One of the most experienced American Generals of the Second World War, Lucian Truscott had the rare advantage of commanding units of several sizes in actions of various durations and intensity as he built up the experience necessary to be an effective army commander.
Despite having been a school teacher up until becoming a ’90 day wonder’ officer in the Great War, he became one of the best practitioners of the military arts that the United States has ever produced. A particularly impressive achievement given that he spent the entire First World War in a training camp in the Uited States, and had no combat experience at all when he was first sent to the European Theatre of Operations in 1942. From a position as a newly promoted Colonel, he had been chosen to head a group of officers who would get some combat experience to pass on to other officers, through the process of working with the new British Commando units.
Truscott had spent much of the interwar period in the cavalry, and in the cavalry staff school, so he was bewildered as to why anybody would have thought him appropriate to run a group that would learn to specialise in Amphibious Operations. But he had an unexpected advantage. He had become a devotee of the prestige game of the American officer corps, Polo, and was considered one of the army’s foremost practitioners. The reason for his selectioin became a bit more clear when Eisenhower briefed him on working with Lord Louis Mountbatten’s Combined Operations Command, and then asked “Did you know that Lord Louis wrote a book on Polo?”
Such are the vagaries of decision making, which gave a man who had spent most of his military career in training or staff duties (or commanding the ceremonial detachment at Arlington cemetery), the first active combat command for American ground forces in the European Theatre.
In many ways he was the ideal candidate. He was a natural gruff soldier, far more intent on getting things done effeciently, than on being a posing media hungry prima-donna like Patton or Clarke. He certainly lacked the indecisiveness and incompetence that bedevilled so many of his contemporaries like Fredendall and Dawley and Lucas. He was a serious practitioner of the military arts, without thinking that ‘map skills’ or being a skilled football coach was adequate preparation for leading troops in combat, like Bradley and Eisenhower. And he never, ever treated his soldiers or officers with the contempt that was so much a part of MacArthur’s personality.
His experience began with learingn Commando tactics, and then training American officers and men in commando operations. From this the cavalry man came to the conclusion that the standards of fitness and movement required by US infantry in general were unsuitable for modern warfare. From there on his troops were required to perform to the standards similar to the Roman Legions in covering ground, and his standard speed of advance became referred to in the army as the ‘Truscott Trott’.
He became the first senior American officer in Europe to observe amphibious warfare combat techniques, when he accompanied the Dieppe raid. (An operation that, although unsuccessfu, he always felt taught lessons vital to all later amphibious operations…)
It was to stand him in good stead, because from that point on he was the man at the pointy end for the American invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy (twice) and France.
Off Casablanca, he came face to face with a potentially much greater disaster than Dieppe. As a Brigadier General his small invasion force was still supposedly in communication silence when a force of four French warships – his biographer (H. Paul Jeffers - Command of Honor) claims cruisers, but then quotes Truscott as giving a name (the Lorraine) of a Battleship that was under British control in Alexandria at the time – cruised slowly through the vulnerable invasion craft, and even signalled a warning that the troops on shore were aware the Americans were coming. Had these warships been interested in fighting, Truscott’s war would have ended right there.
The remainder of the operation introduced him to the issues of command and control of invasion forces, and no doubt left him very grateful that he was only facing a very half hearted French effort rather than the German professionals. Every problem of communication and supply that were to bedevill later operations were given a trial run. His comments on the effectiveness of naval support… they withdrew “halfway to South America”… were particularly bitter.
As a result of his success, Truscott was made a Major General, which meant that, as an equal/potential competitor, Patton would not be willing to have him in his command any more. Patton suggested his choices were to return to the US, or go to Algiers and try to get another job from Ike. Naturally he chose the second.
Eisenhower initially appointd him as a deputy commander, to set up a forward headquarters near the front where Ike could try and get the Americans and French to co-operate with the British on a new attack. But even as he started to get organised, Rommell decided to give the Americans a lesson in how offensives (or at least limitd spoiling operations) should be done, at Kasserine Pass. So Truscott’s most important task for Eisenhower during this period was to report that Fredendall should be relieved, preferably by Patton.
By the time Patton arrived, Truscott was off to take over 3rd Division, and prepare it for the invasion of Sicily. He trained the division most thouroughly for the operation, and fortunately they faced little serious opposition. Nonetheless Truscott led them at a pace, and with an effeciency, that left even the armoured division in his wake. His infantry division produced the outstanding performance of the Sicily campaign.
As a result he got to lead 3rd division again in the hard fought Salerno landing, and later in the breakout to Cassino, and then again in the desperate Anzio landings. He did comment that naval suppport was clearly improving with every invasioin experience, but that did nothing to make up for command problems on the ground. Things went so wrong at Anzio that Truscott was appointed to relieve the commander of VIth Corps (a US army formation that often included British or allied units), and spent months rebuilding the units before the eventual breakout. (Where he apparently attempted to inform General Alexander when Clarke re-routed the forces – meant to cut off the German Xth armies escape – against Alexander’s specific orders. Clarke managed to prevent this, but Truscott was clearly appalled by Clarke’s pursuit of vainglory, particularly at the cost of stupid military decisions.)
After rest and refit, he led VI Corps again in Dragoon - the invasion of Southern France – and here he was finally satisfied with the excellent co-operation and skill of the (Royal) Navy. (Though he was never entirely satisfied with tactical air support from his own air-force.) Fortunately by this time the Germans had already had orders to try and escape France if possible, so he finally had a chance to experience proper maneouvre warfare, without the need for a grinding and bloody breakout first.
From there he was called back to command 5th Army in Italy when Clarke was put in charge of the Allied Army Group. It was with mixed feelings that he reported back. He clearly didn’t want to lose the energetic sweep of th French camapign to be tied bak to the slow slog of the Italian one, and he now had to suffer repeated show pony performances while Clarke attempted to milk the media. On the other hand he was in charge of the most international of ‘American’ forces. (7th ‘American’ Army in France had consisted of 2 American and 8 French divisions, but that only made it a minority ‘American’ force. 5th ‘American’ Army in Italy almost always had more British and allied troops in it than American, a constant problem to Clarke whose attempt to avoid having any British troops at all enter Rome was the final straw for many of the foreign officers serving under him.)
Truscott was the ideal man to make a polyglot force work. British, South African, Polish, Italian, Brazilian and other troops were all equally acceptable to him. He worked hard with all of them, and did his best to help the units that were failing. (When the US 92nd ‘Black’ division repeatedly failed, he worked to reduce its weaknesses, and eventually rebuilt it by combining the best troops from the division in a single Regiment, and importing the Nisei (Japanese) regiment, and troops collected from anti-aircraft commands, to make it a tougher proposition.) He was reportedly respected and appreciated by all who served under him. (A more complete contrast to Clarke could not be imagined, and the morale of the whole Army must have benefitted enormously.)
After the final breakthrough and collapse of the Germans, he had a second chance at maneouvre warfare, and again performed well with his mixed command. The German surrender saw an Army Commander at the height of his powers. (And one who had overcome his reluctance at having to command Corps leaders who were senior to him, and fully justified the confidence of his superiors.) In fact when the failing Patton had to be replaced for political (and possibly sanity) reasons after the end of the war, Truscott was dragged back from an administrative command to take over 3rd Army and command the occupation forces in his part of Germany. Naturally he was a vastly superor choice for such a peacetime/administrative role in an occupied country than the unfortunate Patton. (Who died as the result of an accident soon after.)
After the war he was invalided out with a heart condition, but was soon recalled to head the Army studies on amphibious warfare. An excellent responsibility for the army's leading amphibious practitioner.
A second period of retirement was then cut off when he was appointed to run the new CIA operations in Europe, and later became deputy head of the CIA, in charge of such things as spying and coups (though apparently he objected to assassination).
The last is little reported, and there is scant information about his actual activities, but it does go to demonstrate his flexibility and trustworthiness. Two vital characteristics in a profession of arms that was often noted for inflexible dinosaurs (several of whom Truscott had replaced during his war career).
So how do we assess Lucien Truscott?
Frankly he was one of the, if not the, best American generals of the war. (Possibly of any of the Allied generals.) This was partly due to his outstanding natural abilities and willingness to be flexible and learn: and partly due to being in the right place at the right time.
It would be unfair to sugest that this was pure luck. He made it to Mountbatten’s command only partly on the amusing note of being a fellow Polo player. He was also obviously in the short list before this may have swung it in his favour.
From there he simply had he slow and careful build up of experience that so many other generals never got. He saw amphibious action going wrong (Dieppe), before being given a chance to make one that could have gone wrong turn out somewhat better (Morocco). He than got to observe how much tougher the Germans were (Kasserine), before leading a somewhat more successful invasion (Sicily) with troops that he actually got to train to his standards. He then had the luck to mainly face Italians, so that the 3rd division could become a well oiled machine before going head to head with serious German opposition in his third (Salerno) and fourth (Anzio) invasions. By the time he went into his fifth invasion and breakout (France), he was completley ready to achieve excellent results even with less experienced troops. (The fact that the navy was ready to do it right too, and the Germans already on the run, didn’t hurt.) Finally he led an army in the smashing and pursuit of the last remnants of serious German opposition in Italy. Even his post war command of an army of occupation in Germany must have been made incomparably easier by his experience leading the most polyglot army in the US inventory.
In fact a more perfect training regime for the production of a good solid and experienced general could hardly have been imagined. He led battalioins, regiments, divisions, corps and armies in combat, interspersed with staff duties where he mixed with the Allies highest commanders (a useful addition that few other generals came close to), and observed his seniors mistakes. Virtually no other major American commander had half the practice and experience he did.
It is not unfair to suggest that many other generals who failed might have done much better had they gone through his experiences on the way to commanding large units.
On the other hand much of his success also comes down to him. He was a really solid trainer and commander, from Truscott’s Trott to his detailed rehearsals for invasions. Despite having to repeatedly take over from officers who had failed in one way or another (Lucas - twice, Fredendall, Clarke, even Patton), he had phenomenal success, and always rebuilt the morale and fighting integrity of the units. He got on with soldiers regardless of race or nationality, and was certainly one of the top ‘Allied’ generals in the way he treated, and was responded to, by his troops.
In fact, as an all round performer, Lucian Truscott (Jr) was certainly one of the top ten generals on the Allied side, and possibly the best American general of the war.
Saturday, March 24, 2012
Thursday, February 23, 2012
Primogeniture (or concentrated inheritance): the making of the modern world
Equal inheritance amongst children has been one of the most destructive patterns in human history.
At it’s simplest level, a farming family may live comfortably and easily support four to six children on something in the order of ten acres. But if that ten acres is divided into four plots of 2.5 acres, it will no longer support a family of six. Nonetheless two surviving children in the next generation are enough to reduce the arable land per family to an acre or so, which is below subsistence for the next generation, particularly if more than one child survives. This situation has driven much of the third world into perpetual poverty, and has had baleful effects in modern countires such as France. (Where the 1792 Revolutionary State’s policy of equal inheritance amongst children has entrenched a peasant farming economy that shocked British Tommies in the Great War, and remains a constant economic and political drain on the economy of the European Union even now). Napoleon dismantled many of the social ‘reforms’ of the revolutionary state, but chose to leave this one intact.
On a larger scale the effects are most easily visualised amongst the great land holders and kings. Charlemagne united much of Europe, including what we now call France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and the Low Countries, under one kingdom. A kingdom that ran reasonably smoothly and remarkably effeciently., and which triggered a minor Renaissance of literacy and government services. Unfortunately that kingdom was soon split between his three grandsons (into roughly France, Germany, and ‘the middle bits’), each of whom had multiple children of their own. Within a few generations the entire system had collapsed back into a hodge-podge of territories constantly in conflict with each other. The Dark Ages returned with a vengeance, as Danes and Norsemen (Vikings) and other marauders gleefully moved in to pick over the remains.
The problem was largely solved in Europe by the introduction of the system of primogeniture, which theoretically implies that the oldest son inherits the families property, and dispenses only minor inheritances for other sons, and sometimes doweries for daughters. (The doweries could be quite substantial of course. When Eleanore of Aquitaine divorced her French husband and took an English one instead, she moved enough of France into Norman/English control to greatly expand a conflict between the two nations that would last for centuries.)
The most recognised explanation of the system is the original folk story of Puss in Boots. The oldest son inherited the mill, the middle son the mules, and the youngest son a cat. The more recognisable version is the medieval truism that the oldest son inherits the estate, the middle son goes into the church (often for those from influential families to become an important abbot or powerful bishop magnate in his own right), and the younger son becomes a military adventurer… (see the vast majority of crusaders and conquistadores).
In terms of great landholders and kings, primogeniture meant that careful managers steadily increased their holdings, and, if careful investors, their wealth. The resulting estates became the foundations of most of the modern nation states of Europe. The French were particularly impressed that a fairly second string noble family called the Capetians, who started as fairly minor nobles, managed to ruthlessly pursue concentrated inheritance to the point of making their family Kings of France, and then France the eventual greatest power in Europe.
[As an aside, it might be interesting to note that traditionally the better great families have invested in the living standards of their communities, and the original great industrial magnates were equally keen to build idealised estates for their workers – though of course that didn’t last for long with the bourgeoise that followed. These families were also the founders of all the great hospitals and universities and charities. But the idealistic imposition of death duties on the ‘rich’ by jealous ‘socialists’ in many coutries stopped that pretty much cold. Only places that do not have death duties, like the United States, have maintained high levels of philanthropy by the great families… from the Rockefellers and Carnegies to the Gates and Buffets.]
What has not proved to be a good thing, is election. The traditional Germanic tribal pattern of electing a replacement King after the death of the previous incumbent led to endless squabbles and feuds between competing families, and almost inevitably led to exactly the drain on resources and defections of provinces that were trying to be avoided. Similarly an overfond father choosing an incompetent or obnoxious favourite son has traditionally led to poor results, not least for the chosen incompetent. (The story of William Rufus being ‘accidentally’ shot on a hunting trip being a pretty clear example.)
The Saxon version of inheritance was half and half. The Witan elected a candidiate, but it had to be one eligible to inherit through the royal line. In the tenth century only 3 out of 8 Saxon kings succeeded their fathers. (For a continuing version of nobles and officials appointed by previous monarchs getting together to elect the next one, see the Papacy.)
But considering the system of primogeniture to be always in favour of the 'eldest son' is still an oversimplification. In fact the orignial Norman version, although it theoretically specified eldest sons, was far more practical. Of the first 9 monarchs of Norman England, only 1 was direct from father to eldest son. William I was succeeded by his third son William II (Rufus), who was succeeded by his brother Henry I, who was succeeded by his nephew Stephen (because his daughter Matilda was considered unfit). Stephen was succeeded by his second cousin Henry II, grandson of Henry I. The seventh Plantagenet (and first eldest son), was Richard I, who was succeeded by his brother John (who was so bad that the nobles crowned a French prince as the next king), before the throne was returned to John’s easily controlled infant son Henry III.
The key therefore is not inheritance by an eldest son, but the principle of concentrated inheritance regardless of who is chosen. In fact for many great families, kingdoms and empires throughout history, the ideal has been to choose the best candidate for inheritance, either from amongst immediate relatives, or by adoption into the family. (A point reinforced by the fact that the only direct primogeniture on the above list led to the dynastically disastrous Richard, who once claimed he would sell London if he could find a buyer.)
Just to emphasise that I am not being entirely Eurocentric here, the Japanese families were masters of concentrated inheritance, as were most of the great imperial dynasty’s of history. (One of the great dynastic mistakes that could be exampled was when Charles V of the Hapsburgs split the Spanish and overseas territories from the Austrian/Italian lands. It might have worked, except that he reflexively gave his favourite son a continental part – his favourite territories of the Netherlands – as a disfucntional annex to the overseas bits, rather than leaving it with his brothers part, the logical Austrian bits that were also in the Holy Roman Empire. The resulting mess sapped both empires fatally.)
Almost every modern nation state established prior to the First World War (and that is still the vast majority of all stable states), has been built on the principle of concentrated inheritance. Even radically Republican ones such as the United States started as assemblies of colonies that evolved under a hereditary monarchy. In fact the only obvious thing uniting the 13 colonies was their relationship with, and eventual opposition to, the English crown. Otherwise it is hard to imagine how such a disparate group could have been brought to combine! Russia, China, Japan, most of the Asian and South American nations, and certainly most of the island groups, can all trace their origins to such an approach.
The post Great War states also have a suprising correlation. Even in Africa and the Middle East, where European powers largely established states by drawing lines on the map, the ‘nations’ established came from what had been accumulated by the colonial powers – usually monarchies or empires – in the first place, and were almost always established as independent on the basis of tribal groups that could be in some way combined under a reasonable facsimile of a monarch with some claim to traditional loyalty through the region. The greatest exceptions were places like Iraq – where the British lumped three unrelated groups forced together by the Turks under a dubious imported royal house – and Liberia, which the Americans created as an imperial exercise for dumped ex slaves in a fit of idealistic romanticism. (And before anyone gets too romantic about Liberia, it, like most other Republics – and in mimicry of its founders – has been subject to dictatorship, multiple civil wars, and hundreds of thousands of deaths.)
Post World War Two, some different conglomorations were attempted… or so it might appear. India was a group of British crown colonies and dependencies – almost all established by monarchies of some sort – combined with the ‘Independent Principalities’ which were also under the hereditary protection of the British Empire… Hmmm. Botswana, the closest thing to a successful Republic of the last century, was pretty much a single tribal group under a hereditary ruling family (who now take turns calling themselves ‘Presidents’).
The curent passion for devolution is interesting. Nations are moving into ‘federations’ – such as the European Union or the more fanciful ‘Arab League’, at the same time that Yugoslavia splits into separate ethnic states, and Scotland mutters about independence from Britain.
They can do this because international stability has reached a point where states don’t need to be big to survive. But the inevitable result of smaller and weaker states is much less capactiy to deal with issues like famine, or collapse of vital industries by reliance on disparate parts of the economy. Too many of the modern states are ‘all our eggs in one basket’ cases (often known quite quickly just as basketcases.) Scotland for instance, will look pretty stupid if it splits from English tax subsidy in the assumption that it can rely on North Sea Oil, only to have the (let’s face it different ethnic group) Shetlands split from Scotland to keep the oil for itself.
Bigger is not always better. The Roman and British (and French and even American) Empires eventually started calving off separate states as soon as they could stand on their own, because that is far more sensible and cost efective than trying to run everything centrally. (And far more likelly to avoid revolts by the colonies who have recognised the problems of over-centralisation and lack of regional control.. did I mention the 13 colonies?) The process is particularly attractive if international stability suggests that independence can be granted to disparate groups without them being immediately conquored by rapacious neighbours. (See the unseemly haste with which post war British taxpayers abandoned only half established states in Africa well before their social development or infrastructure was really ready to stand on its own.)
States need to big big enough to survive and prosper in the context of their period, but flexible enough to ‘calve’ into smaller states if that helps. It is notable that the really big ‘republics’ like the United States and the Soviet Union and China have more trouble with devolution than the monarchies. (The American Civil War being an example at lest comparable with the fall of the Soviet union, and the Chinese attitude to Tibet and Taiwan showing interesting potential.) India was perhaps fortunate that Pakistan and Bangladesh ‘escaped’ a forced union… the conflicts have been bad enough without an American style civil war.
Concentrated inheritance has been the making of successful states, and a stable international system for the modern world. But the counter-balancing principle of devolution of estates to pass on non vital elements to other siblings has also proved useful in allowing states who understand the principles to devolve govrnment. Britain has been the most succesful proponent of this. (A Commonwealth of 54 nations containing a quarter of the world’s area and a third of its population that gets together regularly to play sporting challenges – and sometimes to discipline errant members – is a considerably more impressive achievement than the relative farce we call the United Nations.) But France, and even the United States have managed something similar, although on a much smaller scale. (The independence of the Philippines after 40 years of revolts could be compared to the American War of Independence for instance… certainly a third of the local population was pro, a third anti, and a third disinterested, in each struggle.)
The principles of primogeniture could be said to have had an unequalled effect on the shape of the world we see today.
At it’s simplest level, a farming family may live comfortably and easily support four to six children on something in the order of ten acres. But if that ten acres is divided into four plots of 2.5 acres, it will no longer support a family of six. Nonetheless two surviving children in the next generation are enough to reduce the arable land per family to an acre or so, which is below subsistence for the next generation, particularly if more than one child survives. This situation has driven much of the third world into perpetual poverty, and has had baleful effects in modern countires such as France. (Where the 1792 Revolutionary State’s policy of equal inheritance amongst children has entrenched a peasant farming economy that shocked British Tommies in the Great War, and remains a constant economic and political drain on the economy of the European Union even now). Napoleon dismantled many of the social ‘reforms’ of the revolutionary state, but chose to leave this one intact.
On a larger scale the effects are most easily visualised amongst the great land holders and kings. Charlemagne united much of Europe, including what we now call France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and the Low Countries, under one kingdom. A kingdom that ran reasonably smoothly and remarkably effeciently., and which triggered a minor Renaissance of literacy and government services. Unfortunately that kingdom was soon split between his three grandsons (into roughly France, Germany, and ‘the middle bits’), each of whom had multiple children of their own. Within a few generations the entire system had collapsed back into a hodge-podge of territories constantly in conflict with each other. The Dark Ages returned with a vengeance, as Danes and Norsemen (Vikings) and other marauders gleefully moved in to pick over the remains.
The problem was largely solved in Europe by the introduction of the system of primogeniture, which theoretically implies that the oldest son inherits the families property, and dispenses only minor inheritances for other sons, and sometimes doweries for daughters. (The doweries could be quite substantial of course. When Eleanore of Aquitaine divorced her French husband and took an English one instead, she moved enough of France into Norman/English control to greatly expand a conflict between the two nations that would last for centuries.)
The most recognised explanation of the system is the original folk story of Puss in Boots. The oldest son inherited the mill, the middle son the mules, and the youngest son a cat. The more recognisable version is the medieval truism that the oldest son inherits the estate, the middle son goes into the church (often for those from influential families to become an important abbot or powerful bishop magnate in his own right), and the younger son becomes a military adventurer… (see the vast majority of crusaders and conquistadores).
In terms of great landholders and kings, primogeniture meant that careful managers steadily increased their holdings, and, if careful investors, their wealth. The resulting estates became the foundations of most of the modern nation states of Europe. The French were particularly impressed that a fairly second string noble family called the Capetians, who started as fairly minor nobles, managed to ruthlessly pursue concentrated inheritance to the point of making their family Kings of France, and then France the eventual greatest power in Europe.
[As an aside, it might be interesting to note that traditionally the better great families have invested in the living standards of their communities, and the original great industrial magnates were equally keen to build idealised estates for their workers – though of course that didn’t last for long with the bourgeoise that followed. These families were also the founders of all the great hospitals and universities and charities. But the idealistic imposition of death duties on the ‘rich’ by jealous ‘socialists’ in many coutries stopped that pretty much cold. Only places that do not have death duties, like the United States, have maintained high levels of philanthropy by the great families… from the Rockefellers and Carnegies to the Gates and Buffets.]
What has not proved to be a good thing, is election. The traditional Germanic tribal pattern of electing a replacement King after the death of the previous incumbent led to endless squabbles and feuds between competing families, and almost inevitably led to exactly the drain on resources and defections of provinces that were trying to be avoided. Similarly an overfond father choosing an incompetent or obnoxious favourite son has traditionally led to poor results, not least for the chosen incompetent. (The story of William Rufus being ‘accidentally’ shot on a hunting trip being a pretty clear example.)
The Saxon version of inheritance was half and half. The Witan elected a candidiate, but it had to be one eligible to inherit through the royal line. In the tenth century only 3 out of 8 Saxon kings succeeded their fathers. (For a continuing version of nobles and officials appointed by previous monarchs getting together to elect the next one, see the Papacy.)
But considering the system of primogeniture to be always in favour of the 'eldest son' is still an oversimplification. In fact the orignial Norman version, although it theoretically specified eldest sons, was far more practical. Of the first 9 monarchs of Norman England, only 1 was direct from father to eldest son. William I was succeeded by his third son William II (Rufus), who was succeeded by his brother Henry I, who was succeeded by his nephew Stephen (because his daughter Matilda was considered unfit). Stephen was succeeded by his second cousin Henry II, grandson of Henry I. The seventh Plantagenet (and first eldest son), was Richard I, who was succeeded by his brother John (who was so bad that the nobles crowned a French prince as the next king), before the throne was returned to John’s easily controlled infant son Henry III.
The key therefore is not inheritance by an eldest son, but the principle of concentrated inheritance regardless of who is chosen. In fact for many great families, kingdoms and empires throughout history, the ideal has been to choose the best candidate for inheritance, either from amongst immediate relatives, or by adoption into the family. (A point reinforced by the fact that the only direct primogeniture on the above list led to the dynastically disastrous Richard, who once claimed he would sell London if he could find a buyer.)
Just to emphasise that I am not being entirely Eurocentric here, the Japanese families were masters of concentrated inheritance, as were most of the great imperial dynasty’s of history. (One of the great dynastic mistakes that could be exampled was when Charles V of the Hapsburgs split the Spanish and overseas territories from the Austrian/Italian lands. It might have worked, except that he reflexively gave his favourite son a continental part – his favourite territories of the Netherlands – as a disfucntional annex to the overseas bits, rather than leaving it with his brothers part, the logical Austrian bits that were also in the Holy Roman Empire. The resulting mess sapped both empires fatally.)
Almost every modern nation state established prior to the First World War (and that is still the vast majority of all stable states), has been built on the principle of concentrated inheritance. Even radically Republican ones such as the United States started as assemblies of colonies that evolved under a hereditary monarchy. In fact the only obvious thing uniting the 13 colonies was their relationship with, and eventual opposition to, the English crown. Otherwise it is hard to imagine how such a disparate group could have been brought to combine! Russia, China, Japan, most of the Asian and South American nations, and certainly most of the island groups, can all trace their origins to such an approach.
The post Great War states also have a suprising correlation. Even in Africa and the Middle East, where European powers largely established states by drawing lines on the map, the ‘nations’ established came from what had been accumulated by the colonial powers – usually monarchies or empires – in the first place, and were almost always established as independent on the basis of tribal groups that could be in some way combined under a reasonable facsimile of a monarch with some claim to traditional loyalty through the region. The greatest exceptions were places like Iraq – where the British lumped three unrelated groups forced together by the Turks under a dubious imported royal house – and Liberia, which the Americans created as an imperial exercise for dumped ex slaves in a fit of idealistic romanticism. (And before anyone gets too romantic about Liberia, it, like most other Republics – and in mimicry of its founders – has been subject to dictatorship, multiple civil wars, and hundreds of thousands of deaths.)
Post World War Two, some different conglomorations were attempted… or so it might appear. India was a group of British crown colonies and dependencies – almost all established by monarchies of some sort – combined with the ‘Independent Principalities’ which were also under the hereditary protection of the British Empire… Hmmm. Botswana, the closest thing to a successful Republic of the last century, was pretty much a single tribal group under a hereditary ruling family (who now take turns calling themselves ‘Presidents’).
The curent passion for devolution is interesting. Nations are moving into ‘federations’ – such as the European Union or the more fanciful ‘Arab League’, at the same time that Yugoslavia splits into separate ethnic states, and Scotland mutters about independence from Britain.
They can do this because international stability has reached a point where states don’t need to be big to survive. But the inevitable result of smaller and weaker states is much less capactiy to deal with issues like famine, or collapse of vital industries by reliance on disparate parts of the economy. Too many of the modern states are ‘all our eggs in one basket’ cases (often known quite quickly just as basketcases.) Scotland for instance, will look pretty stupid if it splits from English tax subsidy in the assumption that it can rely on North Sea Oil, only to have the (let’s face it different ethnic group) Shetlands split from Scotland to keep the oil for itself.
Bigger is not always better. The Roman and British (and French and even American) Empires eventually started calving off separate states as soon as they could stand on their own, because that is far more sensible and cost efective than trying to run everything centrally. (And far more likelly to avoid revolts by the colonies who have recognised the problems of over-centralisation and lack of regional control.. did I mention the 13 colonies?) The process is particularly attractive if international stability suggests that independence can be granted to disparate groups without them being immediately conquored by rapacious neighbours. (See the unseemly haste with which post war British taxpayers abandoned only half established states in Africa well before their social development or infrastructure was really ready to stand on its own.)
States need to big big enough to survive and prosper in the context of their period, but flexible enough to ‘calve’ into smaller states if that helps. It is notable that the really big ‘republics’ like the United States and the Soviet Union and China have more trouble with devolution than the monarchies. (The American Civil War being an example at lest comparable with the fall of the Soviet union, and the Chinese attitude to Tibet and Taiwan showing interesting potential.) India was perhaps fortunate that Pakistan and Bangladesh ‘escaped’ a forced union… the conflicts have been bad enough without an American style civil war.
Concentrated inheritance has been the making of successful states, and a stable international system for the modern world. But the counter-balancing principle of devolution of estates to pass on non vital elements to other siblings has also proved useful in allowing states who understand the principles to devolve govrnment. Britain has been the most succesful proponent of this. (A Commonwealth of 54 nations containing a quarter of the world’s area and a third of its population that gets together regularly to play sporting challenges – and sometimes to discipline errant members – is a considerably more impressive achievement than the relative farce we call the United Nations.) But France, and even the United States have managed something similar, although on a much smaller scale. (The independence of the Philippines after 40 years of revolts could be compared to the American War of Independence for instance… certainly a third of the local population was pro, a third anti, and a third disinterested, in each struggle.)
The principles of primogeniture could be said to have had an unequalled effect on the shape of the world we see today.
Saturday, February 11, 2012
Dangers of self deception - American racism in WW2
At the risk of this being taken as another anti-American rant, I want to make another comment on the self delusion in their history.
(Though I will pause to note that I recently wrote that Americans have the worst written and perceived history in the Western world, which viewpoint i have had to revise recently after looking at some more French history. Lets just say the two fight for worst place.)
In 1942 Roosevelt lectured Churchill about granting immediate independence to India. He was of course contentedly ignorant of what effect setting off a civil war between hundreds of millions of Hindu's, Muslim;s, Sikh's, Independent Principalities, etc: might have on the Allies losing World War Two.
Churchill, being a polite, as well as somewhat more intelligent and knowledgeable, world player, contented himself with pointing out that of all the nations in the world with armies in the millions, only one was entirely composed of volunteers not conscripts. India was the only nation with a completely voluntary military, and deserved respect for that fact that it raised the largest all volunteer force in history.
He did not go on to point out that India was at the same stage in the Independence process as the Philippines, and way ahead of Puerto Rico and various other American imperial possessions.
But what he might have pointed out, had he been impressed enough by Roosevelt's ignorance to think it worthwhile, was the complete hypocrisy of the American position. Particularly that of the American military.
There is an episode of The West Wing, where the military's representatives are arguing with the White House staff about why it is not possible to acknowledge gays in the armed forces. The Chief of Staff wanders through and amusedly asks if they have used such and such half a dozen excuses as to why it would be a bad idea. When they ask how he knew, he laughs and says they are the same excuses used against him when he first joined. He is of course black.
The racism in the British or French or Russian or even German forces during World War Two was at least tempered by officers regularly commanding units of different races and nationalities. In fact in the British and French army, it was practically impossible to progress without time spent working in the colonies or with native troops at some time. Racism was there, but tempered by some small elements of knowledge of reality.
Americans however were different. (Though in fact service in teh Philippines or Panama was also important to the careers of many officers!) Racism in their forces was almost completely untempered by any version of reality. Whereas the Royal Navy had had Asian or Jamaican sailors for centuries (in fact it had been some black Jamaican frigate captains in the RN that had caused much of the outrage by American financial/piracy interests in the 1770's): the USN was still trying to keep blacks off its battleships in WW2 because of their 'poor eyesight'.
Whereas the British army in WW2 was composed of dozens of races - including Indians, Jews, Poles, East and West Africans, Jamaicans, Burmese, Kerens, Sikhs, Ghurkha's, etc, etc. The American army was violently opposed to letting black troops into front line units... until manpower shortages in France caused the more progressive generals like - God help us - Patton, to overcome the resistance of men like Bradley and Bedell-Smith.
(The attempts that were made with Japanese American units in Italy were actually quite successful. But I suppose Americans had worked out the Japs could be tough opponents by 1943? The attempt at an American black division - the 92nd - was less successful, but its incredible failure - it actually had to be rescued on occassions from attacks or counter-attacks by Italian troops! - was probably more to do with the way the higher command and its senior officers treated it, and failed to train it, than with any inadequacy of basic personnel.)
But the cincher on the argument could have been taken from the American black non-combat units in Australia. 1942 saw the mutiny by the black troops in the US 96th Engineers - a labour battalion in Queensland. 600 of them went on the rampage, hosing down their (white) officers tents with machine gun fire, and then many escaping into the Australian outback for weeks or months. They were furious about institutional racism, and apparently the mutiny was spiked by the death of a black Sergeant, supposedly at the hands of a white officer.
The future President Lyndon Johnson, then a junior Congressman, investigated while in Australia and produced a report (or more probably plagiarised it from the work of Robert Sherrod, a journalist for Time and Life magazines). The whole incident was hushed up, and Johnson felt it should be kept that way. It is almost by accident that the report resurfaced from Johnson's archives recently.
Now this is not to say that terrible things did not happen in many nations backyards. Particularly during the stress of major wars. Mutinies and violent repression of them are part and parcel of modern industrial scale war.
The point I am making here is that American 'holier than thou' attitudes, particularly during WW2, were shrouded in ignorance and self delusion.
Having said that, I will point out that a holier than thou attitude is just a sign of national immaturity. Every major nation I can think of has gone through it, from the Ancient Greeks and Romans to modern Russia and Iran. (China has almost never not had a 'holier than thou' attitude, and Japan has often been a close second.)
Unfortunately the Americans were still in the worst stages of theirs when events thrust them into the international limelight. Wilson's ridiculously idealistic 14 points - a major cause of WW2, and Roosevelt's 'Independence for India now', while still running a 'I can work with Stalin' line - major causes of the Cold War and the drop into dictatorship and penury for much of the third world after WW2 - are just samples of how unhelpful such an attitude is for 'statesmen'.
I would happily give samples of many other nations holier than thou attitudes, but in this case it is more fun to point out that most of the people now lecturing the Americans from a holier than thou perspective (say the Europeans for instance), are using exactly the same language, and often with the same self delusional self righteousness, as American used 50 or 100 years ago (towards the Europeans for instance).
PS: Just to be clear. Racism is stupid. And that includes affirmative action, or cultural relativism, or any other sort of hypocrisy... People are people and virtually any person of any race has strengths and weaknesses and information or ignorance that defines them, and what they can do. But that's for another post.
(Though I will pause to note that I recently wrote that Americans have the worst written and perceived history in the Western world, which viewpoint i have had to revise recently after looking at some more French history. Lets just say the two fight for worst place.)
In 1942 Roosevelt lectured Churchill about granting immediate independence to India. He was of course contentedly ignorant of what effect setting off a civil war between hundreds of millions of Hindu's, Muslim;s, Sikh's, Independent Principalities, etc: might have on the Allies losing World War Two.
Churchill, being a polite, as well as somewhat more intelligent and knowledgeable, world player, contented himself with pointing out that of all the nations in the world with armies in the millions, only one was entirely composed of volunteers not conscripts. India was the only nation with a completely voluntary military, and deserved respect for that fact that it raised the largest all volunteer force in history.
He did not go on to point out that India was at the same stage in the Independence process as the Philippines, and way ahead of Puerto Rico and various other American imperial possessions.
But what he might have pointed out, had he been impressed enough by Roosevelt's ignorance to think it worthwhile, was the complete hypocrisy of the American position. Particularly that of the American military.
There is an episode of The West Wing, where the military's representatives are arguing with the White House staff about why it is not possible to acknowledge gays in the armed forces. The Chief of Staff wanders through and amusedly asks if they have used such and such half a dozen excuses as to why it would be a bad idea. When they ask how he knew, he laughs and says they are the same excuses used against him when he first joined. He is of course black.
The racism in the British or French or Russian or even German forces during World War Two was at least tempered by officers regularly commanding units of different races and nationalities. In fact in the British and French army, it was practically impossible to progress without time spent working in the colonies or with native troops at some time. Racism was there, but tempered by some small elements of knowledge of reality.
Americans however were different. (Though in fact service in teh Philippines or Panama was also important to the careers of many officers!) Racism in their forces was almost completely untempered by any version of reality. Whereas the Royal Navy had had Asian or Jamaican sailors for centuries (in fact it had been some black Jamaican frigate captains in the RN that had caused much of the outrage by American financial/piracy interests in the 1770's): the USN was still trying to keep blacks off its battleships in WW2 because of their 'poor eyesight'.
Whereas the British army in WW2 was composed of dozens of races - including Indians, Jews, Poles, East and West Africans, Jamaicans, Burmese, Kerens, Sikhs, Ghurkha's, etc, etc. The American army was violently opposed to letting black troops into front line units... until manpower shortages in France caused the more progressive generals like - God help us - Patton, to overcome the resistance of men like Bradley and Bedell-Smith.
(The attempts that were made with Japanese American units in Italy were actually quite successful. But I suppose Americans had worked out the Japs could be tough opponents by 1943? The attempt at an American black division - the 92nd - was less successful, but its incredible failure - it actually had to be rescued on occassions from attacks or counter-attacks by Italian troops! - was probably more to do with the way the higher command and its senior officers treated it, and failed to train it, than with any inadequacy of basic personnel.)
But the cincher on the argument could have been taken from the American black non-combat units in Australia. 1942 saw the mutiny by the black troops in the US 96th Engineers - a labour battalion in Queensland. 600 of them went on the rampage, hosing down their (white) officers tents with machine gun fire, and then many escaping into the Australian outback for weeks or months. They were furious about institutional racism, and apparently the mutiny was spiked by the death of a black Sergeant, supposedly at the hands of a white officer.
The future President Lyndon Johnson, then a junior Congressman, investigated while in Australia and produced a report (or more probably plagiarised it from the work of Robert Sherrod, a journalist for Time and Life magazines). The whole incident was hushed up, and Johnson felt it should be kept that way. It is almost by accident that the report resurfaced from Johnson's archives recently.
Now this is not to say that terrible things did not happen in many nations backyards. Particularly during the stress of major wars. Mutinies and violent repression of them are part and parcel of modern industrial scale war.
The point I am making here is that American 'holier than thou' attitudes, particularly during WW2, were shrouded in ignorance and self delusion.
Having said that, I will point out that a holier than thou attitude is just a sign of national immaturity. Every major nation I can think of has gone through it, from the Ancient Greeks and Romans to modern Russia and Iran. (China has almost never not had a 'holier than thou' attitude, and Japan has often been a close second.)
Unfortunately the Americans were still in the worst stages of theirs when events thrust them into the international limelight. Wilson's ridiculously idealistic 14 points - a major cause of WW2, and Roosevelt's 'Independence for India now', while still running a 'I can work with Stalin' line - major causes of the Cold War and the drop into dictatorship and penury for much of the third world after WW2 - are just samples of how unhelpful such an attitude is for 'statesmen'.
I would happily give samples of many other nations holier than thou attitudes, but in this case it is more fun to point out that most of the people now lecturing the Americans from a holier than thou perspective (say the Europeans for instance), are using exactly the same language, and often with the same self delusional self righteousness, as American used 50 or 100 years ago (towards the Europeans for instance).
PS: Just to be clear. Racism is stupid. And that includes affirmative action, or cultural relativism, or any other sort of hypocrisy... People are people and virtually any person of any race has strengths and weaknesses and information or ignorance that defines them, and what they can do. But that's for another post.
Saturday, February 4, 2012
A few comments on my recent publications
Some of my publications have been getting a bit of international press recently.
Here are a few:
First from the editor of The Dorchester Review, a new Canadian publication that picked up and ran one of my prior publications in Quadrant...
Dear Mr. Davies,
You might be interested in your new-found notoriety among Canadian readers:
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/12/31/david-frum-amateur-historians-to-the-rescue/
and for background:
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/07/01/david-frum-setting-canadian-history-right-in-an-exciting-new-journal/
Very best wishes,
Chris Champion
Contributing Editor - Dorchester Review
(The David Frum who is commenting is a Canadian/American commentator who worked as an aide/speechwriter for Geroge W Bush. His recommendatioin could be considred a double edged sword... In fact he wrote the Axis of Evil speech. Though he personally claimed to preferred to call it the 'Axis of Hatred'... Hmm.)
I followed the original book review with a 6,000 word article, also in Quadrant, on the warped historiography of the Singapore Debacle. I couldn't get it published in any academic magazine 20 years ago, but in the last year I have managed 7 publications in Austrlaia and overseas on the topic... An idea whose time has (belatedly ) come?
Meanwhile, in a complete reversal of normality, an Australian reviewer has picked up one of my overseas publications to comment on...
http://australianwargamer.wordpress.com/2011/09/17/why-did-barbarossa-fail/
ATO magazine commissioned 15,000 words on Opertion Barbarossa (not one of my specialty areas), on the basis of articles they read on this blog. they said thy wanted a fresh interpretation, and were inspired by my Oversimplification: the numbers fallacy post.
(This Barbarossa article was copyrighted to the small distribution and subscription only ATO magazine for 12 months, which is now expired... anyone know a new publisher who might be interested? Apparently some people like it!)
Here are a few:
First from the editor of The Dorchester Review, a new Canadian publication that picked up and ran one of my prior publications in Quadrant...
Dear Mr. Davies,
You might be interested in your new-found notoriety among Canadian readers:
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/12/31/david-frum-amateur-historians-to-the-rescue/
and for background:
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/07/01/david-frum-setting-canadian-history-right-in-an-exciting-new-journal/
Very best wishes,
Chris Champion
Contributing Editor - Dorchester Review
(The David Frum who is commenting is a Canadian/American commentator who worked as an aide/speechwriter for Geroge W Bush. His recommendatioin could be considred a double edged sword... In fact he wrote the Axis of Evil speech. Though he personally claimed to preferred to call it the 'Axis of Hatred'... Hmm.)
I followed the original book review with a 6,000 word article, also in Quadrant, on the warped historiography of the Singapore Debacle. I couldn't get it published in any academic magazine 20 years ago, but in the last year I have managed 7 publications in Austrlaia and overseas on the topic... An idea whose time has (belatedly ) come?
Meanwhile, in a complete reversal of normality, an Australian reviewer has picked up one of my overseas publications to comment on...
http://australianwargamer.wordpress.com/2011/09/17/why-did-barbarossa-fail/
ATO magazine commissioned 15,000 words on Opertion Barbarossa (not one of my specialty areas), on the basis of articles they read on this blog. they said thy wanted a fresh interpretation, and were inspired by my Oversimplification: the numbers fallacy post.
(This Barbarossa article was copyrighted to the small distribution and subscription only ATO magazine for 12 months, which is now expired... anyone know a new publisher who might be interested? Apparently some people like it!)
Wednesday, January 18, 2012
Hypocrisy 2 - naval disasters and feminism
The entertaining thing about the tragedy of the misguided Mediterranean cruise liner, is watching or listening to commentators turn themselves in knots trying to justify their perspectives on right and wrong.
So the crew abandoned before helping the passengers. Almost certainly wrong.
Did they do so because: a) they are bastards; b) they are slimy wogs who can't face things with a proper stiff upper lip; c) they are products of a modern world where no one is expected to know what a stiff upper lip is (yes the Titanic comparison was playing big on the whole issue of women and children first and men, particularly the captain, going down with the ship); or d) underpaid and under-appreciated workers who know full well their value and pecking order in relation to both the no doubt corrupt company and the average insufferable passenger, and therefore were fully justified in not considering their duties went to the point of sacrificing themselves for people who only treated them with contempt? Or was it just so fast that everyone panicked?
I would suspect all of those had a certain effect, but I wouldn't be willing to argue which individuals (passengers as well as crew) were effected by which.
But the fascinating thing is that the more it was discussed, the more the outraged commentators found themselves cast as ridiculous old fogies. And wasn't it a shock to the self righteous commenteriat that anyone could see the self contradictions in their perspectives?
My favourite bit was the 'women and children first' part. As countless bloggers pointed out, why in a world of supposed equality should women go first? Children, yes. Perhaps mothers escorting the children as some sort of preference (though in this day of stay at home fathers that is possibly a bit sexist),. But certainly not young healthy women before elderly and infirm of either sex?
One of the young men who phoned in rightly commented that if he was ever sitting on public transport, and a middle aged woman and an elderly man approached, he would offer the elderly man a seat first. Then a pregnant woman, then an older person of any description... amazing to hear such a young sounding living fossil.
The radio commentators were simply stuck on 'women first'. They acknowledged that although they had campaigned for equality for years, their own ingrained upbringing would insist they offer a woman a place first. It was quite sweet listening to them try and explain their reversion to ingrained prejudice, and the confusion they felt as they admitted it was politically incorrect, but nonetheless felt as though it should still be the right thing to do.
Hypocrisy is as often for good motives as for bad. In fact the worst and most dangerous hypocrisy is the self righteously 'but I am doing it for other people's best interests' kind. But the issue is self contradiction. (And I will give these two the credit of acknowledging they were being self contradictory...).
As I listened to two male baby boomer's – who have spent a large part of their careers castigating other baby boomers for hypocrisy – struggle to explain themselves even to each other, I reflected again on the inadequacy of logical thinking that most modern people apply to matters of morality. They talk of doing the right thing, and all they really mean is applying the prejudice that was ingrained with as a child, or that is currently fashionable (or in this case trying to balance the two).
They missed completely the sensible comment from the younger man, and from several women who rang up. They believe in equality, and will fight for it, but they accept disadvantage, and are willing to work to overcome that. They just don't know how to say that that is what they mean.
In practical terms what they seemed to mean was that in a modern age of equality, the hierarchy should be disadvantage. Buggar the idea of all women before all men. That is just prejudice. How about the physically disadvantaged like children and elderly - of either sex - before fit adults - of either sex. Then, if you want to be finicky, how about the mid 20's male with severe asthma ahead of the mid 50's female who swims 100 laps a day?
Interestingly this approach is far closer to the Titanic example than most commentators seemed to realise. The rich, powerful, important, and often elderly and infirm, men, who stayed aboard the Titanic, had an ingrained sense of not only disadvantage, but also of noblisse oblige. Noblity, real nobility (which already meant very little by that time) existed for centuries on the idea that priviledge involved sacrifice... in battle, or on a sinking ship.
[Nobility, on the English model, is quite separate to Arisotocracy, which, on the French model which the Americans seem to have adopted, has devolved into priviledge without responsibility. The insistence of the old French aristocracy on maintaining their rights regardless of not having many responsibilities anymore, is what led to the French Revolution. The Americans adopted this perspective to help explain their betrayal of oaths of loyalty during their revolutionary war, but then seemed to ingrain into their culture the concept that all priviledge was without responsibility. Which actually fights with their equally recognisable tendency towards charity by the wealthy in America... Or at least by the old fashioned wealthy. fortunately Bill Gates and others are old fashioned. But Americans as a rule seem have a hard time understanding nobility except in Holywood features about dog's.]
A medieval knight's deal with his peasants was that he would be priviledged, as long as he was willing to die to protect them. A king or nobles justification for priviledge was that they served. (Modern politicians make the same promises, but don't seem to suffer or take many risks for their vast returns. Given the choice between Prince Andrew coming from a family that expected him to use his helicopter to distract guided missiles from his aircraft carrier during the Falklands War, and expected Prince Harry to serve in the front line in Afghanistan: and President Clinton coming from a family who rigged things to keep him safe in the National Guard during the Vietnam war, you have to think seriously about which tradition might be valuable...)
Civilisation is built on morality. Many people can behave in a morale way without being able to explain it, and many people who drone on endlessly about rights couldn't recognise moral behavior if they were hit in the face with it. The two media commentators in this post fit the former, and the so called Feminists (who aren't really) in the previous post fit the latter.
Unfortunately modern children are being harangued with the misunderstood and misapplied crap of the latter all through school.
Fortunately, most generations want to rebel against the previous.
Any rebellion against the impossible hodge podge of misconception and self deception that makes up what is 'politically correct' at the moment can only be for the good.
So the crew abandoned before helping the passengers. Almost certainly wrong.
Did they do so because: a) they are bastards; b) they are slimy wogs who can't face things with a proper stiff upper lip; c) they are products of a modern world where no one is expected to know what a stiff upper lip is (yes the Titanic comparison was playing big on the whole issue of women and children first and men, particularly the captain, going down with the ship); or d) underpaid and under-appreciated workers who know full well their value and pecking order in relation to both the no doubt corrupt company and the average insufferable passenger, and therefore were fully justified in not considering their duties went to the point of sacrificing themselves for people who only treated them with contempt? Or was it just so fast that everyone panicked?
I would suspect all of those had a certain effect, but I wouldn't be willing to argue which individuals (passengers as well as crew) were effected by which.
But the fascinating thing is that the more it was discussed, the more the outraged commentators found themselves cast as ridiculous old fogies. And wasn't it a shock to the self righteous commenteriat that anyone could see the self contradictions in their perspectives?
My favourite bit was the 'women and children first' part. As countless bloggers pointed out, why in a world of supposed equality should women go first? Children, yes. Perhaps mothers escorting the children as some sort of preference (though in this day of stay at home fathers that is possibly a bit sexist),. But certainly not young healthy women before elderly and infirm of either sex?
One of the young men who phoned in rightly commented that if he was ever sitting on public transport, and a middle aged woman and an elderly man approached, he would offer the elderly man a seat first. Then a pregnant woman, then an older person of any description... amazing to hear such a young sounding living fossil.
The radio commentators were simply stuck on 'women first'. They acknowledged that although they had campaigned for equality for years, their own ingrained upbringing would insist they offer a woman a place first. It was quite sweet listening to them try and explain their reversion to ingrained prejudice, and the confusion they felt as they admitted it was politically incorrect, but nonetheless felt as though it should still be the right thing to do.
Hypocrisy is as often for good motives as for bad. In fact the worst and most dangerous hypocrisy is the self righteously 'but I am doing it for other people's best interests' kind. But the issue is self contradiction. (And I will give these two the credit of acknowledging they were being self contradictory...).
As I listened to two male baby boomer's – who have spent a large part of their careers castigating other baby boomers for hypocrisy – struggle to explain themselves even to each other, I reflected again on the inadequacy of logical thinking that most modern people apply to matters of morality. They talk of doing the right thing, and all they really mean is applying the prejudice that was ingrained with as a child, or that is currently fashionable (or in this case trying to balance the two).
They missed completely the sensible comment from the younger man, and from several women who rang up. They believe in equality, and will fight for it, but they accept disadvantage, and are willing to work to overcome that. They just don't know how to say that that is what they mean.
In practical terms what they seemed to mean was that in a modern age of equality, the hierarchy should be disadvantage. Buggar the idea of all women before all men. That is just prejudice. How about the physically disadvantaged like children and elderly - of either sex - before fit adults - of either sex. Then, if you want to be finicky, how about the mid 20's male with severe asthma ahead of the mid 50's female who swims 100 laps a day?
Interestingly this approach is far closer to the Titanic example than most commentators seemed to realise. The rich, powerful, important, and often elderly and infirm, men, who stayed aboard the Titanic, had an ingrained sense of not only disadvantage, but also of noblisse oblige. Noblity, real nobility (which already meant very little by that time) existed for centuries on the idea that priviledge involved sacrifice... in battle, or on a sinking ship.
[Nobility, on the English model, is quite separate to Arisotocracy, which, on the French model which the Americans seem to have adopted, has devolved into priviledge without responsibility. The insistence of the old French aristocracy on maintaining their rights regardless of not having many responsibilities anymore, is what led to the French Revolution. The Americans adopted this perspective to help explain their betrayal of oaths of loyalty during their revolutionary war, but then seemed to ingrain into their culture the concept that all priviledge was without responsibility. Which actually fights with their equally recognisable tendency towards charity by the wealthy in America... Or at least by the old fashioned wealthy. fortunately Bill Gates and others are old fashioned. But Americans as a rule seem have a hard time understanding nobility except in Holywood features about dog's.]
A medieval knight's deal with his peasants was that he would be priviledged, as long as he was willing to die to protect them. A king or nobles justification for priviledge was that they served. (Modern politicians make the same promises, but don't seem to suffer or take many risks for their vast returns. Given the choice between Prince Andrew coming from a family that expected him to use his helicopter to distract guided missiles from his aircraft carrier during the Falklands War, and expected Prince Harry to serve in the front line in Afghanistan: and President Clinton coming from a family who rigged things to keep him safe in the National Guard during the Vietnam war, you have to think seriously about which tradition might be valuable...)
Civilisation is built on morality. Many people can behave in a morale way without being able to explain it, and many people who drone on endlessly about rights couldn't recognise moral behavior if they were hit in the face with it. The two media commentators in this post fit the former, and the so called Feminists (who aren't really) in the previous post fit the latter.
Unfortunately modern children are being harangued with the misunderstood and misapplied crap of the latter all through school.
Fortunately, most generations want to rebel against the previous.
Any rebellion against the impossible hodge podge of misconception and self deception that makes up what is 'politically correct' at the moment can only be for the good.
Sunday, January 15, 2012
Hypocrisy… the ultimate test of political value
(Another rant I am afraid... enjoy)
I have got more than a little sick of self righteously high minded pratts preaching about the nobility of their ideas, and then failing to admit that they only hold those ideas when convenient to their politics. This sort of hyprocrisy is, to me, the worst possible failing of any politician, or idealist or idealogue of any sort.
Not acknowledging it is a clear statement that the person is an unprincipled shit, out only for what they can get.
Not recognising that there is any hypocrisy, is the sign of being too stupid to be trusted to run a church cake stall, let alone have a say in any policy on anything that might ruin people’s lives. (Sorry, forgot. Church cake stalls are illegal in the Victorian nanny state… OH&S issues and public liability now making baking a cake for privatye sale a criminal enterprise unless your kitchen passes health department guidelines, and your cake is plastic sealed and labelled with a complete list of ingredients, their origins, and the name, address and shoe size of the person who baked it…. Alright the shoe size is an exaggeration, but you get the point.)
Unhappily, the vast majority of modern politicians, journalists, lobbyists, and lawyers, are screaming hypocrites. Professionally. In fact they could not do their jobs unless they can either ignore the truth, or not recognise it in the first place.
There was a fabulous example quoted on the radio today. A few years ago a police car entered the men’s ceremonial area of a remote Australian Aboriginal tribe, with… a woman in it! Now the media had a field day with the ‘disrespect’ element of this, because of course cultural relativism argues that such a thing was disrespectful. But to do so the media happily quoted an Aboriginal elder who stated that, had the female been Aboriginal, she would have automatically been killed.
The fact that they quoted this was not a problem. It is a true reflection of Aboriginal culture. It was a true statement by the elder concerned. It was accepted by all who new the facts as a statement of reality. And, most importantly I suppose, it fitted the argument of how ‘disrespectful’ the female police officer was being to Aboriginal culture.
The problem is of course, that the statement that Aborigines reserve the right to murder women who are Australian citizens, was not remarked upon by anyone in the media. Not one single member of the press who commented on it that day thought it was a problem. (Others did later of course.) Not even the many hard line Feminists who had raged against the white ‘oppression’ of Aboroiginal culture seemed to think that it was a problem. Apparently, Aborigines are allowed to oppress women as much as they like in the eyes of an Australian Feminist, because Aborigines – also being victims of white male oppression – clearly have the right to hang on to a culture that oppresses women. In fact any attempt to stop them doing so must be racist.
Now I realise that the self avowed ‘left’ in politics has to find, or invent, causes to rage about to get people who are young enough or stupid enough motivated. (I frankly agree with the old joke that if you are not Socialist when you are 20 you have no heart – we know people’s rationalty is not fully developed until 24 or 25 – and that people who are still socialist at 40 have no brain.) But that does not excuse hypocrisy.
If you genuinely believe (as I do) that women are equal, and deserve equal rights, then you believe it for all women, in any culture. Not just for the ones who will vote for that, and not excluding the ones for whom you can get more mileage from denying those rights in the name of another supposedly honourable cause.
The reason that a police car was on the ‘men’s reservation’ in the first place, was because Australian police have the unfortunate task of trying to protect Aboriginal women from Aboriginal men despite the efforts of our Socialists and Feminists and lawyers and judges to keep them properly subjugated in the name of cultural relativity.
A court case at a similar time was about a 13 year old aboriginal girl who had been raped by a 50 year old aboriginal man. The judge was presented with serious arguments that the case be thrown out because the girl had been promised to the man as a bride by her family. (In fact her grandmother assisted with the rape!) Sad to say the cultural relativists have such a sway over the Australian legal system that the judge initially delivered a sentence of only a few weeks, explaining that the case fit more within ‘traditional cultural law’ than in modern Australian law.
Or, in other words, Australian female citizens should have no protectioin from murder or rape if that happens to fit the cultural practices of the primitive uneducated hunter gatherer tribe from which they come. (And why are they uneducated? Because the cultural relatavists have forced the missions and schools to stay away from the ‘purity’ of aboriginal tribal life… for their own good of course.)
Presumably this same approach will soon be available throughout Australia to Muslims in favour of female circumcision or honor killing, to New Guineans who would like to hang on to tribal cannabalism, and to Indians in favour of Suti. As long as they only practice it on members of their own tribes of course. It has to be culturally relative!
Hypocrisy in applying standards only where and when convenient – preferably to your own political advantage – is unforgivable. More, it is uncivilised. In fact it is one of the clearest signs of people working to undermine anything that could be called civilisation… again, usually for their own political advantage.
The only real test of a person’s political trustworthiness is whether they can recognise, and reject, hypocrisy. Those that recognise it, but take advantage of it, are scum. Those who fail to recognise it, are simply beneath contempt.
What a pity so many of them hold high office.
I have got more than a little sick of self righteously high minded pratts preaching about the nobility of their ideas, and then failing to admit that they only hold those ideas when convenient to their politics. This sort of hyprocrisy is, to me, the worst possible failing of any politician, or idealist or idealogue of any sort.
Not acknowledging it is a clear statement that the person is an unprincipled shit, out only for what they can get.
Not recognising that there is any hypocrisy, is the sign of being too stupid to be trusted to run a church cake stall, let alone have a say in any policy on anything that might ruin people’s lives. (Sorry, forgot. Church cake stalls are illegal in the Victorian nanny state… OH&S issues and public liability now making baking a cake for privatye sale a criminal enterprise unless your kitchen passes health department guidelines, and your cake is plastic sealed and labelled with a complete list of ingredients, their origins, and the name, address and shoe size of the person who baked it…. Alright the shoe size is an exaggeration, but you get the point.)
Unhappily, the vast majority of modern politicians, journalists, lobbyists, and lawyers, are screaming hypocrites. Professionally. In fact they could not do their jobs unless they can either ignore the truth, or not recognise it in the first place.
There was a fabulous example quoted on the radio today. A few years ago a police car entered the men’s ceremonial area of a remote Australian Aboriginal tribe, with… a woman in it! Now the media had a field day with the ‘disrespect’ element of this, because of course cultural relativism argues that such a thing was disrespectful. But to do so the media happily quoted an Aboriginal elder who stated that, had the female been Aboriginal, she would have automatically been killed.
The fact that they quoted this was not a problem. It is a true reflection of Aboriginal culture. It was a true statement by the elder concerned. It was accepted by all who new the facts as a statement of reality. And, most importantly I suppose, it fitted the argument of how ‘disrespectful’ the female police officer was being to Aboriginal culture.
The problem is of course, that the statement that Aborigines reserve the right to murder women who are Australian citizens, was not remarked upon by anyone in the media. Not one single member of the press who commented on it that day thought it was a problem. (Others did later of course.) Not even the many hard line Feminists who had raged against the white ‘oppression’ of Aboroiginal culture seemed to think that it was a problem. Apparently, Aborigines are allowed to oppress women as much as they like in the eyes of an Australian Feminist, because Aborigines – also being victims of white male oppression – clearly have the right to hang on to a culture that oppresses women. In fact any attempt to stop them doing so must be racist.
Now I realise that the self avowed ‘left’ in politics has to find, or invent, causes to rage about to get people who are young enough or stupid enough motivated. (I frankly agree with the old joke that if you are not Socialist when you are 20 you have no heart – we know people’s rationalty is not fully developed until 24 or 25 – and that people who are still socialist at 40 have no brain.) But that does not excuse hypocrisy.
If you genuinely believe (as I do) that women are equal, and deserve equal rights, then you believe it for all women, in any culture. Not just for the ones who will vote for that, and not excluding the ones for whom you can get more mileage from denying those rights in the name of another supposedly honourable cause.
The reason that a police car was on the ‘men’s reservation’ in the first place, was because Australian police have the unfortunate task of trying to protect Aboriginal women from Aboriginal men despite the efforts of our Socialists and Feminists and lawyers and judges to keep them properly subjugated in the name of cultural relativity.
A court case at a similar time was about a 13 year old aboriginal girl who had been raped by a 50 year old aboriginal man. The judge was presented with serious arguments that the case be thrown out because the girl had been promised to the man as a bride by her family. (In fact her grandmother assisted with the rape!) Sad to say the cultural relativists have such a sway over the Australian legal system that the judge initially delivered a sentence of only a few weeks, explaining that the case fit more within ‘traditional cultural law’ than in modern Australian law.
Or, in other words, Australian female citizens should have no protectioin from murder or rape if that happens to fit the cultural practices of the primitive uneducated hunter gatherer tribe from which they come. (And why are they uneducated? Because the cultural relatavists have forced the missions and schools to stay away from the ‘purity’ of aboriginal tribal life… for their own good of course.)
Presumably this same approach will soon be available throughout Australia to Muslims in favour of female circumcision or honor killing, to New Guineans who would like to hang on to tribal cannabalism, and to Indians in favour of Suti. As long as they only practice it on members of their own tribes of course. It has to be culturally relative!
Hypocrisy in applying standards only where and when convenient – preferably to your own political advantage – is unforgivable. More, it is uncivilised. In fact it is one of the clearest signs of people working to undermine anything that could be called civilisation… again, usually for their own political advantage.
The only real test of a person’s political trustworthiness is whether they can recognise, and reject, hypocrisy. Those that recognise it, but take advantage of it, are scum. Those who fail to recognise it, are simply beneath contempt.
What a pity so many of them hold high office.
Thursday, November 10, 2011
Rating General Wavell
Archibald Wavell is probably the most difficult general of the Second World War to give a fair rating. His achievements against the odds are almost as astonishing as his failures to deliver anything final. He was undoubtedly a great man, and some of his actions argue that he was a great general. But those flaws...
His achievements are well known. He used O'Connor's tiny Western Desert force to blitzkreig an Italian army ten times its own size, and send them scurrying back in ignominy. He then conquored an equally large force in Italian East Africa with a classic double pincer, while cleaning up various other minor problems in Palestine, Iraq, Vichy Syria, etc. He ran 9 major campaigns in a little over two years, most of them successful, despite an appalling inferiority in men and materiel.
Meanwhile
However his failings are equally well known. He let the Italians in Libya off the hook when they were defeated, allowing them to recover while he concentrated on Italian East Africa. The Italo/German counter-attack took him completely by surprise. he was talked into vainglory in Greece despite his doubts, and put the British war effort back two years by losing many crack troops and much vital equipment in a 'forlorn hope'. It was to take years of hard slogging to retrieve the position lost by these decisions.
Almost as bad, when Churchill despatched him to 'sit under a pagoda tree' in India, he found himself caught up in the maelstrom of the Japanese blitzkreig through the American, British and Dutch possessions in Asia. Here he once again badly underestimated his enemy, and his direct interference amongst the commanders in the field of battle (whether undermining Percival without sacking him, or supporting Bennett without recognising him as a hopeless windbag, or imposing Hutton into a field command - Burma - he was not suitable for), had consequences that only avoiding being disastrous themselves because the situation was already so bad that they became mere icing on the cake.
On the success side, it is no small consideration to wonder which other general could have done what he did with so few resources. His victories in North Africa and East Africa and the Middle East were run on a shoestring that would have given Montgomery hives, and Eisenhower fits. (MacArthur would have thrown a tantrum and refused to even have tried without better resources.) None of the successful Allied generals of later in the war came anywhere near achieving what he did with so few resources, and arguably none of them could have. (Though I note that O'Connor was the one who actually did the heavy lifting, and may well have been able to repeat the exercise later...)
On the other hand his mistakes are dire. The decision to take advantage of some passing transport to remove the crack 4th Indian division from O'Connor's successful advance and send them to East Africa was a classic example of undermining a winning hand. Even after the Australian 6th division almost made up the weight, by continuing the pursuit well into Libya, he felt the need to undermine the effort again by looking at Greece. When Rommel arrived in Libya he had only a recconnassaince battalion to try and stop the British advance. Had Wavell let them finish the job, Libya would have fallen in 1941! (And possibly Rommel spent the rest of the war in a POW camp). Had the 4th Indian been still present, or the Australian 7th been heading there instead of to Greece, it would have been a certainty.
Greece was an even worse mistake. Certainly Churchill had been enthusiastic, and certainly there was a moral advantage to helping anyone willing to stand up to Hitler. But Wavell had a duty to, as Brooke put it, finish one job before starting another. Particularly jobs won with so much blood. His succumbing to Eden and Dill's overenthusiasm (despite Churchill's last minute words of caution), was hardly the stuff of inspiring legends.
A standout intellectual general, Wavell had delivered a series of lectures entitled 'Generals and Generalship' during the 1930's which had been avidly consumed by international officer training schools. (It is notable that while Wavell had a book if poems beside his bed during the North African campaigns, Rommel kept a translated copy of Wavell's book beside his.)
Wavell was one of three possible choices for Chief of Imperial General Staff (CIGS) in 1938, and, to the minds of men who later held the post like Dill and Brooke, he was undoubtedly the stand out. Unfortunately a smart-arse politicians did what they do best, and appointed an attractive looking junior as a PR exercise (excusing Lord Gort's obvious limits with the idea that his deputy Adam would be able to do the thinking for him). The decision to send Wavell to the Middle East instead was thereafter considered either a godsend (at least until 1941), or a mistake (thereafter).
Would Wavell have made a better CIGS? than Gort? Definitely. Certainly he was unlikely to run off to the excitement of being commander of the BEF and taking most of the the War Office with him. He would almost certainly have appointed either Dill or more likely the bilingual and French raised Brooke to run the BEF, and the army and nation would have been much better off.
On the other hand his greatest failing was his inability to communicate with the politicians. He had written extensively on the importance of good communications between pollies and generals, and it had been a key part of his famous lectures, but he was not able to live up to it in the field. Brooke repeatedly appealed to him to talk to Churchill, or write chatty letters, but Wavell did not fit that mold. (It might just have been Churchill I suppose, a notoriously difficult character. But the point of Wavell's writings was the need to get on with any political leader.)
In retrospect if Wavell had been CIGS in 1938 - 1941, and had stood down for Brooke thereafter, the result might have been better for all. Particularly if Wavell had then been assigned a post that ideally suited his skills, such as co-ordination with the Soviets. (One of the several languages he spoke was Russian, and he had done extensive travel and research in Russia. He was one of the few men in the war who stood up to Stalin and made passionate speeches at Russian dinners that even Stalin applauded.)
But speculation aside, Wavell must be judged on what he actually achieved, and here he is certainly the most difficult assessment of the Second World War.
He did what few others could have done in the vital points in the lean years. Tick. But undid much of it through bad communication with the politicians. Cross. ( I am including Greece in this category). He was a disaster in ABDA, but was possibly too exhausted and sick to be blamed for that. (A sign of superiors making the wrong assignments at the wrong time.) Then he blotted his copybook further by letting the retreating Burma Army be treated with contempt by Eastern command... or perhaps by not paying adequate attention to be aware of what was going on. And by disastrous attempts at offensives by the Eastern Command later. (So even the common soldier, who had worshipped him in the early years, suffered in the latter.)
Perhaps this was not his fault. Brooke felt before Wavell's sacking that he was exhausted and needed several months rest at home. Certainly he had held a crucial position through more stress just in Middle East command longer than any other Allied general held for the whole war. Unfortunately Churchill did not want him in London, available to stir up unrest in parliament, and sent him to what he hoped would be a quiet zone just in time to face, and fail, new threats. Even then, his failure there was probably more from being assigned to a post in charge of an area of which he new nothing, more than it was to inadequate resources. (After all, he had achieved miracles with inadequate resources when given time to prepare and in an area he knew reasonably well.)
So was Wavell a goood general, or a bad one?
He was certainly better than many who got more credit for doing far easier jobs later. He had better understanding of strategy than Dill or Marshall (but not better than Brooke or MacArthur); better grasp of theater command than Eisenhower or Alexander (but not Nimitz or Brooke), and better leadership of troops than Bradley or Anderson (but not Montgomery or Truscott). So in practical terms he was one of the best all round generals of the war, which means he may well have shone in the roles that Dill or Marshall or Eisenhower or Alexander or Bradley or Anderson received undeserved credit for.
His faults largely came down to being too deferential to his political superiors, and to being misused by them. Which in the end means that his superiors were at fault for asking the impossible too many times, and never giving him a break with adequate guidance or support.
Wavell had the potential to be, and in many ways was, one of the best generals on any side during the war. But he was asked to do what very few others could have attempted, and thus weaknesses of character that most of his contemporaries in simpler roles could hide eventually came out. Brooke, who did seem to understand his strengths and weaknesses, did his best to help him once he became CIGS, but too late.
In the final analysis, Wavell deserves to be ranked as a very good general. Like all of them he had failings, but these only became a problem when he was used and abused by his superiors. In fact I would write off all his problems in the Far East, where he was ignorant and exhausted (and later injured), and concentrate on the two mistakes that do reflect badly on him. Not finishing a defeated enemy in Libya, and letting his desire to please the politicians divert his attentions to Greece despite the obvious risks.
The second was the fault of his superiors (particularly Eden and Dill, but Churchill included), and he should get some consideration for letting his repeated demands that generals bow to the politicians undermine his judgement. Unforgiveable, but perhaps understandable.
But the lack of resolve that did not finish the defeated enemy in the Libyan campaign before starting two other campaigns can't be written off as the result of outside pressure. This was his mistake, and largely his alone. It is impossible to imagine Brooke or Montgomery or Patton or Truscott making such a mistake. This, and this alone drops him from the ranks of top generals.
Considering what he did achieve, this is a harsh judgement. Particularly considering that so many other generals later in the war had much easier paths to being considered 'great'. (Montgomery and Patton included.) But nonetheless the key to moving from what Montgomery called 'a good plain cook', to genuine greatness: must include the killer instinct, and a ruthless will to pursue it. Wavell, the brilliant academic and passionate poet, was just too much of a gentleman (in both senses) to cross the line.
His achievements are well known. He used O'Connor's tiny Western Desert force to blitzkreig an Italian army ten times its own size, and send them scurrying back in ignominy. He then conquored an equally large force in Italian East Africa with a classic double pincer, while cleaning up various other minor problems in Palestine, Iraq, Vichy Syria, etc. He ran 9 major campaigns in a little over two years, most of them successful, despite an appalling inferiority in men and materiel.
Meanwhile
However his failings are equally well known. He let the Italians in Libya off the hook when they were defeated, allowing them to recover while he concentrated on Italian East Africa. The Italo/German counter-attack took him completely by surprise. he was talked into vainglory in Greece despite his doubts, and put the British war effort back two years by losing many crack troops and much vital equipment in a 'forlorn hope'. It was to take years of hard slogging to retrieve the position lost by these decisions.
Almost as bad, when Churchill despatched him to 'sit under a pagoda tree' in India, he found himself caught up in the maelstrom of the Japanese blitzkreig through the American, British and Dutch possessions in Asia. Here he once again badly underestimated his enemy, and his direct interference amongst the commanders in the field of battle (whether undermining Percival without sacking him, or supporting Bennett without recognising him as a hopeless windbag, or imposing Hutton into a field command - Burma - he was not suitable for), had consequences that only avoiding being disastrous themselves because the situation was already so bad that they became mere icing on the cake.
On the success side, it is no small consideration to wonder which other general could have done what he did with so few resources. His victories in North Africa and East Africa and the Middle East were run on a shoestring that would have given Montgomery hives, and Eisenhower fits. (MacArthur would have thrown a tantrum and refused to even have tried without better resources.) None of the successful Allied generals of later in the war came anywhere near achieving what he did with so few resources, and arguably none of them could have. (Though I note that O'Connor was the one who actually did the heavy lifting, and may well have been able to repeat the exercise later...)
On the other hand his mistakes are dire. The decision to take advantage of some passing transport to remove the crack 4th Indian division from O'Connor's successful advance and send them to East Africa was a classic example of undermining a winning hand. Even after the Australian 6th division almost made up the weight, by continuing the pursuit well into Libya, he felt the need to undermine the effort again by looking at Greece. When Rommel arrived in Libya he had only a recconnassaince battalion to try and stop the British advance. Had Wavell let them finish the job, Libya would have fallen in 1941! (And possibly Rommel spent the rest of the war in a POW camp). Had the 4th Indian been still present, or the Australian 7th been heading there instead of to Greece, it would have been a certainty.
Greece was an even worse mistake. Certainly Churchill had been enthusiastic, and certainly there was a moral advantage to helping anyone willing to stand up to Hitler. But Wavell had a duty to, as Brooke put it, finish one job before starting another. Particularly jobs won with so much blood. His succumbing to Eden and Dill's overenthusiasm (despite Churchill's last minute words of caution), was hardly the stuff of inspiring legends.
A standout intellectual general, Wavell had delivered a series of lectures entitled 'Generals and Generalship' during the 1930's which had been avidly consumed by international officer training schools. (It is notable that while Wavell had a book if poems beside his bed during the North African campaigns, Rommel kept a translated copy of Wavell's book beside his.)
Wavell was one of three possible choices for Chief of Imperial General Staff (CIGS) in 1938, and, to the minds of men who later held the post like Dill and Brooke, he was undoubtedly the stand out. Unfortunately a smart-arse politicians did what they do best, and appointed an attractive looking junior as a PR exercise (excusing Lord Gort's obvious limits with the idea that his deputy Adam would be able to do the thinking for him). The decision to send Wavell to the Middle East instead was thereafter considered either a godsend (at least until 1941), or a mistake (thereafter).
Would Wavell have made a better CIGS? than Gort? Definitely. Certainly he was unlikely to run off to the excitement of being commander of the BEF and taking most of the the War Office with him. He would almost certainly have appointed either Dill or more likely the bilingual and French raised Brooke to run the BEF, and the army and nation would have been much better off.
On the other hand his greatest failing was his inability to communicate with the politicians. He had written extensively on the importance of good communications between pollies and generals, and it had been a key part of his famous lectures, but he was not able to live up to it in the field. Brooke repeatedly appealed to him to talk to Churchill, or write chatty letters, but Wavell did not fit that mold. (It might just have been Churchill I suppose, a notoriously difficult character. But the point of Wavell's writings was the need to get on with any political leader.)
In retrospect if Wavell had been CIGS in 1938 - 1941, and had stood down for Brooke thereafter, the result might have been better for all. Particularly if Wavell had then been assigned a post that ideally suited his skills, such as co-ordination with the Soviets. (One of the several languages he spoke was Russian, and he had done extensive travel and research in Russia. He was one of the few men in the war who stood up to Stalin and made passionate speeches at Russian dinners that even Stalin applauded.)
But speculation aside, Wavell must be judged on what he actually achieved, and here he is certainly the most difficult assessment of the Second World War.
He did what few others could have done in the vital points in the lean years. Tick. But undid much of it through bad communication with the politicians. Cross. ( I am including Greece in this category). He was a disaster in ABDA, but was possibly too exhausted and sick to be blamed for that. (A sign of superiors making the wrong assignments at the wrong time.) Then he blotted his copybook further by letting the retreating Burma Army be treated with contempt by Eastern command... or perhaps by not paying adequate attention to be aware of what was going on. And by disastrous attempts at offensives by the Eastern Command later. (So even the common soldier, who had worshipped him in the early years, suffered in the latter.)
Perhaps this was not his fault. Brooke felt before Wavell's sacking that he was exhausted and needed several months rest at home. Certainly he had held a crucial position through more stress just in Middle East command longer than any other Allied general held for the whole war. Unfortunately Churchill did not want him in London, available to stir up unrest in parliament, and sent him to what he hoped would be a quiet zone just in time to face, and fail, new threats. Even then, his failure there was probably more from being assigned to a post in charge of an area of which he new nothing, more than it was to inadequate resources. (After all, he had achieved miracles with inadequate resources when given time to prepare and in an area he knew reasonably well.)
So was Wavell a goood general, or a bad one?
He was certainly better than many who got more credit for doing far easier jobs later. He had better understanding of strategy than Dill or Marshall (but not better than Brooke or MacArthur); better grasp of theater command than Eisenhower or Alexander (but not Nimitz or Brooke), and better leadership of troops than Bradley or Anderson (but not Montgomery or Truscott). So in practical terms he was one of the best all round generals of the war, which means he may well have shone in the roles that Dill or Marshall or Eisenhower or Alexander or Bradley or Anderson received undeserved credit for.
His faults largely came down to being too deferential to his political superiors, and to being misused by them. Which in the end means that his superiors were at fault for asking the impossible too many times, and never giving him a break with adequate guidance or support.
Wavell had the potential to be, and in many ways was, one of the best generals on any side during the war. But he was asked to do what very few others could have attempted, and thus weaknesses of character that most of his contemporaries in simpler roles could hide eventually came out. Brooke, who did seem to understand his strengths and weaknesses, did his best to help him once he became CIGS, but too late.
In the final analysis, Wavell deserves to be ranked as a very good general. Like all of them he had failings, but these only became a problem when he was used and abused by his superiors. In fact I would write off all his problems in the Far East, where he was ignorant and exhausted (and later injured), and concentrate on the two mistakes that do reflect badly on him. Not finishing a defeated enemy in Libya, and letting his desire to please the politicians divert his attentions to Greece despite the obvious risks.
The second was the fault of his superiors (particularly Eden and Dill, but Churchill included), and he should get some consideration for letting his repeated demands that generals bow to the politicians undermine his judgement. Unforgiveable, but perhaps understandable.
But the lack of resolve that did not finish the defeated enemy in the Libyan campaign before starting two other campaigns can't be written off as the result of outside pressure. This was his mistake, and largely his alone. It is impossible to imagine Brooke or Montgomery or Patton or Truscott making such a mistake. This, and this alone drops him from the ranks of top generals.
Considering what he did achieve, this is a harsh judgement. Particularly considering that so many other generals later in the war had much easier paths to being considered 'great'. (Montgomery and Patton included.) But nonetheless the key to moving from what Montgomery called 'a good plain cook', to genuine greatness: must include the killer instinct, and a ruthless will to pursue it. Wavell, the brilliant academic and passionate poet, was just too much of a gentleman (in both senses) to cross the line.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)