA cruisers (plus 16), 1 cruiser-minelayer (+4), 113 modern destroyers (plus 24), 68 old destroyers (+ 11 being converted for AS duties), 47 modern submarines (+12); 54 Escorts (plus 80); 42 fleet minesweepers (+10); 2 monitors and 2 net-layers.

Most people would have a few minor quibbles, but this looks approximately correct. In aircraft carriers the experimental model Argus (really reduced to a training ship) is not included, and it appears the 6th aircraft carrier would be Unicorn, (as the last Illustrious was not ordered until 1940). Fair enough.. The 9 capital ships building include the 5 KGV and 4 of the 6 Lions. Also, fair enough. Read Parts I & II for commentary on those. 

Cruisers.

15 heavy cruisers would be the same. Adding Radar, and some additional armour and light AA, being the only likely changes to those. (Though it is interesting to note that the surprisingly swift up-armouring of several of the County class in the late 30's seems to have revealed that they were designed specifically to have a 4" belt bolted on at short notice the moment the 10,000 ton Treaty restrictions could be downplayed... A 1941 start would have probably completed up-armouring all of them.)

But let's look at how the other numbers would have varied by December 1941. I will note that I have to assume the cancellations on start of war in September 1939, and the even bigger dial down of the 1940 program (more than replaced later in the 41 and 42 programs), didn't happen when war didn't happen. So we have to use the established build programs from the 1937, 1938 and 1939 programs to guess at the likely 1940 and 1941 programs...

First the 6 AA cruisers (+16) of 1939. Note that the 6 AA were all converted 'C' class WWI vintage cruisers, and the plan was to re-arm another 6 C class, and all 8 of the D class, as AA, for a total of 20 modernised AA cruisers. Plus of course the 16 new Dido AA cruisers, of which 11 were complete by December 1941, with 5 more to complete 1942. (It is very likely that the lack of 5.25" turrets that led to the latter Dido's being equipped with 4.5" instead, would have been felt earlier if battleship production discussed previously had continued, so we can assume that most of the Dido's would have actually been finished with 10 4.5", rather than 10 or even 8 5.25". Actually improving stability, range, and their AA performance for most of the war, without too much reduction in their anti-ship capabilities.) So 31 AA cruisers in December 1941, with 5 from the 1939 program due 1942, and presumably the 1940 program of another 6 more Dido might be finished, but the 1941 program of perhaps 4 might be either completed or just cancelled?

So of the 40 light cruisers (plus 8) listed for 1939, 13 would have converted to AA. The remaining 27 presumably would have all had some additional light AA (any ships with single 4" AA, having them replaced with twin, and with several others having some 6" or 7.5" single guns also replaced by twin 4" mounts), and presumably a fair number might have radar added. 

Of the '8' cruisers building, 10 Fiji class were actually completed or working up by December 1941 (last one commissioned December 19), with the 6 Minotaurs in each of the 1940 and 1941 programs scheduled for completion during 1942 or 1943. So 37 light cruisers, with 6 more due 1942 and another 6 1943.

This lifts the 1939 total of 61 cruisers (still 7 short of the minimum required for the Defence Requirements DRC fleet of 1936 called for a minimum of 70 cruisers) to a December 1941 total of 83 cruisers, with 11 more due 1942, and perhaps 10 more 1943. The New Standard Fleet (NSF) of 1938 target was 100 cruisers, it appears the NSF was on track for mid 1943. Meaning cruisers would be the last part of the NSF to reach their target, with every other part of the plan exceeding their targets a full year earlier.

Of the mine-laying cruisers, the 4 builds listed in 1939 were all in commission by December 1941, for a total of 5, with 2 more in the 1940 program due in 1942, and probably another 2 from the 1941 program in 1943. (Plus whatever extra 'wartime emergency' orders would have been made after war start in December 1941 of course.)

Submarines. 

Preston lists 47 'modern' (+12). Presumably excluding the old H and L classes used for training, but including the two dozen O, P, R and Thames classes (the big long range boats optimised for the China station, too many of which were lost plugging gaps in the unsuitable Mediterranean waters before they could come into their own in a Pacific war). The 27 or so S, T and U classes in service or working up by September 1939 take the numbers over 47, again, not including the 6 Porpoise class minelayer subs which Preston might think of as seperate (like the mine-laying cruisers?). I make it about 55 in service September 1939 (49 without the mine-layers), with another 37 actually reaching service by December 1941, for 92 in total. (Though again I think peacetime conditions would have lifted that by at least 8 or 10 others.) Say 100 in service, with another 24 or so due in each of 42 and 43. 

As usual the existing designs were immediately standardised when war started in 39, and only slightly modified for the first few years of the war. So the new and improved A class (optimised for Pacific operations again, and a considerably simplified construction that took half as along – only 8 months or so – to build), were not actually entering the production schedule until 43. Meaning the first dozen did not enter service until late 44 and early 45, effectively too late to see much service. So again it is interesting to speculate on whether the 1940 or 1941 peacetime programs might have included some A class style design for Pacific work to replace the old O, P & R class, once the target of 82 submarines for the NSF was clearly going to be passed in mid 1941. It seems likely that some newer Pacific oriented boats would at least be in the pipeline for delivery in 1943 or 44.

Destroyers. 

Of the 68 old destroyers (plus 11 converting), almost all would have been converted to long range escorts by December 1941, so those 79 ships belong in the Escort Destroyer total. 

Of the 113 modern (+24 building) in 1939, the 24 appear to be the L, M and N class, (which finally established dual purpose guns in proto-turrets on British destroyers, though, limited to 55 degree elevation, they still had a long way to go to be anywhere near as good as the 5"/38 with 85 degree elevation fitted on contemporary US destroyers). The J and K class had been particularly good balanced designs, but with only low angle guns. the L and M classes were a bit too big, and a bit too expensive, so the N class returned to a J/K design but still without proper dual purpose. 

When war started in 1939, the next classes dropped back to simpler earlier design 'Wartime Emergency' destroyers, and reverted to 9 classes constructed on an older 4 x 4'7" designs, but whether the same process would have happened for a December 1941 start is doubtful.

Fairly obviously, the return to a J & K class design for the N class was supposed to establish a new standard destroyer type. The ongoing efforts to improve the Dual Purpose nature of armament in follow up N style classes in 1940 and 1941 would almost certainly have seen proper DP guns installed. If N class production had been repeated by another half dozen similar classes (say another 48 ships),  during 1940 and 1941, and become the standard design by December 1941, the N class would probably have remained the main wartime production, in the same way as the contemporary Fletcher design became the default for the USN when it entered the war.

[When exactly the 4.7" DP turrets would have swapped for the superior 4.5" twins is hard to say. Under the 1939 start, they were delayed becoming the main battery until 1943, but it is pretty likely that with a December 1941 start, the advantages of standardising the DP armament of the majority of fleet vessels – older modernised battleships, aircraft carriers, modern AA cruisers, and modern destroyers – so they all used 4.5", might have got them into service, or at least into production prior to December 1941? (Which is the exact process the Fletchers came from.) Some of the British destroyers launched in 1940 or 1941 were actually fitted with twin 4", or single 4.5" anyway. And the 65 odd Z, C  and Battle classes from 1943 on all had DP 4.5". HMS Savage – commissioned 1943 – was actually the first real use of 4.5" DP, with wartime delays responsible.Who can say how much faster things might have developed with 2 more years of peace? But let's assume proper DP mounts, possibly in the P or Q class, and certainly by the S class. Which means proper destroyer DP would starting to be in use by war start in December 1941, not 4 years into the 1939 start war.]

As it was all 24 L, M and N were complete by December 1941, as were the P class, most of the O class, and half of the Q class. Under non wartime conditions, let's assume all of them, for 48 new builds, with perhaps the new 'proper' DP designs, the S and T classes, of another 16 launched and fitting out or working up. 

On top of the 113 1939 destroyers, adding that 65 that comes to 177 destroyers, or 22 flotilla's... (exactly on target for the NSF requirement). In which case another 24 - 32 might be expected in each of the 1942 and 1943 years.

Add the 79 fast escort destroyers from old WWI conversions, for 256. Also, not a single one of the excellent Hunt class fast escort destroyers was ready in 1939, whereas 65 were in service by December 1941, with another 13 due in 1942. 

So about 321 destroyers and destroyer escorts in service in December 1941, compared to 113 two years earlier, (with 24-32 more due in 42, even before 'wartime emergency' builds were started).

Smaller Escorts is where it starts getting tricky. 

Preston lists 43 with 80 building in 39. That 43 appears to be about 8 WWI, and 35 interwar ocean going sloops of the 1,050-1,250 tonne style, including a few new build Egret and Black Swan class. (The 11 600 tonne patrol sloops don't seem to make his list.)

Minesweeping sloops (600-900 tonne) were a particular problem with only about 45 in September 1939, with another 120 or so due to complete by December 1941, for a much more useful 165 available for a December 41 war start (with the same again on order).

The new Corvettes (the famous Flower class) had not started to come into service in September 1939, but about 210 of them, as well as the first half dozen of the new River Class would be in service by December 1941. With a couple of dozen more Flower or modified Flower, and the same of the River class due in 1942 (maybe 50 or 60), and at least the same again in 43 and 44. Then the much improved Castle class and Loch Bay class would start rolling out by the score in 43 and 44. 

So instead of the 220 odd destroyers and escorts actually available in September 1939, by December 1941 Britain actually had put into service about 600 destroyers and escorts. (This would probably be a bit less for a December 1941 war start, as the building rate wouldn't already have seen resources diverted from finishing battleships and aircraft carriers for urgent wartime conditions as yet. But let's be really  conservative and say 500 odd minimum by December 1941 instead of the 220 available 2 years earlier?) 

Even with all 22 flotilla's of Fleet destroyers reserved for fleet work (which never really happened), that allow somewhere between 400 and 500 escort vessels available, compared to the 125 or so available in September 1939. Plus a number of Escort carriers and Merchant carriers. Plus considerably more Coastal Command long range air patrol capacity. Nor did German 'wartime emergency' U-boat production start climbing at any considerable rate until their own Plan Z battleship and aircraft carrier effort was officially abandoned when war started in 1939. Presumably if war had been delayed until December 1941, the Kriegsmarine would have continued to concentrate on producing at least 2-4 of the 8 authorised of the H class battleships, plus 3 or 4 more heavy cruisers and another carrier, etc... leaving U-boat construction to fall far far behind the increases in RN escorts. Frankly, with plenty of resources to make convoys possible from December 1941, it is hard to see how Germany could have even attempted the sort of Battle for the Atlantic that was possible with a 1939 start.

(Let's not even consider the American contributions - the famous 50 '4 stacker' destroyers probably would not have been sent to Britain, or at least not until after war started. Similarly the 10 Coastguard cutters, 34 mine-sweeping sloops, and 110 odd Escort sloops that all arrived in 42 or 43.)

So just to reflect, the New Standard Fleet design of 1938 was predicated on being able to have superior fleets available for facing both Germany and Japan at the same time, with adequate left-over to convince the Italians that war would be a bad idea. 

The New Standard Fleet was predicated on: 

20 capital ships. In fact 20 or 21 would be ready in December 1941, with another 3 due in 1942, and 2 probably more 1943. (But given that the old Revenge class were planned to be restricted to back ups as newer models came on line, the real goal of 20 modernised or new build capital ships would really be achieved 1942-3, with the total number of 25 or more capital ships in commission just being a bonus.)

15 aircraft carriers. 13 ready December 41, with 2 to 3 more due in each of 42, 43 and 44 (not counting dozens of escort carriers etc.) Target to be reached mid 1942.

100 cruisers, of which 80-90 were ready, with a dozen more due in each of 42 and 43. Target to be reached early 1943.

22 flotillas of destroyers would probably be available by December 1941. Target exceeded (plus perhaps 500 escorts!)

82 submarines were required, but more like 100 would be in service by December 1941. Target exceeded (with 30 more due in each of 42 and 43).

Though I note that it is also predicated on the French navy providing the backup to give absolute superiority over all 3 Axis powers - Germany, Italy and Japan. Of course if war didn't start until December 1941, that would still be the case.

So a bit of a summary of other navies builds for a December 1941 war start.

We know the USN and Japan numbers of course, and it is unlikely that there would be much change there had Europe not gone to war earlier. Both were building up at a significant rate, and the US in particular was vamping up as fast as it could in peacetime.

France: would have probably commissioned 2 Richelieu, with a third due perhaps 1943-44.  Also the aircraft carrier Joffre would be close to completion, and her sister Panlieve likely to be cancelled at war start (unless it was war against Japan, not Germany, in which case it would be accelerated rather than cancelled). 

None of the new St-Louis heavy cruisers were in commission, but 2 were planned to be finished in 1943, along with a few light cruisers and a dozen new destroyers.

Italy: 2 Vittorio-Vennetto's, with a third due 1942. Several more cruisers and a couple of dozen destroyers and escorts and submarines would have been added, with the same again in production.

Germany: 2 Bismarck's, and their first aircraft carrier working up, and perhaps another 2 Hipper class cruisers, and a dozen destroyers, and probably another 40 - 50 submarines.  (Possibly another 2 H class launched, and maybe even one approaching completion, though it seems extremely unlikely that more than 1 or 2 were possible to actually complete even if the naval plan had soldiered on into December 1941... The German economy was actually in dire straights even with raiding the Austrian and Czech  – and presumably Polish – economies to keep it going...) Any other major ships were unlikely to complete, with wartime emergency production switching to escorts and submarines. (Though even Doenitz would have to admit that there were still not nearly enough U-boats to take on the expanded RN escort fleet with any chance of war winning success given relative numbers in December 1941.)

Balance of Power December 1941

On the - fairly unlikely - chance, that a war starting in December 1941 might still see the same sides develope, let's look at Allies vs Axis in these circumstances.

Battleships/Battlecruisers:

Britain – 21 (+7 likely to complete), France – 10 (+1 likely to complete), US – 16 (+9 likely to complete). Total 47? (+17?)

Germany – 4 (+1?), Italy – 7 (+1), Japan – 10 (+2). Total 21? (+3 or 4?). 

(Note, without Italy – which would be far less likely to jump onto the Axis team in such circumstances – the real German/Japanese battleship/battlecruiser numbers would be just – 14 (+2 or 3), with potentially Italy now in Allied column making it 54 (+20) on that side... You can do similar calculations for the rest of these types if it amuses you, but note that the Italians are about 40% of the Axis totals in most classes, and if they rejoined the Allies for the Second war, the Allied naval dominance would be even greater than in the First...)

Fleet Aircraft Carriers:

Britain – 13 (+ 8), France – 1 (+2), US – 6 (+11). Total 19? (+20?).

Germany – 1? (+1?), Italy – (+2?), Japan 6 (+1 and 4 conversions). Total 7? (+6-8?)

(Note, Britain, Japan and the US also had 2 or 3 older or lighter carriers each, none really suitable for front line service, and Britain and the US would both have their first few escort carriers coming on line. Japan also had 4 light conversions in process, and a pile of UNRYU class on order (only 3 of which were ever completed), while the USN had 11 cruiser conversions in line for 1943-4 and lots more escort carriers starting in 1942; and the RN would also have had 10 Colossus class in line for 1943-4, and lots more escort carriers starting 1942.)

Cruisers:

Britain – 88 (+24?), France – 23 (+5?), US 37 (+40?). Total 148? (+69?)

Germany – 12? (+3?), Italy – 23? (+12?), Japan 38 (+10). Total 73? (+25?)

(Italy in allied line up  - Allies 171 (+81) to Axis 50 (+13)...)

Destroyers:

Britain –  321 (+64), France – 105 (+30?), US 177 (+188). Total 604? (+282?)

Germany – 34? (+12), Italy –59? (+12?), 108 (+43). Total 188? (+63?)

(Italy in allied line up  - Allies 663 (+294) to Axis 142 (+75)...)

Escorts:

Britain –  500? (plus 240?), France – 120 (+45?), US – 120? (+160?). Total 740 (+445?)

Germany –  35 (+18), Italy – 78 (+15?), 

Submarines:

Britain – 102? (+60?) , France – 113? (+40?), US – 114 (+79). Total 329 (+ 179?).

Germany – 112? (+85?), Italy – 129? (+24?), Japan 63 (+60?). Total 304 (+169?)

(Italy in allied line up  - Allies 458? (+203?) to Axis 175? (+142?)...)

I think you can see where I am going with this. With these respective numbers in December 1941, it is extremely unlikely that Italy would enter the war on Germany's side. 

Even if France was suddenly defeated and knocked out and the French fleet dropped out of the allied count. British naval dominance would be too great for Italy to take the risk. 

And Japan would be unlikely to see an opportunity to take advantage of even if France was suddenly knocked out, given RN and USN combined numbers. Especially if Italy seemed unlikely to assist.

Would war have started in December 1941?

Can't see Italy joining the Axis. Mussolini, like Stalin, was an opportunist: not a genuinely foam flecked ideological idiot like Hitler.

Can't see Japan attacking Britain and the US. (And even less Britain, the US, and France, with Italy potentially now in their column!) Perhaps war against Russia to retake Siberia (which Japan had actually held for most of the 1920's after the White Russian intervention by the Allies of WWI) might look a better option

Frankly Germany would probably still not be deterred from a continental war if the madman still wanted one, as her naval situation – or lack of naval possibilities – would really be no worse than in WWI...

But that assumes the land and air relative strengths by December 1941 would still make a continental war an attractive game for Germany.

I will look at those figures in the next posts.

If the war had not started until December 1941: Part II – Aircraft Carriers

Same Intro as Part I - I recently started looking at the issue of what would have happened if a second 'Munich Agreement' in 1939... a 'Warsaw Agreement' perhaps (presumably because France and perhaps a couple of Dominions refused to support a declaration of war), meant that Britain and France did not actually declare war on Germany on September 3, 1939. 

Might the World War have started in December 1941 instead? Probably not, but that needs explaining. It looks like being a fun topic, but it requires a lot of background. So I thought I would start with an analysis of where naval power would be in December 1941 if the European powers had not kicked off early. Even that is too big a bite for one go, so part I looked at Battleships, and Part II will just looks at aircraft carriers. (I will also look at land and air power in another article, then consider how – or if – any war might have developed on that basis as I progress.) 

If the war had not started until December 1941: Part II – Aircraft Carriers

Britain entered the war in September 1939 with 7 aircraft carriers (Argus, Hermes, Eagle, Furious, Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal), of which the last four were fast, 30 knot plus, well equipped models, with significant antiaircraft firepower. A fifth, Eagle, was also a proper fleet carrier, but at 24 knots only as fast as the older 21, 23 or 24 knot battleships – which admittedly included every pre 1939 British or American battleship – so she could continue to work with the battle-fleet at least. Whereas Argus and Hermes were little better than escort or training carriers: and in practice spent most of the war on ferry or escort duties, with only brief roles as operational carriers. 

So let's look at 1939 for the Americans and Japanese. In 1939 America had two big Lexington carriers and the newly commissioned Yorktown and Enterprise, plus the failed experiment Ranger, while Japan had two big old Akagi/Kaga carriers, two smaller modern ones (Hiryu and Soryu), a their own little experimental one (Hoshu). So four and a bit carriers each compared to the British five and two bits in September 1939. All 3 navies were using a mixture of biplanes and some pretty unimpressive monoplanes in 1939 (see my article on naval aircraft here). 

Myths

To knock off a much misunderstood issue early, the main reason British carriers carried less planes per tonnage than the equivalent American or Japanese carriers was twofold. 

A) British carriers in general were more heavily constructed, protected, fire-safe, and armoured. No British carrier had the structural or seakeeping problems that bedevilled Shoho and Ranger (though Argus was really not a fleet carrier either); none were knocked out of service by storms like a Princeton or even an Essex (at least not after the curved bow doors of courageous were welded shut!); none were unable to fly off in anything other than calm weather like the soon to be completed Wasp. Most British carriers also tended to have considerably more fuel safety and fire suppressions systems, (to the point that when the first American built escort carriers arrived they were rushed straight into dock for extra safety fit-outs before being considered fit for operations). Though as a byproduct, no RN carrier carried anywhere like the amount of fuel for operations as many American and Japanese carriers.

B) the British also considered permanent Pacific style deck-parks completely unsuitable for Atlantic conditions, or indeed too dangerous for continental waters too close to enemy airbases like the Mediterranean. 

(Noticeably, British carriers deployed to the Indian or Pacific oceans quickly adopted deck parks for air wings on average 50% larger than their ‘designed capacity’, coming much closer to Japanese and American ‘designed capacity’. But also note that most carriers lost to air attack in the Pacific suffered explosions amongst such deck-parks, or in un-armoured hangars, while British carriers in the Mediterranean and Pacific regularly survived bombings because their aircraft were hidden away under armour. A bomb hit on a plane on the deck of any Japanese or American carrier, usually led to fires that often put the entire air group out of operation, if not outright disabling or sinking the ship. A bomb hit on a British carrier usually left the majority of the air-group relatively untouched, and the ship able to resume combat operations. To paraphrase one American observer in 1945 "A Kamikaze hit on a US carrier puts it in dry-dock for 6 months... whereas on a British carrier it's a case of 'sweepers, man your brooms'...") 

Also note that when 'Halsey's Typhoon' hit the Pacific optomised US fleet, the USN had 30+ ships damaged , with 9 requiring major repair (see Princeton and Essex class ships put out of action) and 3 sunk, and 145 or so planes destroyed. When Halsey radioed the British Pacific Fleet asking about storm damage, the somewhat cheeky reply from an Atlantic optomised force was "what storm?". (In reality a couple of dozen RN planes were damaged or written off when their tie-downs broke, but nothing worse than that.)

So the designed 'under-cover' aircraft numbers listed for British carriers usually went up by 50% once deck parks were used in the Indian or Pacific Oceans. Illustrious, Victorious and Formidable, designed for 36 under armour, carried 54 aircraft in the Pacific. Indomitable, designed for 48, carried 72, as presumably would Courageous and Glorious had they survived for work in the Pacific. Implacable and Indefatigable, designed for 54 under armour, carried 81. And Ark Royal, theoretically designed for 72, but really suitable for 60 under cover, presumably could also have carried about 80 or 90 in the Pacific. 

(Perhaps it should also be noted that, regardless of supposed design numbers, ships like Saratoga, Yorktown, Wasp, Akagi, Soryu and Shokaku – all of them designed for 80 - 100 aircraft in ideal conditions, usually actually operated about 65-75 aircraft in Pacific actions like Coral Sea and Midway. Although accepted numbers vary a little: at Coral Sea Lexington had 69 and Yorktown had 66, while Shokaku had 66 and Zuikaku 65. At Midway the Yorktown class - design 96 - actually carried, Yorktown 71, Enterprise 78, and Hornet 76. From the Japanese end the numbers at Midway were Akagi 60, and Kaga 71, Hiryu 54 and Soryu 56. Later in the war – when the percentage of smaller and lighter fighters over heavier attack aircraft went from a starting 25%-30% to an eventual 75% - 80% – obviously the total numbers carried went up a bit. Theoretical number capacity and actual numbers used operationally vary a lot.)

RN carriers in 1939 

So in 1939 these 7 available carriers were only inadequate for British needs because the oldest two were outdated experimental models (rather like the USS Ranger, or the Japanese Hosho), so they should not really count as proper fleet carriers. The Eagle, although a good conversion design. was a bit small and a bit slow, and Furious, though fast, was also a bit small. Really leaving only Ark Royal, Courageous and Glorious as proper modern fleet carriers. (Note - Courageous lost 1939, Glorious 1940, Ark Royal 1941... Meant that situation didn't actually improve much despite commissioning of Illustrious, Formidable, Victorious and Indomitable during the same period...)

Under the DRC (Defence Requirements Committee 1935) fleet requirement for 10 modern aircraft carriers, the 1936 program saw the first 2 Illustrious laid down, with another 2 in 1937, a fifth – plus the support carrier Unicorn – in 1938, and a final Illustrious in 1939. 2 more were planned in each of the 1940 and 1941 programs, allowing all the 'over age' – over 25 years old – designs to not be included in that '10 modern' list by about 1944. (Though Courageous and Glorious at least were likely to be modernised rather than scrapped, even if Furious and Eagle were retired to training carriers, with Hermes and Argus completely scrapped or put in reserve.)

But the NSF (New Standard Fleet 1938) plan lifted the requirement to 15 modern aircraft carriers, which would have seen an extra fleet carrier, or two, ordered in each of the 1939, 1940, and 1941 programs, with presumably another 1 or 2 more for the 1942 plan. (With further modernised designs taking advantage of the naval escalation limits being dropped, to lift the 23,000 ton standard/ 28,000 ton full load limits of the Illustrious class to more like the 27,000 tons standard/ 33,000 ton full load of the Essex class.) 

Given that the heavily armoured Eurocentric Illustrious design varied from the Pacific oriented Ark Royal because of the perceived need for heavier armour for Mediterranean operations, it is also sensible to think the 6 extra 'Eurocentric' fleet carriers becoming available by 1941 would have allowed for a more Pacific friendly design on the next 5 or 6. Presume larger ships with bigger air-groups but somewhat reduced hangar armour. (See the Audacious class for what really happened in the 1941 program, but in that case only after the 2 year order holiday caused by the 1939 start. The Audacious were 'improved Implacable's with proper double hangars', and should actually have been started in the 1940 program, and half complete by a December 1941 start to the war.)

RN build progress in December 1941

Had Britain entered the war in December 1941 they would have also had the 4 Illustrious class - Illustrious & Victorious (1936 program), Formidable (all 28,000 ton full load), & upgrade design I - Indomitable (1937 - 30,000 tons) - and probably Unicorn (1938 - a 20,000 ton 'maintenance carrier'), already in service. With the upgrade II ships - Indefatigable (1938 - 32,000 ton) about to commission, and Implacable (first of 5 in the 1939 plan) working up. 

The other two 1939 program upgrade II Illustrious ships from the 1936 DRC plan - Irresistible and Irrepressible, plus hopefully the two bonus 1939 upgrade II Illustrious of the 1938 NSF plan - Inflexible and Incomparable (now pushing 34,000 tons) - would be launched and fitting out for service between mid 42 and mid 43. 

The 1 DRC aircraft carrier and bonus NSF carrier - Audacious and Africa  -  of the new 38,000 ton Audacious class 1940 program would be due in late 1943, and the single DRC and single NSF ships of the same class of the 1941 program would be due in 1944 (and traditionally might adopt names of any aircraft carriers sunk in the war so far).

Designs for a 3 ship 50,000 ton Malta class (the size the Audacious class actually finished at after all their delays), 2 for 1942 - Gibraltar, Malta - and  1 for 1943 programs -  New Zealand  - would have been well advanced, and the even larger design for a 56,000 ton class for the 1944 and 45 programs would be in the works.

Meanwhile the 10 ship 18,000 ton Colossus class of 'light fleet' carriers would probably have entered the process contemporary with the USN's light cruiser carrier conversions alternative. With 3 or 4 arriving in 1943, and 5 or 6 in 1944, by which time the first of the 6 slightly enlarged Majestic's would also be starting to appear, and the 4 28,000 ton Centaur class would be in production. (In fact I am only assuming these about 12-18 months in advance of when they actually happened even during the wartime slowdown.) These Centaur 'light fleet' carriers of the 1944 program had actually grown as big as the 1937 Illustrious Class fleet carriers, while the equivalent Malta class fleet carriers had doubled in size to 57,000 tons over the course of the war!]

[Note - When war started in September 39, Britain cancelled future battleships builds, and put aircraft carriers on an 18 month to 2 year delay, while concentrating on urgently needed escorts. When war started in December 41 for the United States, the USN also cancelled new battleships builds, but kept the aircraft carrier process going (though the assumption that the allies had enough escorts in 1942 was severely tested by the U-boats as a result). However if Britain had not entered the war until December 1941, and had still stopped new battleship construction then, the RN might also have been able to continue their aircraft carrier program anyway. Certainly by December 1941 the RN escort build program would have been increased by over 300 ships in advance of its 1939 strength, and they would not have needed to slow so much construction elsewhere... see the next article on naval balance overall.]

RN carriers in December 1941

So the new fleet carriers Illustrious, Formidable, Victorious and Indomitable, already in service; and Indefatigible working up (and Implacable due mid 42); along with Ark Royal, Furious, Courageous and Glorious (last two both possibly re-fitted, with flight decks and hangars extended to the bows bringing them to a capacity of about 56 under cover, and 76 with deck parks), that amounts to 9 large, fast, well armed and - in most cases - well armoured aircraft carriers available, with several more in the pipeline... with the modern Unicorn, and older Eagle, Argus and Hermes to back them up. 

The first couple of experimental escort carriers would probably have also come on line, to support a number of Merchant Catapult ships, or Aircraft Armed Merchant Ships (usually oil or grain carriers suitable to having a small flight deck installed for half a dozen aircraft... ) These would be in partial replacement of the Armed Merchant Cruisers that Britain had needed in 1939, but would not have needed had the NSF lifted the number of cruisers available from 70 to more like 100.

Comparative numbers for December 1941:

Britain:

Fast Fleet 8 or 9 - Courageous, Glorious, Furious, Ark Royal, Illustrious, Formidable, Victorious, Indomitable, (with 2 more – Implacable and Indefatigable - fitting out, and 8 more fleet carriers under construction. 3 or 4 due in 1942, 2 or 3 in 1943, 2 in 1944, for 18 – if no more were ordered... the 15 'underage' from Ark Royal forward required for the 1938 NSF plan, and the 3 'over age' rebuilds still – like the Lexington and Saratoga – too good to just scrap.)

Others 6? - Argus, Hermes, Eagle and the new Unicorn, with say 2 escort carriers. (With several more escort carriers fitting out and several more escort carriers and a few 'light fleet' carriers on order. Say 2 dozen, if no more were ordered? Though Argus at least would probably have been honourably retired to depot ship in these circumstances...)

United States:

Fast Fleet 6 – Lexington, Saratoga, Enterprise, Yorktown, Hornet and Wasp. (With 11 Essex class on order or under construction, for 17 – if no more were ordered?)

Others 2 - Langley and  Ranger. (With 4 Independence, and several escort carriers building and several more on order. Say two dozen, if no more were ordered?).

Japan:

Fast Fleet 6 – Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku (with Taiho under construction).

Others - Hosho, Ryuho, Ryujo, (with conversions to Chitose, Chiyoa, Hiyo and Junyo in progress).

Other Nations:

Although France, Germany and Italy would all have one new carrier 'launched' by December 1941, and another building, actual completion is more dubious. 

The French Joffre would almost certainly not be completed yet. Perhaps late 1942 to early 1943. Her sister ship Panlieve, running 2 years later, would probably be cancelled at wars start. (War with Germany anyway. If it was war with Japan only, no doubt she would be accelerated.)

The Italian Aquila, a liner conversion rather than a new build, would only have started the conversion a few months previously, and be no where near completion. 

The German Graf Zeppelin might be completed, and even possibly in service, but might still lack an air-wing of suitable aircraft. (The planned Junkers 87 scout/dive bombers were probably quite workable, as were the fascinating Feiseler F 167 torpedo bombers – surprisingly effective biplane equivalents to the British Albacore – but the suggested BF109 fighters were definitely not suitable for deck landings – at least in Atlantic conditions – so exactly how that would have been sorted remains dubious. Without a fighter arm, she would be extremely limited in operational capacity.) The first of her 3 proposed sisters would probably also be launched, and might be completed in 1943, but it seems likely the remaining two would be cancelled.

If Graf Zeppelin was operational, the RN would certainly want at least 2 modern carriers available for the Home Fleet. If not, well that depends how threatening Japan looks...

Notes - Wartime plans/additions

Britain ordered 10 Colossus in 1942, 6 Majestic, and 4 Audacious in 1943, and 4 Malta in 1944, but, although all 16 Colossus and Majestic, and 2 of the Audacious, were eventually completed, only half a dozen Colossus were serving with the fleet by wars end. (4 of them with the British Pacific Fleet.)  

Had the war started in December 1941, some of those new orders would probably have been a year or two earlier, and the number completed would almost certainly have been increased due to less urgency to divert effort to build emergency escorts. (Given that the NSF would have received another 50-70 plus destroyers and more than 200 other escort vessels by December 1941!) Let's assume perhaps 6 or 7 more fleet carriers and a dozen of the Colossus/Majestic class in action by 1945, with the same number of each due by 1946, even if no additional orders were made.

After Pearl Harbour the US ordered 5 more Independence (all completed in wartime), and 15 more Essex (only 6 of them commissioned during wartime - Bennington, Bon Homme Richard, Shangri-La in late '44, and Boxer, Antietam, and Lake Champlain in early-mid 1945 - which meant that they -  like some of the RN's Colossus class, were simply too late too see any real combat). Of 34 Essex's ordered only 24 were actually completed, and only 14 saw wartime service, if not actual action for some, while the others were really post war ships. Plus 6 Midway class, of which, like the British Audacious, half were completed post war.

Japan ordered 16 Unryu class (budget copies of Soryu), most of which were later cancelled. Only 3 saw wartime service. Also converted the last Yamato class, Shinano, into a huge HMS Unicorn style support carrier, and half a dozen other escort carrier style conversions.

First a few more side notes for context...

1. People overlook the fact that the Royal Navy experimented with 3 carrier (Furious, Courageous, Glorious) fast strike task groups in the mid 1930’s. (The first plan for raiding the Italian fleet at Taranto was based on 1930's exercises by these 3 ships.) 

2. Also overlooked is that the Fleet Air Arm was re-established in early 1939, too late to be ready for a war in 1939, but excellently timed to be ready for a war starting almost 3 years later! (The RAF 'assigned' planes on RN carriers pre the hand-back had drastically restricted RN preparations for modern carrier work, both in numbers and technique. Huge advances in naval aviation were being made under RN control, but numbers and techniques were still 2 years behind where they needed to be. December 1941 would have seen a very different fleet air arm.)

3. People also tend to compare the British 1939 biplanes with 1942 American aircraft, somehow failing to note that the British were using the Hurricane and Wildcat fighters as their main carrier fighter by the time of Pearl Harbour, whereas the Americans were still using many of the dreadful Buffalo fighters as well as the newer Wildcat, even at Coral Sea, and Midway.

The British Gladiator biplane fighters, and Swordfish biplane torpedo bomber, or Skua monoplane fighter/dive bombers of 1939: were in no way inferior to the equivalent Japanese Claude monoplane fighter and Susie biplane bomber, or the American F3F biplane fighter, the just introduced Buffalo monoplane fighter, the Vindicator dive-bomber, or Devastator torpedo bomber of the same period. In fact Gladiator fighters were still surprisingly effective in defence of Malta against the Italians and the Luftwaffe in 1941 (as, interestingly, was the Buffalo when used by the Finns against the Soviets in 1942), whereas the Devastator was a death-trap when used as the main American torpedo bomber at Midway in 1942. (In fairness to the Devastator - and the Swordfish and Albacore - even the vastly superior TBF Avenger that replaced the Devastator was a death-trap in daylight hours until adequate fighter support was available.) 

See a full article on comparing naval aircraft here.

4. Also, amusingly, the British continued using biplane strike aircraft throughout the war, even after good monoplanes were easily available, but they had found a way to take advantage of their strengths - ruggedness, manouvrability, stability, excellent take off and landing abilities on small carriers, load capacity, and flexibility; and obviate their main weakness – speed – which made all attack aircraft - and biplanes in particular - so vulnerable to day fighters. By 1941 they were radar equipped night strike aircraft with proven track records against the Germans – see Bismarck – and Italians – see Taranto and Vittorio Veneto at Matapan. Not only were the Japanese and Americans incapable of night ops in 1941 - let alone 1939 - they were still regularly crashing dozens of aircraft that got lost in the dusk in 1942 and 1943! But a December 1941 start to the war would probably have seen the first monoplane Fairey Barracuda torpedo/dive bombers, and possibly even the first American built Avenger's, arriving to replace the older Swordfish and Albacore's on fleet carriers. (Probably at about the same rate the Avengers were replacing Devastators on US carriers in 1942.)

RN Deployments in December 1941

So if Britain had had 8-9 fleet carriers available in late 1941, compared to the US or Japan with 6 each, how might they have been deployed? 

(Noting that in December 1941 the primary naval threat would probably be Japan, with Germany a poor second – at least in heavy units – and Italy probably quite unlikely to take the risk of war in these circumstances.)

Home Fleet 

3-5 battleships - 2 Nelson's (Rodney just out of refit), with the new KGV Howe just commissioning, and the first 1 or 2 Lion class battleships, and possibly even the new Vanguard working up. 

With another 2 Lion launched but still fitting out (and Malaya and Hood still in dock for major rebuilds). 

Plus the possibility of a Richelieu or two for backup if the Germans look genuinely frisky.

2-3 Fleet Aircraft Carriers and perhaps 2-3 smaller carriers -  Victorious and Formidable in service, and perhaps Implacable fitting out, plus perhaps Argus as training carrier, and at least 2 new escort carriers on North Atlantic escort duty.

Gibraltar 

3 old battleships - 3 Revenge class, mainly to back up the 5 older battleships of the French fleet in the Mediterranean, but also for a bit of South Atlantic escort duty.

(Plus the possibility of a couple of Dunkerque 'cruiser killer's' for South Atlantic patrolling if Germany looks dangerous?)

1-2 aircraft carriers - Eagle, plus the French carrier Bearn?

Mediterranean 

4-5 battleships - 4 fully modernised Queen's, with the still in rebuild Malaya expected later.

1-2 aircraft carrier - Illustrious, with one of the Home Fleet carriers like Formidable likely to join if Italy looked genuinely threatening.

Far East 

8-9 capital ships - including 4-5 fast battleships, 2 slow battleships, and 2 battlecruisers - 4-5 KGV (though Howe would probably still be working up or en-route), plus 2 fully modernised Renown's, and 2 Revenge on Indian Ocean escort duty.

(Plus perhaps a Richelieu or two, and possibly both Dunkerques in Indochina, if Japan looks more threatening than Germany/Italy?)

A completely modernised Hood (possibly as flagship), and 2 or 3 of the new Lion class, also expected to join this force in the next year or so.

4-5 fleet aircraft carriers and one or two smaller - Indomitable, Ark Royal, and the somewhat modernised Courageous and Glorious (all about 70 aircraft each if deck parks had been adopted for service in the Indian or Pacific oceans?), and the new support carrier Unicorn (33 operationally) probably en-route.

Also Hermes and/or Argus, and perhaps a new escort carrier or two, for Indian Ocean escort duty.

Indomitable or Implacable and maybe some more escort carriers expected to join this force in a few months; with Indefatigable joining late 1942, and another 3 or 4 large fleet carriers and several more escort carriers due in 1943. 

Naval Security?

Had Britain entered the war in December 1941 her 8 or 9 modern carriers in service, 2-4 more expected in 1942, and at least 4 more in 1943/44 (plus three older carriers, and a steady stream of escort and light carriers expected), the RN would have had a much easier war. 

Combined RN and USN build rates, even without French support, would have already simply swamped the build capacities of the Axis powers.

Particularly as these new carriers would  be fitted with Sea Hurricane and Wildcat/Martlet fighters, Fulmar strike-fighters and probably still Albacore bombers, (while waiting for deliveries of TBM Avenger and Barracuda Dive/Torpedo bombers), rather than the Swordfish and Gladiators of September 1939. 

Also, the 8-9 available Japanese battleships would be facing potentially 20-24 RN, French and USN battleships – most of them more modern or more effectively modernised, and generally faster than anything the Japanese had in service. 

Likewise the RN and USN's 8 or 9 fast modern fleet carriers (plus 2 or 3 small), with several more expected in 1942 and again in 1943, compared to Japan's 6 (plus 2 or 3 small) carriers, with only one significant vessel – Taiho – in the pipeline, and that only laid down a few months earlier – and no emergency Unryu having even been started yet.

In fact if Japan had even considered declaring war without Germany, or – considerably less likely – at least Italy, also declaring war: then the odds would look much worse.

Without genuine threats from Germany or Italy, several more RN battleships – say the 2 Nelsons and 2 of the Queens – and a few more carriers – Illustrious, and  eitherVictorious or Formidable most likely – might have been transferred from the Home or Mediterranean fleet much earlier if needed (in return for Hermes and Argus returning to home waters while Implacable and Indefatigable completed...)

Giving the RN alone complete superiority over the Japanese in battleships: with 12-14 RN fast battleships/battlecruisers available – almost all of them more modern and considerably faster than most Japanese ships – even without any of the 4 modern French fast battleships, and possibly even both modern US battleships – North Carolina and Washington. (Leaving 'just' another 10 or so older and slower USN battleships, for potential support in secondary defensive and escort roles...) 

Note that would still leave the Allies with superior numbers in the Atlantic/Mediterranean area, with the British (7 or 8 - including a couple of Lions and/or Vanguard working up with Home Fleet and 2 or 3 more battleships due in each of 1942, 43 and 44), the French (5 with possibly a 6th due 1943), and USN neutrality patrol (5 or 6 - including the first 2 South Dakota's working up, with 2 more battleships due in each of 1942, 43 and 44). These 'Allied' 18-20 capital ships numbering about twice as many capital ships as Germany (4, with possibly a 5th starting fit out anda 6th just launched but 18 months from completion... If the H plan had got anywhere) and Italy (6 with a seventh working up) combined... not that Italy would be likely to try anything stupid in these circumstances.

In fact I would expect the Italian numbers to move back towards the Allied column in such circumstances.

The RN would also have at least parity, if not superiority, in carriers in the Far East: with 6 or 7 fast fleet carriers, most of them armoured; plus the Unicorn, and another couple of older carriers in support.

Again, this would be even without counting potential USN support. (Britain and the US had serious discussion under Rainbow V in 1941 about moving at least part of the US fleet to Singapore to support the British fleet in intimidating the Japanese away from war – anything from a carrier and several cruisers, to a major battle fleet. Or at least rebasing the 'Asiatic' – read Philippines – submarines, destroyers and cruisers there if they had to be withdrawn. It was sadly unworkable in the circumstances where Britain had already been at war for 2 years – and France had fallen already – but if all 3 nations were still at peace?)

The combined RN, French, USN force in the Pacific in late 1941 to mid '42 might be 30+ battleships to Japan's 10 or 11, and more than a dozen large modern carriers to Japan's 6.

Again, I ask, 'Would Japan have risked war with the Allies under these circumstances?' Or would she have gone looking for easier targets like the Japanese army's preferred opponent Russia?

In such circumstances, is there any realistic chance at all Italy would have even considered joining in a war, except on the Allied side?

More on the overall naval balance of power in Part III. After that we will consider Air and Land.