tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1977310098529084891.post1163507996803330768..comments2024-02-27T02:19:19.667-08:00Comments on rethinking history: The British Pacific Fleet in 1945, an issue of academic honesty...Nigel Davieshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13176570029569275055noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1977310098529084891.post-51384956367091551272013-10-04T00:44:36.176-07:002013-10-04T00:44:36.176-07:00Agree with most of that, but not sure what 'Ge...Agree with most of that, but not sure what 'Genie' could be out of the bottle? <br /><br />Some people claim it was 'loss of empire', but decolonisation was planned and in progress anyway from India to Philippines. (In fact it was pursued with indecent haste post war regardless of whether some countries were ready or not).<br /><br />No, the question about post war 'balance of power' in Asia is all to do with perception and stability, and there is little doubt that had the Allied forces forcibly removed the Japanese, and cracked down on Communist insurgencies during wartime (as was done reasonably effectively even postwar in Malaya and Brunei and other places despite this failure), the Cold War would have been a lot more pleasant for most Asian people.<br /><br />Consider whether China would have necessarily gone communist? Korean war? Vietnam war? Pol Pot? Great Leap Forward? Burma? Worth at least idle speculation. Nigel Davieshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13176570029569275055noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1977310098529084891.post-39196674326800681302013-10-02T16:04:10.434-07:002013-10-02T16:04:10.434-07:00In general, the WWII literature seems to focus wit...In general, the WWII literature seems to focus with laser-like precision on Britain's 1st half defeats, while basically glossing over her 2d half victories (or qualifying them to death, as in Monty's el Alamein victory being "inevitable"). We also see disparaging comments about the British Army's "logistical conservatism" whereas the "dashing" Rommel is lauded - when in fact the British Army's logistical system (and the flexibility it developed) was a, perhaps the, decisive factor, in its many important victories. See French's Raising Churchill's Army for more in this regard.<br /><br />As for the BPF, Hobbs' book is on my list. I have read Smith's Task Force 57 which covers similar ground I think, though I'd guess in less detail. <br /><br />The BPF was something like 1/4 to 1/3 the size of the US Pacific fleet off Okinawa - certainly impressive in its own right. The fact that it was intentionally shunted off to subsidiary ops to keep it out of the limelight explains its low profile then and now. The fact that Britain could field such a force after 5 years of total war shows strength, not weakness.<br /><br />I tend to agree that amalgamating the E Indies and Pacific Fleets and concentrating on reconquering SE Asia would've made the most sense from geopolitical and narrower "Imperial" perspectives - but can also see the chiefs' POV wanted to be in on the final kill and part of the "main thrust." <br /><br />I'd bet CHurchill was thinking if the 14th Army & co had routed the Japanese from all of SE Asia the way it did in Burma (with help from the combined EI/BP fleets + some amphibious shipping), might've gone a long way to erasing the locals' memory of the disasters of '41-2 and made for more post-war stability.<br /><br />Or maybe the genie was out of the bottle by then. But it is a tantalizing what if.DB23noreply@blogger.com