I have been reading the recent biography of
the British CIGS Alanbrooke, and been struck by the clear and concise
explanation of the differences between the British and Americans over the
‘second front’ in Europe, and when it could be.
Even pre the American entry to the war, the
‘Germany first’ principle had been
agreed between Churchill and Roosevelt. After American entry, and despite the
immediacy of the Japanese threat, the same principle was reinforced. And it was
a principla that Marchall and his handpicked planner Eisenhower, thought very
sensible.
One of the first agreements between the
Allies was for ‘Bolero’, which was an American buildup in Britian in
preparation for a future invasion. It was very clear in the dark days of early
1942 that this would be a long term proposition, but it was always hoped that
circumstances might change enough to make it possible in the shorter term, and
the intention was to have as much ready to go as possible, and as soon as possible.
A plan put together for the incredibly
unlikely event of sudden German collapse, was Sledgehammer. This was the
understtanding of Sledgehammer adopted by most Americans. A very limited
offensive by very inadequate forces, which could only succeed had Germany
already gone close to collapse. Given the circumstances this was somewhat
delusional, but it never hurts to plan for eventualities, and the British were
happy to go along with this sort of plan.
[Even in the dark days of March to April
1942 when the Phillipines and Malaysia and the Netherlands East Indies had
fallen; Burma and New Guinea were under threat; Rommel wa advancing in North
Africa; the German armies in Russia were closing in on the Middle East
oilfields (which meant the British were actually withdrawing units previously
assigned Egyptian and Burmese defences to concentrate them in Iran/Iraq to face
the Germans); and the Atlantic war was in it’s second ‘happy time’ for
U-boats.]
The more likely possibility of needing to
take desperate action in 1942, and the one that the British were more concerned
about as possible trigger Sledgehammer, was the possible need to distract the
Germans to fend off iminent Russian collapse. Such a desperate and sacrificial
move to keep a major ally in the war was depressingly familiar to the British
higher command. They had been forced to do the same thing a coupe of times
during the Great War to keep the French army from collapsing. (Some of these
desperately needed sacrifices are now decried by ‘right thinking’ historians as
classic examples of mindless stupidity, but nontheless the Somme and similar actions did do what they
were supposed to do at the time, and kept the French going.)
Any attempt at Sledgehammer would of course
have failed. The German army had not yet been bled dry on the Eastern front,
and the Luftwaffe was still a terrifying force which could be (and regularly
was) easily moved from Russian mud to Mediterranean sunshine and back again in
mere weeks.
Even ignoring the opposition, the British
were gloomily aware that the Americans had not a clue of the complexities of
such a huge amphibious operation. At the time of discussion – May 1942 – the
British were using their first ever Landing Ship Tanks and troopships equipped
with landing craft to launch a Brigade size pre-emptive operation against the
Vichy French on Madagascar. (Another move many historians think was useless.
But coming only months after the Vichy had invited the Japanese into Indo-China
– fatally undermining the defenses of Malaya – and the Germans into Syria, it
was probably a very sensible precaution. Certainly Japanese submarines based in
Madagascar would could have finally caused the allies to lose the war at sea!)
The British deployed two modern aircraft
carriers, and a fleet of battleships, cruisers, destroyers and escorts and a
large number of support ships, on this relatively small operation. It was the
first proper combined arms amphibious operation of the war, and was very
helpful to the British to reveal the scale of amphibious transport needed for
future operations. By contrast the US Marines hit Guadalcanal 6 months later
from similar of light landing craft, and with virtually the same Great War
vintage helmets and guns, that the ANZACS had used at Gallipoli. Anyone who
reads the details of the months of hanging on by the fingernails at Guadalcanal
against very under-resourced Japanese troops, will be very grateful that the
same troops did not have to face veteran German Panzer divisions for several
years.
So I do not know of any serious historian
who imagines that an invasion of France in 1942 could have led to anything
escept disaster. There are no serious generals who thought it either. (Only
Marshall and his ‘yes-man’ Eisenhower consistently argued that it might be
possible. And Eisenhower later came to realise – when he was incharge of his
third or fourth such difficult operation himself – that his boss was completely
delusional in his underestimation of the difficulties involved. See ‘Dear
General’ for Eisenhowers belated attempts to quash Marshalls tactical ignorance
about parachute drops and dispersed landings for D-Day.)
In practice no matter how much Marshall pushed
for it, only British troops were availabe for such a sacrificial gesture, and
the British were not unnaturally reluctant to throw away a dozen carefully
nurtured and irreplaceable divisions on a ‘forlorn hope’, when they would prefer
to save them for a real and practical invasion… When circumstances changed
enough to make it possible.
Unfortunately Roosevelt told the Soviet
foreign minister Molotov that ‘we expect the formation of a second front this
year’, without asking even Marshall, let alone wihtout consulting his British
allies who would have to do it with virtually no American involvement. The British
Chiefs of Staff only had to show Churchill the limited numbers of landing craft
that could be available, and the limited number of troops and tanks they could
carry, to make it clear that this was ridiculous. Clearly this stupidity was
just another example of Roosevelt saying stupid things without asking anyone
(like ‘unconditional surrender’) that did so much to embitter staff relations
during the war, and internationaly relations post war. But it seems likely that
the British refusal to even consider such nonsense was taken by Marshall and
Stimson as a sample of the British being duplicitous about ‘examining planning
options’.
The British fixed on a ‘compromise’ to
pretend that a ‘second front’ could be possible. North Africa, could be
conquored without prohibitive losses. It was not ideal, and in practical terms
not even very useful. But it might satisfy the Americans and the Russians.
Nothing else could.
Marshall in particular spent the rest of
the war believing that when the British assessment clearly demonstrated that
action in Europe was impractical and impossible, they had just been
prevaricating to get what they always intended… Operations in the Med. In some
ways he was correct. The British had done the studies on France despite
thinking that it was unlikely they would be practical, and were proved right.
Marshall and Eisenhower had just deluded themselves into thinking an invasion
might be practical, and could not accept that there was not a shred of evidence
in favour of their delusion.
Which brings us to the debate about the
possibility of an invasion in 1943 – Roundup. Something that a surprising
number of historians, and even a few not entirely incompetent generals, have
suggested might have been possible, and should have been tried.
There are some points in their favour. The
invasions of North Africa definitely took resources that could have been built
up in Britain, and therefore slowed things down. (And the withdrawal of the new
escort carriers, escort groups, and shipping from the Battle of the Atlantic
for the North African adventure, definitely did huge damage in the loss of
shipping and supplies, slowing things down further.) As a result the huge
buildup in North Africa was much easier to use against Italy before moving on to
France. Certainly another distraction or delay… but only if you don’t think
that knocking Italy out of the war would make Germany weaker!
But once Sledgehammer was abandoned, this
operation was the only possible way to get US troops into combat in Europe,
short of shipping some to Russia. It was also the only possible way of coming
close to keeping Roosevelt’s ridiculous promise to the Russians.
Despite the belief by many that it was a
British goal, Torch was really just Churchill’s method of getting Roosevelt out
of domestic and international hole, and giving Marshall an advantage over King
in the ‘Germany first’ debate. It can’t be said that the British Chiefs of
Staff wanted it much. They would have preferred the resources to go to other
fronts. It can’t be said that the American Chiefs of Staff wanted it. It was
just the compromise they had to accept. It can’t even be said Churchill wanted
it greatly, except as a sop to Stalin and a leg up to Roosevelt, he would have
preferred other fronts too. Certainly it wasn’t the Russians who wanted it. The
only one who saw it as absolutely necessary was Roosevelt, and he dragged his Chiefs of Staff along for domestic
and international political reasons, not for reasons of strategy.
Unfortunately, the US Chiefs of Staff apparently
decided this was more British prevarication, designed to get America into
protecting purely British imperial interests like the route to India, rather
than a genuine addition to winning the war.
Again, there is some truth in this. The
British, who were primarily responsible for moving supplies worldwide to – keep
Allied populations fed and working; hold everywhere the Axis were attacking;
keep Russia in the war; and move Americans to where they would be needed for an
eventual operation in Europe – were absolutely fixated on the shipping needs.
Brooke was always absolutely convinced that opening the Med to allied shipping
– which would save the ten thousand mile diversion around Africa for everythig
going to and from the Middle East (oil, military forces, supplies to Russia,
etc), Russia, India and Australia – would save at least a million tons a year
in shipping, and allow that resource to be used for building up for, and then
having, an invasion. To this extent, the British fascination with ‘communications
with India’ is exactly what was worrying the British Chiefs of Staff.
Knocking Italy, it’s army, air force, and
particularly navy, out of the war, would also do more to release Allied forces
to face the Japanese and Germans, than any other single act the Allies could
realistically undertake on the short term. (This by the way, was what Churchill
meant when he referred to Italy as the ‘soft underbelly’. They were an easy and
soft target that would, and did, collapse quickly when pushed. The idea that he
was referring to the Italian peninsular as an ideal way to fight your way to
Germany is mischevious touble-making or outright delusion by far too many
commentators.)
Brooke later wrote that he could ‘never get
Marshall to appreciate that North African and Italian operations were all part
of the strategy preparing for the ultimate blow’.
Nonetheless it is wrong to think that the
British never had any intention of Roundup. Despite what Roosevelt and many
other Americans convinced themselves, the British were, at the start of 1942,
far more optimistic about the possibility of invading Europe through France in
1943 than they had been about Sledgehammer. Their studies seemed to show that
Germany would only have to be weaker, not suddenly collapse, to make invasion
in 1943 a realistic possibility. Realistic that is as long as the rest of the
plans for training and shipping troops, building and concentrating invasion
craft, and moving enough supplies to make it sustainable, all came together.
They didn’t.
For the British, the middle of 1942
revealed how little would be available in time for the middle of 1943. Even on
the best assumptions of American training and preparation, there was no chance
that the majority of forces for Roundup would not be British… assuming they
could supply them either. In practice mid1942 saw the Axis continue to advance
on every front. Burma collapsed; the Allied position in New Guinea was under
threat; the Japanese were still expanding to places like Guadalcanal; Rommel was
advancing in Egypt; the Germans were advancing on the Caucasian oil fields and
towards the Middle East; and more and more was needed just to keep Russia in
the war. As a result British troops, shipping and supplies were continuing to
flow away from Britain, not towards it.
Much of the Royal Navy was trying to save
the dangerous losses caused by King’s refusal to have convoys in American
waters (too ‘defensive minded’ he thought.) These alone, the worst 8 months of
the war, were threatening to scupper Roundup. The rest was so busily deployed
in the Indian and Pacific Oceans against the Japanese, or North Atlantic trying
to fight supplies through to Russia (a high proportion of tanks and planes
defending Moscow were British supplied), that there was virtually nothing left
in the Med to slow Rommels advance. The merchant ships surviving the fight
across the oceans were actually more vitally needed to take men and equipment
from the UK to other places than to bring in a buildup for the UK.
Nor was the American buildup going to plan.
Less well trained troops were becoming available too slowly, could not be
shipped in adequate numbers anyway, and were in no condition to face German
veterans. (The very best US units to go into action in 1942 – the marines in
Guadalcanal – and 1943 – the 1st infantry and 1st armour
which were actually professional troops not conscripts in North Africa – had
very steep learning curves. Particularly at Kesserine. They were clearly not
fit to face German veterans yet.
And American resource buildup was also not
up to promises. King and MacArthur were milking supplies far beyond what had
originally been agreed under ‘Germany first’. In practical terms they were
doing so for the same reasons the British were: an immediate desperate
situation had to be saved before a future ideal one could be pursued.
Nonetheless I have read all sorts of apparently serious suggestions that after North Africa was cleared, or at the very least after
Sicily was cleared, an invasion of France should have happened.
Delusional.
Before Italy had surrendered? While the
Italian fleet was still threatening allied shipping. While the Italian air
force was still threatening allied shipping. While 80 Italian divisions were
available to garrison not only Italy itself, but the Balkans, and a large part
of the Eastern Front!
Before the German army had suffered its
great losses of the 1943-44 Russian Winter, which, backed on to the need to
replace 80 Italian divisions and garrison the Balkans and fight in Italy
itself, halved the re-deployable strength of the German army?
Before Kursk? So the Allied invasion would
have arrived neatly in time to face all the powerful new German panzer
divisions that had not yet been sent to the eastern front!
Before the Luftwaffe was gutted by being forced up to fight the American daylight bombing campaign over Germany? (Or German industry seriously damaged by both that, and the British night bombing campaign.)
Before the U-boat campaign had been
defeated?
While the carrier battles in the Pacific
were still in the balance, at a time when the Americans were twice reduced to a
single carrier, and had to borrow a British one to make the Pacific fleet
viable?
Before the American ‘buildup’ had achieved
a fraction of the strength it needed?
Before enough invasion craft were even
available? (In 1944 the May attack was abandoned and the entire British
shipbuilding industry pulled off finishing new carriers and repairing merchant
ships to make up the shortfall in landing craft. Marshall finally noted in 1944
that apparently the problem was a shortage of some thing he had never heard of
called a Landing Ship Tank!)
While the Indian and Australian fronts
were on the edge and still drawing reinforcements, not able to release them to
other theatres?
That is when some lunatics think a second
front should have been launched in France.
Brooke’s comment is still the best.
They are right in thinking it will end the war
quickly, just not to our advantage.